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THE EXPRESSIVE POWER OF
ADJUDICATION
Richard H. McAdams*
This article provides a causal explanation of adjudicative com-
pliance that is distinct from both the court's threat of sanctions and its
institutional legitimacy. The new mechanism for compliance is the
power of adjudicative expression. The theory of "expressive adjudi-
cation" arises from a previously neglected synergy among three ex-
pressive concepts in game theory -correlated equilibria, focal points,
and signals. The article identifies the circumstances in which adjudi-
cative expression can, by itself, influence the behavior of existing dis-
putants and of future potential disputants. In each case, ambiguity in
the relevant facts or the concepts underlying intentional and sponta-
neous order can cause a conflict that clarifying expression resolves.
This expressive power explains otherwise puzzling instances of com-
pliance with tribunals that lack the power of sanctions, and unifies
theories of third-party norm enforcement with a theory of legal sanc-
tions. Finally, the article examines certain normative implications of
the expressive theory, including a novel function of adjudicative im-
partiality, a new justification for the system of public adjudication,
and a trade-off between dispute resolution and dispute avoidance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A major issue for legal theory and social science is why people obey
law. An important subset of that question is why people obey courts.' For
both the general and the specific question, there are two primary theories.
One dominant answer-nearly the only answer in economic theory-is that
the threat of sanctions motivate legal compliance. Rational and selfish in-
dividuals obey law because they otherwise risk governmentally imposed li-
ability or punishment.' In other words, law coerces. By contrast, sociology
and psychology tend to view obedience to law as the result of the individ-
ual's deference to the authority or legitimacy of law. Using a richer account
of human motivation, these approaches predict greater compliance when
the public views legal rules as being just-either because law produces
morally correct outcomes or because the law is created through a fair proc-
ess (or both).3 Here, we might say, law persuades.4
Despite the sharp differences in these two approaches, they seem to
share a common assumption: for individuals who are motivated by selfish-
ness, or for contexts in which selfish motives control, the only reason to
obey law is to avoid sanctions. Critics of economics think that economists
err by overestimating the role of selfish motivations, and therefore underes-
timating the role of the law's perceived legitimacy in generating compli-
1. More precisely, the question is why people comply as much as they do. Compliance with
courts-and the phenomenon of courts-are pervasive, as Martin Shapiro explains:
Cutting quite across cultural lines, it appears that whenever two persons come into a conflict that
they cannot themselves solve, one solution appealing to common sense is to call upon a third for
assistance in achieving a resolution. So universal across both time and space is this simple social
invention of triads that we can discover almost no society that fails to employ it.... In short, the
triad for purpose of conflict resolution is the basic social logic of courts, a logic so compelling that
courts have become a universal political phenomenon.
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1981).
2. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMICS OF LAW 568 (2004) for a compre-
hensive statement of the existing economics of public law enforcement, almost all of which concerns de-
terrence. Shaven and other economists also discuss the incapacitating effect of certain criminal punish-
ments such as prison, id. at 531-35; Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce
Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353 (1998), but that too is
an effect of the legal sanction. Even Shaven's discussion of rehabilitation, supra at 535-37, assumes the
imposition of sanctions.
3. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Paul Robinson & John Darley,
The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 468-70 (1997); Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest:
Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV.
475, 486-90. There are various causal stories. One possibility is that people defer to specific legal
rules they do not agree with because they think it fair, given that a fair process was used to create the
rules, or given that law more commonly does represent their moral views. Another possibility is that
law persuades individuals as to what the correct moral view is, though this may also depend upon a
general correspondence between the individuals' moral views and the law.
4. Yet a third, less established explanation of legal compliance views law as "constitutive" -that it
provides or at least influences the mental frames, categories, or schema by which individuals understand
and construct the social world. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truths, 26 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 5, 5-10 (2003); Suchman, supra note 3, at 490-92; Cass R. Sunstein, How Law Constructs
Preferences, 86 GEORGETOWN L.J. 2637 (1998). On framing generally, see Robert D. Benford & David
A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC.
611 (2000). Here too, law persuades but in a more covert and indirect manner.
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ance. But these critics seem to accept, along with Holmes,' that the "bad
man" who acts out of his own self-interest would have no reason to obey
law other than sanctions.
By contrast, Lon Fuller once suggested that sanctions and morality do
not exhaust the mechanisms of compliance.6 There are selfish reasons to
obey law other than the fear of governmentally imposed sanctions. In other
articles, I have developed this idea by focusing on the public's compliance
with a legislature's or executive's prospective rules.7 In this article, I instead
focus on disputants' compliance with an adjudicator's declared resolution of
their dispute.' My effort here is to supplement existing approaches by pro-
viding a new account of why people obey courts, a new causal story for the
effect of adjudication. When I say the effort supplements existing ap-
proaches, I mean it does not seek to displace the theories of sanctions or le-
gitimacy. There may come a time when empirical work will make it possi-
ble to choose decisively between different accounts, but for now I seek only
to add to the existing toolbox for understanding what law does.9
My account of adjudication is noncoercive and "expressive" in that it
focuses on what law says rather than the sanctions that law threatens. De-
spite this difference from the usual economic approach, this expressive the-
ory of adjudication relies on the methods of economics. To isolate my
causal claim from various legitimacy theories, I assume that individuals are
5. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW (1897).
6. Much that is written today seems to assume that our larger society is enabled to function by
a combination of the individual's moral sense and social control through the threatened sanctions
of state-made law. We need to remind ourselves that we constantly orient our actions toward one
another by signposts that are set neither by 'morals,' in any ordinary sense, nor by words in law-
books.
Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIs. 1, 36 (1969). As I show infra text accom-
panying notes 63-64, the "signpost" metaphor is quite appropriate; traffic situations provide useful exam-
ples of how law works expressively.
7. See Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the
Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2003); Richard H.
McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: Expressive Influence in
an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J. EMPRucAL LEGAL STUD. 87 (2005); Richard H. McAdams, An
Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 369 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1684 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, Focal Point].
8. I pursue the same general issue in Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in An-
archy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004),
where we presented a preliminary version of the theory developed below.
9. Though the existing toolbox is large, even nonstandard theories of compliance rely on the exis-
tence of legal sanctions or legitimacy. For example, some literature claims that law influences behavior by
changing its "social meaning." See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime,
27 J. LEGAL STuD. 609 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CMI. L. REV.
943 (1995). Others suggest that law changes behavior by shaping preferences. See Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1;
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 903 (1996). Yet both theories ap-
pear to require sanctions. Law changes social meaning because unregulated behavior that once "meant"
(or signaled) one set of attitudes or preferences may, after becoming legally obligatory, "mean" (or sig-
nal) only that one seeks to avoid legal sanctions. Certain consequences follow that will be missed if one
ignores the dimension of social meaning, but the first step in the causal chain remains the threat of sanc-
tions. Similarly, I understand Sunstein and Dau-Schmidt to view the imposition of criminal sanctions as a
necessary first step to changing preferences.
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more or less selfish and rational, or at least that they are motivated by self-
ishness in the particular context under discussion. The selfish motive to
comply may indeed be most important not when dealing with hypothetical
individuals who are entirely self-regarding, but instead when dealing with
individuals whose dispute arises because of conflicting moral principles. In
other words, when moral principles lead individuals into conflict, self-
interest may be the only motive that can lead them out. More generally,
the importance of a full understanding of legal compliance recommends
exhausting the implications of these simple assumptions in addition to con-
sidering the implications of richer accounts of human motivation. Finally,
understanding when selfish incentives for compliance do not otherwise exist
will provide a better understanding of when sanctions and legitimacy are
strictly required and what their unique contribution is.
The expressive theory of adjudication explored here synergistically
combines three ways that economics has of understanding communicative
influences: (1) as a device for creating a "correlated equilibrium;" (2) as a
"cheap talk" means of constructing a "focal point" around which individu-
als coordinate; and (3) as a signal of private information. Economic writ-
ings on a variety of topics try to use one of these three elements individually
to explain compliance with mediation or adjudication lacking the force of
sanctions (as in international law). Unfortunately, the individual contribu-
tions seem not to be aware of the existence of the others, much less the
common enterprise they share. One goal of this article is to bring together
these disparate writings for the first time and to recognize them as discuss-
ing the same broad topic-the expressive services a third party can provide
in resolving and avoiding disputes, services that do not require the power of
sanctions or legitimacy.
Existing theoretical work also suffers from a tendency to conflate the
different contributions of constructed focal points, signaling, and correlated
equilibrium. Another goal of this article is to resolve this confusion. Once
one is clear about the different elements of expressive adjudication, it is
easier to move to the final step, which is to identify the synergies of their
interaction. This article's primary contribution will be to explain how focal
points, signaling, and the correlated equilibrium concept work together and
reinforce each other. I first identify decisive objections to expressive theo-
ries based on any one of these mechanisms, but then show how, in combina-
tion, each mechanism solves the objections to the others.
To explain how courts influence behavior independent of their per-
ceived legitimacy and the sanctions they wield, one must engage in a pecu-
liar thought experiment imagining a court without two characteristics that
are important-some would say essential-to what courts are. As a result,
my method is to begin with what Martin Shapiro calls the "logic of the triad
in conflict resolution."1 I devote much of this article to describing an ex-
10. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 1.
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pressive influence a third party-any third party-might have over two par-
ties in a dispute. To identify the expressive power of a court judgment, I
focus only on the expressive power a third party wields when he declares to
disputants how they should resolve their dispute. This part of the article is
explicitly more about nonbinding arbitration and "evaluative" or "direc-
tive" mediation" -thus, about "expressive ADR" -than it is about actual
adjudication. But despite the current emphasis on ADR, I agree with
Shapiro that the distinctions drawn between contemporary courts and these
contemporary alternatives obscures some basic similarities between them."
Thus, to build a theory of expressive adjudication, one must explore the ba-
sic logic of the triad and discover the general power of third-party expres-
sion.
After discussing dispute resolution, I turn more clearly to a discussion
of adjudication-to the ability of courts or quasi-judicial bodies to influence
the behavior of those not a party to the dispute that prompts its decision.
This third-party influence comes from articulating rules. Even without the
power of sanctions or legitimacy, I claim that courts have some ability to set
precedent by clarifying the formal or informal rules governing the parties'
interactions in a particular context. Indeed, this is a power that seems to
justify some centralization of adjudication into a branch of government, and
which may be lost by dispute resolution outside of courts. After extending
the analysis to explain the expressive power of rule articulation-
adjudication proper-I also extend the analysis from two-party to multi-
party disputes.
A word about terminology: this article is about compliance, specifi-
cally, compliance with the declarations of arbiters and courts. The mecha-
nism I explore is expression-that in certain circumstances adjudicative ex-
pression has a power independent of legitimacy or sanctions. As a result, I
describe a theory of "expressive dispute resolution" and "expressive adju-
dication." I am not alone in using the term "expressive" to refer to the
law's ability to generate compliance by what it says independent of sanc-
tions." I note, however, that legal "expression" and related terms like "ex-
pressivism" play an important role in other domains of legal theory. Cer-
11. Here, I use the distinction drawn in the ADR literature between "evaluative" and "facilita-
tive" mediation or, more recently, between "directive" and "elicitive" mediation. See, e.g., RUSSELL
KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 357-65, 370 (2002); MEDIATION: THEORY,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 152, 155, 165, 180-01 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2001); Leonard L. Riskin,
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 4-5 nn.5-6 (2003). 1 suspect that all types of mediation involve expressive influences, but I
focus on the influence that arises from the third party declaring before both disputants how the dispute
should be resolved. Because courts make declarations, explaining the expressive power of third party
declarations will help to explain the expressive power of courts.
12. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 8-17; see id at 15 ("[J]udges tend to share the same means of conflict
resolution with other triadic figures, and most of those we would label judges engage in a great deal of
mediation").
13. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Alex
Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, On
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
[Vol. 20051048
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tain social science scholars make the positive claim that lawmakers select
the rules they do because of what they express, such as a status hierarchy or
a challenge to that hierarchy.' 4 Certain legal philosophers make the norma-
tive claim that law can be morally evaluated, in part, by what it expresses,
independent of its consequences. 5 This article does not significantly en-
gage either such claim, but instead advances a causal theory of legal com-
pliance.16
Having introduced in Part I the broad subject matter of this article,
Part II reviews and critiques the existing economic literature about what I
call expressive adjudication. There are three key ideas-that adjudication
"correlates" strategies, constructs "focal points," and signals information-
but in isolation none succeeds in explaining expressive power. Part III pre-
sents a new, integrated theory of expressive adjudication, explaining how
the three elements interact, each overcoming an objection to the other. I
explain how expressive adjudication works not only in cases of contested
facts, but also to resolve ambiguities in the concepts underlying formal or
informal order, creating precedent that influences future behavior as well as
resolving the immediate dispute. I also examine the necessary conditions
for the theory, which circumscribe the domain of disputes to which it ap-
plies. Part IV discusses some positive and normative implications of the
theory, including an explanation for otherwise puzzling compliance with
sanctionless adjudication, a unified theory of formal and informal third-
party sanctioning, and a trade-off between dispute resolution and dispute
avoidance. Part V concludes.
14. See, e.g., JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITIcs AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 177 n.83 (2d ed. 1986); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics,
Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1318 n.25 (2003);
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,416 n.18 (1999).
15. Some theorists claim that an appropriate normative theory forbids law that expresses an inap-
propriate inegalitarian meaning, such as racial inequality. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Injustice and the
Normative Nature of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REv. 578, 600 (2001); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Di-
mension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 18 n.13 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not
Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 723 (1998).
Other theorists claim that the social meaning of crime is essential to understanding its wrongfulness and
that an appropriate normative theory compels punishment that expresses the appropriate condemnation
of criminal acts. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRBUTIVISM AND
ITS CRITICS (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992). For a critique of such theories and an exchange, see Matthew D.
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Matthew D.
Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic 'Expression' and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply
to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
16. Although I do not here engage these other expressivist theories, there are some possible inter-
sections. Most obviously, if I am right that adjudicative expression influences behavior, it becomes even
more likely that individuals and interest groups will struggle against each other through adjudication.
No. 5] 1049
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II. DIVERGENT ECONOMIC THEORIES OF ADJUDICATIVE EXPRESSION:
A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE
Within law and economics, there is such a strong emphasis on sanc-
tions as the reason for legal compliance that one can fairly say that the dis-
cipline does not distinguish between the two questions "What is the effect
of the legal rule?" and "What is the effect of the legal sanctions?" In the
absence of sanctions, psychology and sociology still predict that individuals
may comply with legal rules out of deference to the perceived legitimacy or
authority of the law. Economics, however, would seem to predict no com-
pliance without sanctions.
There are, however, a few recent exceptions. A small rational-choice
literature has sought to explain how law influences behavior expressively by
what it says, independent of what it threatens.17 To date, this literature has
mostly addressed the expressive effects of statutory law and administrative
or executive decisions. This article asks, however, whether adjudication-
specifically, the judicial declaration resolving a dispute-can work expres-
sively. Does economics offer any selfish reason for the parties to a dispute
to obey a judicial declaration other than the threat of legal sanctions? The
scant literature giving an affirmative answers suggests three different theo-
ries: that adjudication is a device for (1) achieving a "correlated equilib-
rium," (2) constructing a focal point, and (3) signaling information. In this
Part, I describe the existing literature and elaborate on each theory. I also
provide a critique, finding each of the three expressive theories subject to
serious objection.
A. Adjudication as a "Correlated Equilibrium" Device
I begin with the most non-intuitive possibility - a game-theory idea
that is sufficiently esoteric to avoid much discussion in law and economics
texts.18 The idea of a "correlated equilibrium" is that, in some strategic
situations ("games"), it is a stable outcome for two individuals to condition
17. I discuss and cite particular works below. A general list of such scholarship includes the sources
cited supra notes 7 and 8; Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80
VA. L. REV. 323 (1994); Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Con-
structing the European Community's Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS,
INSTITI1ONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (J. Goldstein & R.O. Keohane, eds. 1993); Matthew C. Stephen-
son, "When the Devil Turns... ": The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL
STuD. 59 (2003); Iris Bohnet & Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?
(2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); J. Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, Why People
Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provisions of Public Goods (Jan. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
18. There is no entry for "correlated equilibria," "correlated strategies," or their originator "Robert
Aumann" in most leading law and economics texts. See DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW (1994); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2000); THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (1998); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998); SHAVELL, supra note 2.
1050 [Vol. 2005
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their behavior (technically, "actions" or "strategies" 9) on some observable,
random feature of the world. I explain the relevance correlated equilibria
may have to adjudication, extend the existing theory, and then describe
some critical objections to it.
1. Existing Literature
Game theory predicts behavior based on the idea of an equilibrium.
An outcome is a "Nash equilibrium" when, from that outcome, no individ-
ual has any incentive to switch strategies unilaterally; each is playing his
best response to what the others have done.2" In any game, there may be
one or multiple outcomes that satisfy this condition. Against this back-
ground, however, Nobel Laureate Robert Aumann noted that if the parties
have rich opportunities to communicate, they can sometimes create the
possibility, of an additional correlated equilibrium.21 Under some condi-
tions, if the individuals (technically, those in the game are "players," though
I will also use the term "parties" given my focus on disputes) mutually
agree to observe some random event, they will benefit by basing their ac-
tions on the outcome of the event. For example, one player might flip a
coin in the other's presence and each could then play a strategy that takes
one action when the coin comes up heads and another action when the coin
comes up tails. Or the parties might correlate their strategy on the random-
ized expression of a third party. As a result, the parties now have strategic
options that they did not have in the absence of communication. Some-
times these new strategies will make possible new correlated equilibria.
Jennifer Brown and Ian Ayres use this idea to explain one function of
mediation.22 They observe how a mediator could, by randomly choosing
between alternative resolutions of a dispute, produce a mediate solution
that enhances value for both disputants. They therefore claim to explain
both why the disputants would hire a mediator and why they would tend to
obey him. Brown and Ayres illustrate the point formally with the Battle of
the Sexes Game in Figure 1. (As is standard, each cell lists the payoffs for,
respectively, Player 1 and Player 2.) The players each choose between
Strategy 0 and Strategy B where matching the strategies (00 or BB) pro-
duces a higher payoff for both players than failing to match (OB or BO).
19. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 13 (3d ed. 2001) ("An action ... is a choice [a
player] can make."); id. at 16 (a "strategy... is a rule that tells [a player] which action to choose at each
instance of the game, given his information set.").
20. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 18, at 310 ("A pair of strategies will form a Nash equilibrium if
each strategy is one that cannot be improved upon given the other strategy.").
21. See generally Robert J. Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rational-
ity, 55 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1987); Robert J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strate-
gies, 1 J. MATH. ECON. 67 (1974). See also DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 53-60
(1991); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 244-58 (1991); RASMUSEN, supra
note 19, at 74-75, BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 63-79 (1996).
22. Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323
(1994).
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The two matching outcomes are equilibria (with payoffs of 1 or 5).1 The
two players each prefer reaching either equilibrium to either of the two
non-equilibrium outcomes (with payoffs of 0). But the players also have
conflicting preferences because each prefers a different equilibrium. In-
deed, if each player selects the strategy necessary to produce his desired
outcome (Player 1 picks 0 and Player 2 picks B), the result OB is one of
the non-equilibrium outcomes that is worse for both.
FIGURE 1
A BATrLE OF THE SEXES GAME
Player 2
0 B
Player 1 0 5,1 0,0
B 0,0 1,5
Figure 1 offers a good model for bargaining impasse, where each
threatens to walk away from negotiations and where there is some barrier
to a simple 50/50 split. One might imagine two divorcing spouses disputing
the allocation of two jointly owned properties (or two siblings disputing
jointly inherited property) where both prefer one to the other, but where
the second best property is better than failing to agree because non-
agreement forces a sale and loss of sentimental value. Or the game could
represent two businesses contemplating a merger where the two owners
have not yet agreed which of them will be the new CEO or what the new
firm's name will be; the failure to agree blocks the merger. All of these in-
dividuals lose by failing to agree, but each may purposely risk impasse to
get his preferred outcome.
Brown and Ayres claim that, in this situation, the parties would agree
to have a mediator announce a recommendation before they simultane-
ously select their strategies. The key assumption here, explored further be-
low, is that each player has a sufficiently large probability of "winning"
from the mediator a message to play his preferred equilibrium. Brown and
Ayres illustrate the point by assuming that the mediator randomly chooses
between the two messages "Play 0" and "Play B," so that each party has a
fifty percent chance of receiving the message he prefers. If so, then follow-
ing the mediator's recommendation improves the players' expected out-
come by giving each a fifty percent chance of his best outcome, a fifty per-
cent chance of getting his second best outcome, and a zero percent chance
of the noncoordinated outcome both wish to avoid.
The point can be made more precisely by comparing this result to the
"mixed strategy" equilibrium. In addition to choosing 0 or B, a party may
play a "mixed strategy" of choosing 0 with probability p and B with prob-
23. At 00, either player would be worse off being the only one to switch strategies because the
results OB and BO are worse for each (payoff of 0 instead of 1 or 5). The same is true of BB.
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ability (1 - p).24 There can be an equilibrium of mixed strategies. In Figure
1, the equilibrium occurs where Player 1 plays 0 eighty-three percent of the
time and B seventeen percent of the time, while Player 2 plays B eighty-
three percent of the time and 0 seventeen percent of the time. As a result,
they fail to coordinate seventy-two percent of the time and the expected
payoff for each is approximately .83.25 Now consider: if the parties know
the mediator will flip a coin and, depending on the results, announce "Play
0" or "Play B," then mutually following the mediator will eliminate the
noncoordinated outcome and produce an expected payoff of 3 for each, a
"more than a three-fold improvement over the unmediated mixed-strategy
equilibrium., 26  Thus, to solve a dispute that takes the form of a Battle of
the Sexes game, "a mediator... only needs randomly to select one of two
signals and transmit this signal to both parties."'27
As a terminological matter, I would not use "signal" to describe what
the mediator is doing here. What really matters to the Brown and Ayres
analysis is that if each party perceives ex ante that the mediator will recom-
mend the equilibrium he prefers with a fifty percent probability (or some-
thing close to it), and if each will then follow the mediator's advice, then
each will prefer mediating the dispute to not mediating. But it does not
matter how the mediator generates this perception, by promising to ran-
domize in some formal way or just by being unpredictable. 28 So the media-
24. See RASMuSEN, supra note 19, at 66 ("A pure strategy maps each of a player's possible informa-
tion sets to one action," while "a mixed strategy maps each of a player's possible information sets to a
probability distribution over actions."). Thus, given an information set, a "pure" strategy involves the
selection of a particular action with certainty, but a "mixed" strategy involves a player selecting at least
two actions with probabilities that sum to one.
25. At a mixed strategy equilibrium, each party is indifferent between the possible strategies one
can play because any will produce the same payoffs given the mixed strategy of the other player(s). One
can determine the mixed strategy equilibrium for these payoffs by defining p as the probability that Player
2 plays strategy 0, and determining what value p would have to take for Player 1 to receive the same pay-
offs from playing 0 or B. Player l's payoffs for 0 would then be [p(5) + (l-p)(0) = 5p]. Player l's payoffs
for B would then be [p(O) + (l-p)(1) = 1-p]. These two payoffs (5p and l-p) are equal when p = 1/6 (about
17%). So Player 1 is indifferent to the choice between 0 and B when Player 2 plays 0 with probability
1/6 and B with probability 5/6 (about 83%). Because the payoffs in Figure 1 are symmetrical, Player 2 is
indifferent to the choice between 0 and B when Player 1 plays 0 with probability 5/6 and B with prob-
ability 1/6.
Expected payoffs for the mixed strategy equilibrium are calculated by adding the products obtained
when one multiplies the probability of each outcome by the player's payoff for that outcome. The
probability of 00 is 5/36 and Player 1 will then receive a payoff of 5, so the expected gain from 00 is
.7. The probability of BB is 5/36 and Player 1 will then receive a payoff of 1, so the expected payoff
from BB is .14. The probability of either OB or BO is 26/36 and Player 1 receives a payoff of 0 so the
expected payoff from either form of noncoordination is 0. Player l's total expected gain is approxi-
mately .83. Because the payoffs are symmetric, the same result holds for Player 2.
26. Brown & Ayres, supra note 22, at 375. Each has a fifty-percent chance of receiving a payoff of 5
and a fifty percent chance of receiving a payoff of 1, for a total expectation of 3.
27. Id. at 375-76.
28. For example, a mediator might create the impression of giving each side an equal chance to
prevail, at least in the short run, by following a bizarre but nonrandom rule that no one can decipher, such
as: "alternate each mediation between ruling for and against the party with the most vowels in his or her
full name." Thus, the mediator is not signaling any private information (or even if one thinks of the bi-
zarre rule as private information, the effect on behavior is not that the parties update their beliefs about
anything that matters to their behavior).
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tor's message is not a signal of his private knowledge of anything such as
how a coin landed. 9 It is, in game theory parlance, "cheap talk."3
2. Extending Correlated Equilibrium Analysis
The BOS game models unequal equilibria, where the players disagree
on which outcome is best but agree on which outcome is worst.31 Unlike a
Prisoners' Dilemma, where "solving" the game means somehow moving
the players from the all-defect equilibrium to a cooperative outcome that
benefits both players,32 BOS involves a choice between inequalities.
Other games have these characteristics. 3 Now I want to extend the
correlated equilibrium analysis to a similar game-called Hawk/Dove or
Chicken-that I believe is better for modeling certain disputes.' Here,
each player chooses between an aggressive strategy-"Hawk"-where one
insists on getting one's way-and a passive strategy-"Dove"-where one
defers to others. In a two-person version, the game is Hawk/Dove when
both players rank the four possible outcomes as follows, starting with the
best: (1) playing Hawk against Dove; (2) playing Dove against Dove; (3)
playing Dove against Hawk; and (4) playing Hawk against Hawk. The pure
strategy equilibria are Hawk/Dove and Dove/Hawk; an example is Figure 2
below. The Dove/Dove outcome is attractive because it seems "fair," but
29. An interesting implication of this analysis concerns the need for some (but only some) imparti-
ality. For the theory to apply, the mediator cannot diverge too much from the perfect midpoint where
each party has a fifty-percent chance of winning. Otherwise, a party expecting the mediator to favor the
other party too much will prefer to play the game without mediation. However, the same analysis reveals
why the parties may comply even if they expect some divergence from perfect impartiality and precisely
how much "partiality" will be tolerated. See infra Part IV.B.1.
30. "Formally, cheap talk is defined as a message that does not directly affect the payoff of either
the message's sender or receiver." Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk
Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385,412 (1999); see Joseph Farrell & Mat-
thew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (1996). Below I argue that adjudication can work ex-
pressively as a signal. See infra Part I.C.1.
31. See THOMAS C. SCI{ELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICr 89 (1960). Schelling, calls these
situations "mixed motive" games because the players have both common and conflicting interests. The
common interest is in avoiding the outcome(s) they mutually regard as worst (in the BOS Game, OB or
BO; in the next game discussed in the text, Hawk/Hawk). The conflicting interest is over what outcome is
best (in the BOS Game, BB or 00; in the next game, Hawk/Dove or Dove/Hawk).
32. See RASMUSEN, supra note 19, at 20.
33. For example, see the discussion in ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-
OPERATION AND WELFARE 30,62-66 (1986), concerning the "attrition" game and the "Nash bargaining"
game.
34. See infra Figure 2.
35. At the outcome (Hawk, Dove), Player 1 does not want to switch strategies unilaterally because
he currently has a payoff of 4, while (Dove, Dove) would give him a payoff of 2. Similarly, at this point,
Player 2 does not want to switch strategies unilaterally because he currently has a payoff of 0, while
(Hawk, Hawk) would give him a payoff of -1. The same analysis applies to the outcome (Dove, Hawk);
thus, both are equilibria. By contrast, at (Dove, Dove), each receives 2 and either benefits by unilaterally
switching to Hawk, which against Dove produces 4. At (Hawk, Hawk), each receives -1 and either bene-
fits by unilateral switching to Dove, which against Hawk produces 0.
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it is not an equilibrium because each party would benefit by switching to





Player 1 Dove 2,2 0,4
Hawk 4,0 -1,-1
Note the formal difference in the games: in BOS, the two players each
rank both non-equilibrium outcomes as worse than either of the two equi-
librium outcomes, while in the Hawk/Dove (HD) Game the players rank
only one of the non-equilibrium outcomes-Hawk/Hawk-as worse than
either equilibrium. Each regards Hawk/Hawk as being worse even than
giving in to the other's demand (to play Dove against Hawk). Each ranks
Dove/Dove as being second best-better than one equilibrium (one's play-
ing Dove against Hawk) and worse than the other (one's playing Hawk
against Dove).
The HD Game does a better job than BOS of mapping onto real
world situations whenever the different ways of failing to coordinate pro-
duce these different sorts of rankings. For example, imagine two drivers
approaching an intersection on different roads, where each wants to pro-
ceed at his current speed while the other stops. Perhaps there is a line of
cars behind each driver so that stopping means a long delay waiting for all
the cars on the other road to proceed through the intersection. In this case,
Hawk is the strategy of driving on and Dove is the strategy of stopping.
There are two sorts of non-equilibrium outcomes-Dove/Dove means that
both cars stop, while the Hawk/Hawk outcome is a collision.37 Or, suppose
36. In Figure 2, the combination of payoffs at Dove/Dove (2 + 2) outcome is equal to the combina-
tion of payoffs at Dove/Hawk or Hawk/Dove (4 + 0). This is not necessary. The game could still have the
HD structure if the combined Dove/Dove payoffs were greater or lesser than the payoffs at the two equi-
libria. When the Dove/Dove payoffs are greater, because there is some joint gain from compromise, this
outcome is efficient (and therefore doubly attractive as being efficient and fair). Though not explicitly
referring to a Hawk/Dove game, Brown & Ayres demonstrate in such a situation case that a mediator
can, by making certain recommendations to each party, separately and privately, create a correlated equi-
librium in which the parties sometimes reach the efficient Dove/Dove outcome. Brown & Ayres, supra
note 22, at 377-78. This result gives a nice explanation of facilitative mediation or shuttle diplomacy.
By contrast, there are often economies of scale involved that make compromise-Dove/Dove-
inefficient, so it jointly pays less than the Hawk/Dove or Dove/Hawk outcomes. For example, as ex-
plained below, a dispute may concern property that is more valuable when used intact by one person
than when divided evenly between two. In this case, there is no particular advantage to a third party
giving recommendations separately and privately, as in facilitative mediation. However, there remains
the expressive power described in this article for publicly declared recommendations, as that of
evaluative mediators, arbitrators, and courts.
37. Obviously, if both cars stop, at this point, the drivers' decision about how to proceed also has
the structure of a Hawk/Dove game, because each prefers to go first but risks an accident if both try to
proceed first. (Dove/Dove is still better than playing Dove against Hawk because one at least preserves
the possibility of proceeding first.) One could combine the two (or more) stages-who stops and who
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two individuals are sitting near each other in a public place when one pulls
out a cigarette and the other requests that the first not smoke it. At this
point, Hawk is the strategy of insisting on getting one's way and Dove is the
strategy of giving in to the other's preference. Here, Dove/Dove may rep-
resent each party moving slightly away from their current location,38 while
the Hawk/Hawk outcome might be an embarrassing shouting match.
As the most general possibility, whenever the parties have a dispute
Dove/Dove may represent some compromise while Hawk/Hawk represents
violence.39 If two neighbors disagree about the precise location of their
shared property boundary, for example, we can think of Hawk as the strat-
egy of treating the disputed land as one's own and Dove as the strategy of
deferring to the other's claim. Imagine that the Dove/Dove outcome is to
split the disputed land equally, while Hawk/Hawk represents a physical
fight. In this case, although the outcome of Hawk/Hawk for each player is
uncertain - one might win or lose the fight - the expected value is the worst
possible outcome for both players because the cost of fighting is high rela-
tive to the value of the disputed resource. Both parties, of course, are sub-
ject to criminal punishment for assault, but deterrence of violence is obvi-
ously highly imperfect, which is one reason that a significant amount of
violent crime is a "self-help" remedy to a perceived loss of honor or prop-
erty.' The risk of costly but nondeterring criminal sanctions is merely an-
other reason that the violent outcome is the worst for everyone.4
Again, the players in this context will benefit if they correlate their
strategies with a mediator's randomly selected recommendation of one of
the two equilibria. Without anything to make either equilibrium focal, the
players may use a mixed strategy and reach equilibrium (given these pay-
offs and assuming risk neutrality) only when each plays Dove with prob-
ability 1/3 and Hawk with probability 2/3.42 For each player, the expected
proceeds first when both stop-into a single game. This game would no longer be Hawk/Dove but it
would still have multiple equilibria and still be subject to all the points made in the text.
38. Or Dove/Dove here might be a compromise of the smoker smoking just half a cigarette.
39. I use this game as a general model of disputes in articles discussing the expressive effects of law
outside the context of adjudication. See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 8, at 1235-36; McAdams &
Nadler, supra note 7, at 8; McAdams, Focal Point Theory, supra note 7, at 1674.
40. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, URBAN DANGER: LIFE IN A NEIGHBORHOOD OF STRANGERS 175-
86 (1981); RICHARD E. NISBETr & DoV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE
IN THE SOUTH 4 (1996); Donald Black, Crime as Social Control, 48 AMER. SOC. REV. 34, 39 (1983).
41. BOS and HD are two of the simplest mixed motive games. More complex games capture addi-
tional nuance. For example, a dispute may involve numerous stages of escalating conflict leading to a
final BOS or HD game. Or a dispute may be a "war of attrition" where each round is costly for each
player and the winner is the one willing to stay in the game the longest. See FUDENBERG & TIROLE, su-
pra note 21, at 119-26; SUGDEN, supra note 33, at 62-66. Or disputes may recur among players who rec-
ognize each other, so that each seeks each round to establish a reputation for playing aggressively. The
key is that most such games have multiple equilibria in which players mutually prefer to avoid outcomes
of the most costly conflict. Thus, in any such game, there remains an element of coordination. Because
the players' strategy choice then depends on expectations not entirely determined by the payoffs, there is
room for expressive influence.
42. As explained above, one can determine the mixed strategy equilibrium by defining p as the
probability that Player 2 plays strategy Dove and determining what value p would have to take for Player
1 to receive the same payoffs from playing Dove or Hawk. Player l's payoffs for Dove would then be
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value of the game at this equilibrium is .67." This payoff includes a 4/9
chance of the costly Hawk/Hawk outcome. By contrast, if the two players
designate a third party to randomly select one of the two equilibria, and
each player follows this recommendation, then the expected outcome for
each is now 2.' Because the third party mediator never recommends that
both players select Hawk, the mediator eliminates the possibility of a costly
Hawk/Hawk clash. The third party thereby creates a substantial expected
gain for each player.
In sum, the Brown and Ayres analysis appears to apply in a wide array
of circumstances, where adjudicative expression can influence the behavior
of disputants by creating a correlated equilibrium.
3. Two Problems for the Correlated Equilibrium Theory
One reaction to this analysis is to dismiss out of hand the idea that one
could resolve disputes by randomization. There may appear to be some-
thing amiss in equating dispute resolution with an essentially reasonless
process.45 Yet randomization is not so strange if one sees it as merely one
way of "splitting the difference." Ordinarily, compromising disputes in-
volves an intermediate solution where each side gets about half of what it
wants. Randomization is just a compromise where each side gets a fifty-
percent chance of getting what it wants.
Nonetheless, there are two important objections to the correlated
equilibrium theory: (1) the theory is not actually sufficient to show why
disputants would comply with the mediator; and (2) the theory implies that
the disputants would resolve their dispute without a third party. Moreover,
there is a third problem alluded to here that I describe further in a subse-
quent section.
The first problem is a gap in the application of correlated equilibrium
theory to mediation or adjudication. The theory demonstrates only the ex-
istence of a new equilibrium--one in which the two players correlate their
[p( 2 ) + (l-p)(0) = 2p]. Player l's payoffs for Hawk would then be [p( 4 ) + (1-p)(-1) = 5p -1]. These two
payoffs (2p and 5p - 1) are equal when p = 1/3. So Player 1 is indifferent between Dove and Hawk when
Player 2 plays Dove with probability 1/3 and Hawk with probability 2/3. Because the payoffs in Figure 1
are symmetrical, Player 2 is similarly indifferent when Player 1 plays Dove with probability 1/3 and Hawk
with probability 2/3.
43. Expected payoffs are calculated by adding the products obtained when one multiplies the prob-
ability of each outcome by the player's payoff for that outcome. Given the equilibrium probabilities, the
probability of Dove/Dove is 1/9 and Player 1 then receives a payoff of 2, so his expected gain from this
outcome is 2/9. The probability of Hawk/Hawk is 4/9 and Player 1 then receives a payoff of -1, so his ex-
pected payoff is -4/9. The probability of Dove/Hawk is 2/9 and Player 1 then receives a payoff of 0, so the
expected payoff is 0. The probability of Hawk/Dove is 2/9 and Player 1 then receives a payoff of 4, so the
expected is 8/9. The sum of these four products is 6/9 = 2/3. Because the payoffs are symmetric, the same
result holds for Player 2.
44. Each has a fifty-percent chance of receiving a payoff of 4 and a fifty percent chance of receiving
a payoff of 0, for a total expectation of 2.
45. Indeed, nothing in the theory of a correlated equilibrium would require that the adjudicator
understand or engage the reasons that the parties disagree, though we ordinarily think of that engage-
ment as central to adjudication.
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strategy with an observable event. By itself, the theory does not demon-
strate that the players will wind up at that equilibrium. To the contrary,
whenever there are multiple equilibria, the theory tells us only that these
are the possible outcomes, not which outcome will occur.
Brown and Ayres appear to avoid this problem by showing that it is in
the interest of the players to follow the correlated equilibrium created by
the mediator. But it is an error to think that the reason for compliance
flows simply from the calculations of expected payoffs. Given their as-
sumptions, Brown and Ayres only show that, prior to the mediator's an-
nouncement, each party would expect to improve his payoffs by hiring and
following the mediator's message, assuming that the other player would fol-
low it as well.' But is there any reason for one player to assume that the
other player will follow the announcement? Because the mediator's mes-
sage does not change the payoffs, even after the mediator endorses a par-
ticular outcome, the unendorsed equilibria stubbornly remain.
Perhaps the answer is that, when there are multiple equilibria, the
players tend to play the one that is mutually best, if there is one (and sub-
ject to other qualifications not relevant here). Thus, demonstrating that
both players expect to gain the most by obeying the mediator's recommen-
dation is arguably sufficient to show that they will obey him. But this does
not follow. The expected payoff analysis says that each player will be better
off obeying the mediator's recommendation given that the other player
does so. But we could also say the opposite: each player will be better off
doing the opposite of what the mediator recommended, given that the
other player does so.47 The equilibrium of both players doing the opposite
of what the mediator says has the same expected payoffs as both players
following the mediator. Yet this equilibrium represents perfect noncompli-
ance, which now makes it an odd representation of the power of mediation.
Another way to state this objection is to imagine what would happen
if there were another third party besides the mediator-an "interloper"-
who also communicates a randomly selected message favoring either Player
1 or Player 24 in the presence of both. Interlopers are common to disputes
because various bystanders may enjoy offering their opinion on how the
dispute should be resolved. Suppose that the mediator's and interloper's
46. The question of compliance arises ex post, after the message is given. But one can extend the
Brown & Ayres analysis (at least for a BOS game) by noting that ex post, after the adjudication, both par-
ties are still better off complying if the other complies. In their example, even the "loser" of the media-
tion is better off complying because his less preferred equilibrium, with an expected payoff of 1, beats his
mixed strategy equilibrium, with an expected payoff of .83.
47. Another problem here is that, in games other than BOS, it may no longer be the case that fol-
lowing the mediator is Pareto-dominant. That is, in contrast to the analysis in the last footnote, in some
games the player who loses the mediation will prefer going back to the mixed strategy equilibrium, which
is a reason to resist the mediator's message ex post. In the Hawk/Dove game of Figure 2, for example, the
expected outcome of the mixed strategy equilibrium (.67) is higher than the outcome of the "losing"
party-who expects zero playing Dove against Hawk in conformity with the mediator's message.
48. In this context, by a message "favoring Player 1," I mean one endorsing 00, which is Player l's
preferred equilibrium. Conversely, a message "favoring Player 2" would endorse BB, which is Player 2's
preferred equilibrium.
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messages conflict because one favors Player 1 and the other favors Player 2.
Compared to the mixed strategy equilibrium, both parties now gain from
either both following the mediator or both following the interloper (though
each prefers following one to following the other). The parties have merely
exchanged the coordination problem of choosing 0 or B with a coordina-
tion problem of following one third party (mediator) or another (inter-
loper). My point is not that Brown and Ayres are wrong about mediation,
but that there is a gap in the theory. They do not explain what it is about
the mediator's expression that will cause each player to expect the other to
follow it, rather than its opposite and rather than some other third-party
expression. It is not difficult to see what the missing element is,49 but I defer
discussion of it until the next section.
The second problem with using correlated equilibria theory to explain
adjudication is that it does not justify the need for a third party. If dispu-
tants merely need to correlate their strategies with dichotomous events they
perceive as being (approximately) equally likely, then why can't the parties
simply flip a coin? Obviously, it is more costly and time consuming for the
parties to ask a mediator to randomly select between the equilibria than for
the parties to do so themselves. So this explanation raises the question of
why the parties would ever resort to a third party mediator or adjudicator
to provide this service.5"
Third, given that the parties usually have private information, there is
a serious strategic problem for those who agree to resolve their disputes this
way. However, this problem also infects another theory of expressive adju-
dication-concerning "focal points"-and it will be better to defer discus-
sion of it until after I describe that theory.
B. Adjudication as Focal Point Construction
A second expressive theory is that an adjudicator uses cheap talk to
construct a "focal point" in a coordination game. Here I provide some ba-
sic background, describe the literature proposing that courts can construct
focal points, and then provide a critique.
49. Indeed, Brown & Ayres point to the precise answer I will give when they say: "[Tlhe parties'
agreement to bring the dispute before a mediator might allow the parties to look to the mediator's action
as a focal point to coordinate their behavior." Brown & Ayres, supra note 22, at 376 (emphasis added).
But they do not identify the problem for which focality is the necessary solution-the gap in the theory
just described in the text.
50. Brown & Ayres identify other circumstances where a third party is strictly necessary. As dis-
cussed supra note 36, when the efficient outcome to a game is not an equilibrium, a third party can get the
two players to reach the efficient outcome on occasion by sending different signals to each in private. But
I am trying to demonstrate the power of mediation or adjudication to produce compliance with the judg-
ment declared to both parties, and therefore the need for a third party to make such a public announce-
ment.
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1. Background on Focal Points
Talk is said to be "cheap" when it is "costless, nonbinding and non-
verifiable."'" A's threat of harming anyone who fails to keep his promise to
A is cheap talk if A bears no cost from uttering the statement, nothing binds
A to follow through on the threat, and there is nothing to verify whether A
has harmed past promise-breakers. 2 That "cheap" talk could ever influ-
ence behavior may seem puzzling within a rational-choice framework.
There is no puzzle, however, if the game has multiple equilibria.
When a game has only one equilibrium, then by definition the payoffs de-
termine the outcome. If the game has more than one equilibrium, however,
then by definition something other than the payoffs may determine the par-
ticular equilibrium that results. A simple example is the pure coordination
game, such as the choice of whether to drive on the left or right side of the
road. Assume Players I and 2 choose between strategies L and R, where
each receives a higher equal positive payoff if both coordinate at LL or RR
than if they wind up at LR or RL. Merely from the payoffs, Player 1 cannot
rationally determine whether to "aim for" the LL equilibrium or the RR
equilibrium; neither can Player 2. But if the players can communicate
freely, they might "agree" to each play L. Though the agreement is non-
binding cheap talk (it is not enforced by a third party and, let us assume, the
players feel no moral obligation to keep their promise), it is likely the play-
ers will follow it. Even if the players cannot both communicate, if one can
send a message to the other naming a particular equilibrium, it is likely the
message will determine the behavior. Experimental data confirms the
value of cheap talk to coordinating behavior. 3
If players cannot communicate or fail to agree,54 Nobel Laureate
Thomas Schelling identified an alternative mechanism for coordination-
"focal points. '55 An equilibrium is focal if it has some feature that, for rea-
51. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 18, at 303; see discussion infra Part III.B.
52. Similarly, A's statement that he has harmed promise-violators in the past is cheap talk if it is
costless to make and its truth is not verifiable.
53. See generally Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk,
78 J. ECON. THEORY 286 (1998).
54. Cheap talk may fail because there is no opportunity to send or receive messages, because the
exchange of messages among all players is too expensive to be worth it, or because players have conflict-
ing preferences over how to coordinate and reach a bargaining impasse.
55. SCHELLING, supra note 31. Schelling wrote more than four decades ago, but David Kreps ex-
plains his lasting relevance:
The point is that in some games with multiple equilibria, players still 'know' what to do. This
knowledge comes from both directly relevant past experience and a sense of how individuals act
generally. And formal mathematic game theory has said little or nothing about where these ex-
pectations come from, how and why they persist, or when and why we might expect them to arise.
The best discussion of these sorts of things (at least in the literature of game theory) remains the
original treatment due to Thomas Scheling (1960); little or no progress has been made in explor-
ing Schelling's insights.
DAVID M. KREPs, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 101 (1990). Thus, it bears emphasis that
the term "focal point" is more of a conclusion rather than an explanation. Some feature of an outcome
causes the players to focus their attention on it. Economics has no theory for what features have that ef-
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sons of psychology, history, or culture, draws attention to itself, making it
"stand out" among all equilibria. If the players are aware that one equilib-
rium draws special mental attention from all the players-is "salient" to
all-that fact alone can cause everyone to play their strategy associated
with that equilibrium. For example, when Schelling asked individuals
where they would go to meet someone on a map if they had been separated
accidentally, most individuals identified topographically unique places on
the map (such as the only bridge or only 5-way intersection).16 In this con-
text, expectations are self-fulfilling: once a player believes the other players
are "aiming for" a particular equilibrium, the player's best response is to
play the strategy associated with that equilibrium.57 Experiments confirm
that, in games of multiple equilibria, salient nonpayoff features-i.e., focal
points -significantly facilitate coordination. 8
For purposes of law, Schelling's most interesting insight combines
cheap talk and focal points. He discusses the ability of a third party-
someone who is not a player in the underlying coordination game-to in-
fluence the players in the game merely by communicating in favor of a par-
ticular outcome.59 By publicly endorsing a particular outcome in view of
the players, the third party makes that equilibrium "stand out" from the
rest, which may then create self-fulfilling expectations that others will play
the strategy associated with that equilibrium. In contrast to "natural" focal
points, third-party cheap talk constructs a focal point.6
One of Schelling's illustrations is useful. Suppose that two drivers ap-
proach a busy intersection on different roads when the traffic light is bro-
ken. Each prefers to maintain his or her speed and have the other driver
slow down or stop, but each realizes that the drivers will collide in the inter-
section if neither slows down. In this Hawk/Dove context, Schelling ob-
serves the likely effect of "a bystander who jumps into an intersection and
begins to direct traffic."'" The bystander's suggestions do not change the
payoffs because the bystander cannot sanction drivers for failing to comply.
Nor does the bystander seem to enjoy authority or legitimacy of the sort
fect, though other disciplines may. Psychology, for example, may be able to say what features of a situa-
tion are likely to be most salient.
56. SCHELLING, supra note 31, at 54-55, 58.
57. The point is not that every player is certain that others will play the focal strategy, but that as
any one player believes it more probable the others will play the strategy associated with the focal out-
come, it becomes more and more in the interest of that player to play his best response to that strategy.
58. See Michael Bacharach & Michele Bernasconi, The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An
Experimental Study, 19 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 1, 37-39 (1997); Judith Mehta et al., Focal Points in
Pure Coordination Games: An Experimental Investigation, 36 THEORY AND DECISION 163 (1994); Judith
Mehta et al., The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 658, 672 (1994); Judith Mehta et al., An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in Coor-
dination and Bargaining: Some Preliminary Results, in DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK AND
UNCERTAINTY: NEW MODELS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 211,216 (John Geweke ed., 1992).
59. Of course the third party is "in" some larger game. One should ask about his incentives for giv-
ing a particular message. I address this issue below.
60. See Garrett & Weingast, supra note 17.
61. SCHELLING, supra note 31, at 144.
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that sociologists and psychologists attribute to law. Nonetheless, because
"coordination requires the common acceptance of some source of sugges-
tion,"'62 one suspects that the bystander's directions will influence the driv-
ers' behavior. By calling attention to one outcome, the relevant hand sig-
nals make that outcome focal. Experimental studies confirm Schelling's
intuition.63
2. Using Adjudication to Construct a Focal Point. Existing Literature
and the Connection to Correlated Equilibria
Several economic theorists and philosophers have suggested cheap-
talk construction of focal points to explain the expressive effect of law.'
Most of the prior work on legal expression as means of constructing focal
points, including most of my own, has focused on legal rules of general ap-
plication stated in advance of a particular dispute. In this article, however,
my concern is whether this expressive effect can work retrospectively for
adjudication, providing a tribunal with power to influence disputants after
their dispute occurs.
Schelling himself first suggested that mediation and fact-finding might
work to resolve disputes by making focal a particular outcome.65 The first
theorists to apply Schelling's idea to adjudication were apparently the po-
litical scientists Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, who offer a focal
point explanation of the role of the European Court of Justice.66 Garrett
and Weingast claim that nations have a mix of common and conflicting in-
terests that frequently create situations of multiple equilibria. Specifically,
they imagine that nations seeking to cooperate in an iterated Prisoners' Di-
lemma (PD) game may enter into a potentially self-enforcing agreement
that specifies what form their cooperation will take. Two nations, for ex-
62. Id.
63. For empirical evidence specific to the context of the Hawk-Dove game, see McAdams &
Nadler, supra note 7. For other games, see Bohnet & Cooter, supra note 17; Tyran & Feld, supra note 17;
Rick K. Wilson & Carl M. Rhodes, Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination Games, 41 J.
CoNFLICr RESOL. 767,785 (1997).
64. For extended discussions, see Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in
Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 215 (2004) (financial laws supply a focal point); Garrett & Wein-
gast, supra note 17 (international law constructs a focal point); Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUT1ONALISM (Grofman & Wittman eds., 1989) (constitu-
tion supplies a focal point); McAdams, supra note 7 (law generally supplies focal point); David Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Cl-n. L. REV. 877,910-19.(1996) (constitution). Others
have noted the point. Rational choice theorists include Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citi-
zens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); J.R. Hay & A.
Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 398,400-01
(1998); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1719 (1996).
Philosophers frequently note that law works in part by facilitating coordination. See the discussion by
and sources cited in HEIDI HURD, MORAL COMBAT 169-76 (1999). Early examples include Gerald J.
Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundation of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982), and
Conrad D. Johnson, On Deciding and Setting Precedent for the Reasonable Man, 62 Archiv fur Rechts-
Und Sozialphilosophie 161,163 (1976) (F.R.G.).
65. SCHELLING, supra note 31, at 62, 68.
66. Garrett & Weingast, supra note 17.
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ample, may agree to limit their tariffs and sustain cooperation by threaten-
ing to breach if the other breaches. To the conventional point that iteration
allows (but does not ensure) the parties to sustain cooperation,67 Garrett
and Weingast add the point that there is often more than one way for par-
ties to cooperate to achieve their best outcome. The parties therefore re-
quire an agreement to define what behavior constitutes "cooperation" for
purposes of their conditionally cooperative strategies (which effectively
"enforce" the agreement).
The problem is that contracts are inevitably incomplete.' There are
always ambiguities and unforeseen contingencies that create situations
where the parties disagree on what behavior is required to cooperate. The
parties may be drawn to preexisting focal solutions but, in the absence of
natural focal points, "an institution can construct one by devising the re-
quired set of specifications (as to the nature of the agreement, and hence as
to what constitutes cooperation and defection) and by making them known
to the community."69 Similarly, I recently coauthored an article arguing
that the International Court of Justice generates high compliance with its
decisions in part by its ability to make focal the outcomes it endorses.7°
None of this prior work, however, notes the vital connection of focal
point construction to the idea of a correlated equilibrium." Focal points
provide what I described in the previous section as the element missing
from Brown and Ayres's discussion of correlated equilibria. A mediator's
message tends to make salient the outcome he endorses, rather than the
opposite outcome, and thus tends to generate self-fulfilling expectations
that the endorsed outcome will occur, rather than the opposite one.
Moreover, we can now see why the players would tend to follow the
mediator's message instead of an interloper's message. That is, we can
identify what is special about the message the two players select as the one
on which they will correlate their strategies. What makes an outcome focal
is not merely that it stands out to each individual, but a kind of common
knowledge: that each individual believes that it stands out to others, that
each individual believes that each individual believes that it stands out to
others, and so forth.72 Two obstacles may impede the creation of this com-
67. On the standard game theory view, cooperation can occur because, if each party values the fu-
ture sufficiently, they may be willing to forgo the immediate benefits of defection in order to preserve the
benefits of future cooperation. But it is also possible that individuals reciprocate strategies because they
feel it is fair to do so and gain satisfaction from punishing defection and rewarding cooperation. See Dan
M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and the Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003).
Either iteration or a preference for reciprocity creates multiple equilibria, where mutual cooperation be-
comes a possible outcome but mutual defection remains possible as well.
68. For this standard proposition, see SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 299-301.
69. Garrett & Weingast, supra note 17, at 183.
70. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 8.
71. In this respect, and in certain others, this article revises the theory of Ginsburg & McAdams,
supra note 8.
72. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 18, at 304, provide a general definition: "Something is common
knowledge if it is known to each player, and, in addition, each player knows that the other player has this
knowledge; knows that the other person knows the player knows it; and so forth."
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mon knowledge: (1) uncertainty about whether the other players in the
game received the third party's message; and (2) common knowledge that
the other players received conflicting messages from additional third par-
ties. Either fact creates doubt about what outcome is most salient to others.
The ritual of adjudication, however, provides a solution to both obsta-
cles.73 If the parties agree to designate an individual as their arbiter, their
agreement creates a common belief that everyone will pay attention to
what this individual says. The same is true of the ritual itself-the dispu-
tants' joint attendance at the proceeding works toward creating common
knowledge of the resolution that the third party declares. Moreover, even
if everyone pays equal attention to other speakers who send inconsistent
messages (and there is common knowledge of this fact), the special designa-
tion of one individual as the arbiter tends to make his message unique. In
the face of competing messages, that there is only one individual whom the
disputants agreed to consult tends to make his message salient. Thus, two
parties can give a third party a particular power of influencing their behav-
ior by cheap talk by their agreeing (via cheap talk) to designate that indi-
vidual as their dispute resolver.
Thus, the missing element in the story of adjudication as correlated
equilibrium is this ability of the designated coordinator's speech to make a
particular outcome salient and the tendency of salience to produce self-
fulfilling expectations that the salient outcome will result. Henceforth, I
will combine the ideas of focal points and correlated equilibrium by saying
that parties correlate their strategies on an equilibrium the arbiter makes
focal. Note the synergy: while the focal point explains the special power of
the arbiter's message, the ability of a correlated equilibrium to increase ex-
pected payoffs explains why the parties will seek out the message in the first
place.
3. Two Problems for the Focal Point Theory
The idea of constructed focal points solves one of the objections I
raised above to the idea of adjudication as correlated equilibria-that it did
not actually explain compliance. Now we can see why the players are likely
to succeed in correlating their strategies with a mediator's randomly se-
lected message, if they agree in advance to treat his message as their coor-
dinating device.
But we are still left with the second problem-that disputants seeking
a randomized solution do not need to hire a third party because they could
randomize by themselves. If two parties need to correlate strategies on a
73. See MICHAEL S. CHWE, RATIONAL RITUAL (2001). Chwe explains the form social rituals take
by their ability to generate the common knowledge needed to solve a coordination game. He gives many
examples but unfortunately omits the ritual of law, including adjudication, which I believe perfectly illus-
trates his general theory. Cf. Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social
Norms Jurisprudence, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 389 (2003).
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constructed focal point, selected at random, they can create one without
third-party assistance. The parties need only to select a future event with
equal dichotomous outcomes (e.g., a coin flip) and to agree on how they
will correlate their strategies on the two possible outcomes. Once the event
occurs, the agreed-to solution will tend to be focal. Thus, the focal-point
theory does not explain why two parties seek a third-party arbiter to resolve
their dispute.
Garrett and Weingast don't discuss this problem, but it appears to in-
fect their theory. Although they do not identify randomization as the
method the adjudicator uses to choose which equilibria to endorse, neither
do they identify any other basis for the adjudicator's decision. Nothing in
their theory says how a court should choose which of the possible equilib-
rium outcomes to make focal.74 Moreover, recall that the problem focality
solves, in their account, is ambiguity. But when the third party states a par-
ticular clarifying resolution of an ambiguity (in an agreement defining co-
operative behavior), that expression makes that resolution salient without
regard to the reasons the adjudicator had for selecting it. If so, then it is not
clear why the players need a third party; they could themselves use a ran-
dom device to make one equilibrium salient.
There is now a second objection I want to raise with the idea of adju-
dication as a constructed focal point, briefly alluded to above. The problem
with randomly generated focal points is the strategic ability of one party to
exploit randomization by the other. This point requires identifying an im-
plicit assumption of the above analysis. The Brown and Ayres and the Gar-
rett and Weingast analyses are static; they assume that the existence of a
dispute is exogenous to and unaffected by the manner of dispute resolution,
that the players can therefore resolve a dispute without affecting the likeli-
hood of finding themselves in such a dispute again in the future. Put differ-
ently, existing models proceed as if all disputes are genuine-that is, based
on actual differences in how the parties perceive the situation.75 But when
one allows for the dynamic possibility of strategic disputes-that is, the
manufacturing of apparent disagreement about the nature of the situation
to exploit the opportunities the dispute creates-then disputes will be en-
dogenous to the method of dispute resolution. The number of times one
must play a game may be determined by how one plays it. Of particular
relevance, if an individual always randomizes to resolve his disputes, then
he will have more of them.
This strategic problem is obscured if one focuses solely on the payoffs
of the canonical Battle of the Sexes Game. That game is normally de-
scribed as having only positive payoffs in equilibrium, zero payoffs for the
non-equilibrium outcomes, and no negative payoffs. Under these circum-
74. I argue below that they implicitly assume another mechanism at work in dispute resolution and
it is this other mechanism (signaling) that explains why a third party is necessary.
75. Brown & Ayres, supra note 22, explicitly assume, for this part of their analysis, that the parties
have no private information, which means that the dispute is genuine.
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stances, where one cannot lose, one wants to play this Battle of the Sexes
game as often as possible (at least as long as one does not thereby forgo
playing other games with even higher expected payoffs). Therefore, there
is no strategic danger in taking action that encourages others to create this
BOS situation again in the future. Many disputes, however, involve nega-
tive payoffs for at least one party. Here, randomization may encourage
disputes one wishes to avoid.
An example of the strategic problem is a property dispute modeled by
the Hawk/Dove game. A person does not want to be in the situation in
which others assert a claim to property he currently possesses and uses as
his own. Losing property one has been enjoying causes a loss of utility.76
Yet if an individual is known to have used randomization in the past when-
ever others claimed property he was using, he will encourage such claims.
Knowing that A will flip a coin to resolve ownership of what he currently
regards as his house would prompt a long line of individuals to appear
claiming to own the same property, in order to get a fifty-percent chance of
acquiring it. Eventually, A will lose his house and all of his property. To
avoid this predicament, A may want to avoid randomization, or at least to
cabin it in some way. My point is not that this strategic barrier is insur-
mountable; only that it remains to be shown how it can be solved.
The problem is general. It also applies in the BOS game if one consid-
ers what happens after the players initially "solve" the game. Reconsider
Figure 1. What happens if the "losing" party-who prefers the equilibrium
other than the one selected by randomization- demands renegotiation?
To show the payoffs at this juncture, we need to transform Figure I7 Sup-
pose the original adjudication-by-randomization produced Player l's pre-
ferred outcome of 00. Players 1 and 2 will now experience preservation of
00 as the status quo baseline of zero, while switching to BB produces a
76. Thus, if we were going to model this situation, we would have to modify the payoffs in Figure 2
to reflect the fact that the party currently enjoying the good will perceive his retention of it as the baseline
of zero. The result is Figure 2a. Player 1 merely preserves the status quo by playing Hawk against Dove,
so that outcome gives him a utility of 0. His playing Dove against Hawk means that he loses the good he
was enjoying, which represents an outcome of -4. His playing Dove against Dove means he loses half the
value of the good, for an outcome of -2. And his playing Hawk against Hawk means he incurs the costs of
fighting and some probability (assumed to be one-half) of losing the good, for an outcome of -5. Player 2's
payoffs remain the same because, as before, his baseline involves not enjoying the good. The structure is
still HD, but this is a game that Player 1 wants to avoid playing.
FIGURE 2A
A MODIFIED HAWK/DovE GAME
Player 2
Dove Hawk
Player 1 Dove -2,2 -4,4
Hawk 0,0 -5,-1
77. To be more precise, we would transform the simultaneous game of Figure 1 into a sequential
game where the possibility of renegotiation arises after the initial dispute is settled, thus combining Fig-
ures 1 and 3 into a single game. But the textual example is simpler and the strategic point would remain
in the sequential version.
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loss for Player 1 and a gain for Player 2. The result is figure 3,78 which re-




Stay At 0 Change To B
Player 1 Stay At 0 0,0 -5,-
Change To B -5,-1 -4,+4
First consider this game without the possibility of randomization. In
the mixed strategy equilibrium, Player 1 selects Stay at 0 with probability
5/6 and Change to B with probability 1/6; Player 2 selects Stay at 0 with
probability 1/6 and Change to B with probability 5/6. Player l's expected
outcome is then -4.17; Player 2's is -.17.80 Because both expectations are
negative, this is a game both parties would prefer to avoid; even Player 2
would rather stick to the status quo than to demand redeciding the original
dispute.
What if the parties can resolve their renegotiation dispute by ran-
domization? As before, randomization benefits both parties: given a fifty
percent chance of preserving the status quo and a fifty percent chance of
switching, Player l's expectation is now improved to -2 while Player 2's ex-
pectation rises to +2. The crucial difference is that, while Player 1 still ex-
pects to lose value, randomization transforms Player 2's expectation to a
positive one. Thus, the prospect of randomization induces Player 2 to de-
mand reconsideration, a result that harms Player 1. Anticipating that prob-
lem, Player 1 wants to avoid using randomization.81 Therefore, it appears
78. The payoffs are derived from Figure 1 as follows. Once the players arrive at the 00 equilib-
rium, they experience Stay at O/Stay at 0 as the baseline of 0,0. Put differently, there is no difference in
the initial (5,1) payoff and the final (5,1) payoff. If they both were to play Change To B, then the move
from (5,1) to (1,5) is experienced by Player 1 as a loss of 4 (-4) and experienced by Player 2 as a gain of 4.
If Player 1 selects Stay At 0 and Player 2 selects Change To B then the move from (5,1) to (0,0) is experi-
enced by Player 1 as a loss of 5 (-5) and by Player 2 as a loss of 1 (-1). If Player 1 selects Change To B and
Player 2 selects Stay At 0 then the move from (5,1) to (0,0) is experienced by Player 1 as a loss of 5 (-5)
and by Player 2 as a loss of 1 (-1).
79. There remain two equilibria-Stay/Stay and Change/Change-and the two players rank these
two equilibria differently but both prefer either equilibria to either non-equilibria outcome.
80. These numbers are derived in the manner explained at supra note 25.
81. One might want to say that the parties can rule out "re-negotiation" when they first agree to
randomize, thus treating the first mediator's first coin flip as irrevocable. The problem is that I am trying
to determine how mediation or adjudication could work without the threat of sanctions, so we are asking
whether the cheap talk agreement not to renegotiate would work in that context. Thus, we should assume
that no court will use sanctions to enforce a "no renegotiation" pledge. Still, it is possible that this agree-
ment to randomize only once will create self-fulfilling expectations not only to follow the initial random
message but also to ignore subsequent ones. But there is a serious danger that Player 1 will not be able to
resist the pull of randomizing a second time. The precedent of a prior solution often makes the same so-
lution focal for the next situation, so there may be self-fulffiling expectations of using randomization for
future disputes. Moreover, even if Player 1 refuses to "agree" to randomize again, Player 2 might simply
announce to Player 1: "I am going to flip this coin [or hire a new mediator to flip this coin]. If it lands
heads I will play 'Stick at O,' but if it lands tails I will play 'Change to B."' This statement may then create
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that disputants will not generally wish to correlate their strategies with ran-
domly selected focal points.
C. Adjudication as Signaling
The strategic problem just discussed implies that there is a flaw in
Garrett and Weingast's analysis of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
They find significant compliance with the decisions of the ECJ, yet I have
claimed that disputants would not wish to resolve their conflict by following
randomly constructed focal points. Why would a group of nations create an
institution for resolving disputes that would only encourage more disputes?
Upon closer examination, Garrett and Weingast are implicitly relying on
some feature of adjudication other than focal-point construction. Rather
than describing the ECJ as endorsing outcomes arbitrarily or randomly,
they have in mind that the institution mitigates the problem of ambiguity by
"making declarations or judgments about what occurred in the past."82 At
one point, they give an example where the Danish government backed
down prior to an ECJ ruling because the government "fear[ed] an adverse
judgment" had it proceeded with a case "it probably would have lost."83 In
other words, because the adjudicator engages the facts underlying the dis-
pute, its decisions are made on some constrained, predictable basis. De-
spite the authors' claim, this is not (or not merely) focal point construction
(nor is it a correlated equilibrium analysis). Garrett and Weingast are de-
scribing signaling.
In contrast to cheap talk, an individual's costly words or action can re-
veal or signal otherwise private information if the costs or benefits the indi-
vidual incurs from the words or action depend upon the private informa-
tion.' That A spends a lot on burglar alarms may signal his level of risk
aversion or his having many expensive items in his home." Observing A's
expenditures may therefore cause individuals to change their beliefs about
facts they cannot directly observe: A's level of risk aversion or the value of
objects stored in his home.
There has been surprisingly little writing on the possibility of signaling
as an explanation of adjudicative compliance,' or indeed of any legal com-
self-fulfilling expectations. Specifically, if the coin comes up tails, it may then cause Player 1 to expect
Player 2 to play "Change to B," which makes Player 2 prefer to play "Change to B."
82. Garrett & Weingast, supra note 17, at 204.
83. Id. at 195.
84. The first such model is Michael A. Spence, Job Market Signalling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973).
See RASMUSEN, supra note 19; FUDENBERG & TiROLE, supra note 21, at 446-60; see also infra Part H.A.1.
85. Similarly, A's willingness to offer a warranty when he sells a widget may signal his belief in the
reliability of his product or his ability to provide low cost service.
86. I don't count Shaveil's signaling analysis of nonbinding arbitration because it works merely by
signaling the likely outcome of a full-fledged trial, that is, the likely direction of state coercion should the
parties fail to settle. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995). After arbitration, disputants update their beliefs about the probable trial out-
come, which usually narrows their perceived differences, making settlement more likely. On this account,
nonbinding arbitration would still not influence behavior if the state did not stand ready to enforce the
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pliance.87 I contend that the signals adjudicators typically send will com-
monly influence the disputants' behavior. One reason is obvious. Adjudi-
cative signals will matter if one assumes that the disputants are, in the con-
text of their dispute, substantially motivated by a common sense of fairness
or morality. By changing the individuals' view of the facts, signals might
change the individual's view of what morality or fairness requires, and
thereby change behavior.'
As discussed in the introduction, however, I want to demonstrate the
robustness of expressive power by showing that it operates even under the
narrower assumptions of rational self-interest, either for individuals who
are so motivated or for contexts in which such motives prevail. The motive
of self-interest can become especially important when the conflict arises be-
cause the individuals have different views of their moral entitlements.89 In
this section, I describe a theory of adjudicative signaling9" and then raise
some objections.
1. A Signaling Model of Dispute Resolution
The third expressive possibility, within the assumptions of economics,
is that adjudication provides disputants with an informational signal about
some feature of the world.91 According to this idea, those receiving the sig-
nal will change (update) their belief about the feature of the world being
outcome of a trial. The question I am pursuing is whether adjudicative expression can influence behavior
on its own, without even indirect reliance on state sanctions.
87. For a signaling theory of legal compliance that is not specifically about adjudication, see
McAdams, Attitudinal Theory, supra note 7, where I argue that the enactment of new legal rules may sig-
nal the attitudes of individuals toward the regulated behavior (which affects behavior if people care about
gaining approval and/or avoiding disapproval), In addition, Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 7,
claim that legislative enactments may signal information about the costs and benefits of the regulated be-
havior. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 8, address adjudication, but the theory there omits several
features explored here, including the correlated equilibrium concept. Other writing is suggestive of a sig-
naling theory. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 21-33 (2003); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in Interna-
tional Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2005); Stephenson, supra note 17.
88. For example, if A finds an envelope containing cash, he might be willing to give it to B only if
he believes B is the one who lost the envelope. Similarly, B might be willing to use force to obtain that
cash from A only if he believes it is the same cash that he lost. An adjudicator can then influence A
and B's behavior by influencing their view of these facts, which he does either by verifying the parties'
exchange of relevant information, signaling his own belief about the facts, or both.
89. For example, if A believes in (and has internalized) a "finders, keepers" rule, then he will not be
influenced on moral grounds by the signal that B once owned the property. Conversely, B might be in-
sensitive to the signal because he believes that he is entitled to the cash on grounds of distributive justice
even if it is not the cash he lost because he suffered the misfortune of having lost that sum, while A is
wealthy and suffered no such misfortune. But both individuals could still comply with the signal for the
selfish incentives I identify below.
90. The basic theory is first presented in Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 8.
91. Another possibility, noted by Posner & Yoo, supra note 87, at 14-15, is that a third party facili-
tates the parties exchange of information by verifying that each has disclosed all the relevant information
in its possession to the other and verifying the authenticity of all information disclosed. The third party
thus solves or ameliorates certain strategic problems that otherwise limit the reliability of information
exchange. Nonetheless, if this is all the third party did -if. he does not also declare what the facts and ap-
plicable rule are-then this is a form of facilitative mediation, but not adjudication.
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signaled, and this change in beliefs can cause a change in behavior. I will
eventually explain why the change in belief influences the behavior of dis-
putants, but first I address the general idea of signaling.
Economists usually use signaling to describe inferences made from an
individual's conduct. In the typical model, an individual reveals his "type"
("good" or "bad") by the degree to which he will engage in behavior that
has different costs for different types. For example, one who earns a gradu-
ate degree may signal his having abilities that make such education less
costly for him. 2 For my purposes, however, it is important to see how ordi-
nary talk can also constitute a signal.93 As an example, consider the expres-
sion of a critic or reviewer. A review (of theater, wine, stereo equipment,
etc.) is cheap talk only if the reviewer doesn't value his reputation for pro-
viding reliable information for a consumer's purchasing decision. If the re-
viewer does value his reputation, deriving some monetary or other satisfac-
tion from influencing these decisions, then his public statements are costly
because they affect his reputation. For this reason, the expression of a re-
viewer (who values his reputation) can cause readers to change their beliefs
about the reviewed item, which in turns changes their behavior.
Another analogy, closer to adjudication, is the informal sports referee,
who lacks any power to sanction players for disobeying his rulings. None-
theless, athletic competitors sometimes solicit individuals to serve as infor-
mal referees and often obey their rulings. Among other possible reasons is
signaling. If the players believe the referee cares about preserving his repu-
tation for accurate rulings, then they will view his rulings as signals of his
beliefs and update their beliefs accordingly. If such an informal referee sig-
nals a goal in a soccer game, members of the team ostensibly scored against
would assign greater probability to the fact that the ball crossed the goal
line, and expect the team that apparently scored also to assign greater
probability to that fact. As a result, the former team is more likely to con-
cede the goal. Like the reviewer, the informal referee has persuasive,
rather than coercive, influence.
Of course, to cause individuals to update their beliefs about the state
of the world, a reviewer, referee, or arbiter must have a certain ability and
motive. To be able to form a relevant belief, the third party must first have
private information about the relevant state of the world. That could be
based on some independent observation, but more usually it is simply that
the individual reviews existing evidence (perhaps provided by the parties)
and evaluates it with his own unique experience and judgment. Obviously,
individuals vary greatly in their experience and judgment, which from the
92. See RASMUSEN, supra note 19; Spence, supra note 84, at 267-91. As another example, one who
has a relatively low discount rate-valuing the future relatively highly-might reveal their type by their
greater willingness to incur costs following social norms. See ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(2000).
93. See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, Words That Kill? An Economic
Model of the Influence of Speech on Behavior (with Particular Reference to Hate Speech), 34 J. LEGAL
STUD. 93 (2005).
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disputants' perspective means they vary in signaling accuracy-the fit be-
tween the signal and the "true value" of the variable being signaled. They
also differ in their partiality toward the parties. The degree to which the
disputants change their beliefs in the face of a signal depends on this per-
ception of accuracy and partiality. Other things equal, a disputant will give
greater weight to (and change his beliefs more in response to) a signal
against his interests (i) having greater accuracy and (ii) being less biased
against him.9'
Accuracy and bias are only partly a function of ability; they also de-
pend on motive. To be motivated to signal, the third party must have an
incentive to reveal his actual beliefs about what he observes. That requires
that he would incur some costs for failing to speak or for speaking some-
thing other than what he actually believes. A judiciary may (or may not)
embody professional norms that motivate its members to signal their actual
beliefs;95 such a judiciary would then enjoy a reputation that would give it a
particular power to resolve disputes.
But even without norms there is sometimes a selfish motive for pro-
viding accurate and unbiased signals-the prospect of future opportunities
to serve as a mediator or arbitrator. Assume that a third party expects to
receive some benefit for resolving a dispute, such as money, prestige, or in-
fluence. The greater the third party's reputation for accuracy, the greater
his opportunity for being hired as an arbiter.' If so, then an arbiter will
want to adopt a strategy that maximizes his chances that these, or other dis-
putants, will ask him to serve as an arbiter again in the future, which means
maximizing his apparent accuracy and impartiality. Players will measure
accuracy and impartiality by the disparity between their beliefs and what an
arbiter signals. Although different people will see things differently, an ar-
biter who actually believes that the observed state of the world is x can
minimize the disparity in his signals and what others believe by signaling x.
Even if he is not highly confident of x, his belief that x occurred means it is
more likely that the mean belief among the players is x rather than some-
94. Being "less biased" can mean several things. If a signal is contrary to a disputant's interests, he
will give it more weight if he perceives it as unbiased compared to one he perceives as being biased
against him. He will also will give greater weight to a signal against him if he believes the signaler is bi-
ased in his favor rather than unbiased, and greater weight to a signal in his favor if he believes the signaler
is biased against him. Without knowing in advance which way an adjudicator will rule, impartiality pre-
serves the greatest potential influence over both disputants. I discuss the normative implications of this
need for impartiality. See infra Part IV.B.1.
95. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCT 3E (1990). Cf Albert P. Melone, The Senate's
Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75
JUDICATURE 68, 75 (1991) (noting routine refusal of Supreme Court nominees to answer certain ques-
tions on ground of "professional norms of impartiality").
96. Accuracy creates opportunity in both a relative and absolute sense. First, third parties will com-
pete against each other for the job of arbiter; disputants will hire those who are the most accurate relative
to others. Second, the disputants will insist on a certain absolute level of accuracy because, on this theory,
the costs of hiring an arbiter will be justified only if the signal is expected to cause enough belief change to
resolve the dispute. In sum, disputants will pay more for a signal they believe is more accurate because it
provides a greater chance at avoiding conflict. (Below, I present a theory in which signaling matters for
reasons other than updating, but accuracy remains important for different reasons.)
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thing else. He will therefore want to express what he actually believes.
Given this motive, the third party's statement of the state of the world is a
signal of his private information.'
So we come to the basic signaling story of adjudication I want to de-
fend.98 Stated abstractly, the point is that even selfish players, or players
motivated in a particular context by selfish interests, frequently choose
strategies that depend, in part, on observed facts about the world. If so,
then a third-party signal can change the players' beliefs and therefore their
behavior."
For example, in an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, one's best strategy
may depend on whether one's counterpart "cooperated" or "defected" in
the last round, and this may depend on narrower matters of observed
fact."° We might imagine two business partners who each prefer to shirk
while the other works or two neighbors who each prefer to free-ride on the
public-good investment of the other. Sustaining cooperation is possible if
each side implements a reciprocal strategy that in some respect rewards
past cooperation with cooperation and punishes defection with defection.
An example is the strategy Tit-for-Tat, where a player cooperates in round
one and then reciprocates whatever the other player did in the prior
round.' Suppose, however, that the underlying facts are ambiguous; the
situation is "noisy."" ° Noise represents an impediment to cooperation be-
97. If one party is more likely than the other to require dispute-resolution services in the future,
then this fact may skew the third party's incentives to be biased in the direction of the party more likely to
provide repeat business. See, e.g., Lisa Bingham, Focus on Arbitration after Gilmer: Employment Arbitra-
tion: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMPLOYER POL'Y J. 189, 212-15 (1997); Lisa Bingham,
Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108,
113-16 (1996).
98. I defer for now a more complex possibility: that community members will enforce norms
against a party to the dispute who is believed to have violated the community's norms. Thus, if the arbiter
signals that B lost the cash that A found, others may then sanction A if he fails to return the cash to B. In
the face of an arbiter's signal that the money is B's, A may then give the money to B not because A now
believes that B lost it, but because he expects third parties to now believe as much, and A believes that
they will sanction him if he does not comply. See infra Part III.C.
99. Although Posner & Yoo do not use the term "signal," this sort of information revelation appears
to be the theory they use to explain observed compliance with international adjudication. See Posner &
Yoo, supra note 87. There is, however, an ambiguity in their explanation. They say that "[t]he tribunal's
function is to provide information," id. at 17, that "the judgment is, in effect, a disclosure of information,"
id. at 20, and that the tribunal works because it "has the right kind of expertise of information, or the abil-
ity to generate information." Id. at 22. But they do not explain exactly how new information affects be-
havior; they do not explicitly state that the information resolves the dispute by changing the disputants'
beliefs.
100. Here, I am using the conditions Garrett and Weingast, supra note 17, set out to explain the focal
power of a court's decision, though unlike them, I am using the same context to explain signaling. Later, I
show why the arbiter's factual signaling may also matter in the context of a Hawk/Dove Game. See infra
Part III.B.1.
101. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Paul G. Mahoney & Chris
W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
2027 (2001).
102. See, e.g., Jonathan Bendor et al., When in Doubt... Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner's Di-
lemma, 35 J. CONFLIcr RESOL. 691 (1991); Barbara Sainty, Achieving Greater Cooperation in a Noisy
Prisoner's Dilemma: An Experimental Investigation, 39 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 421 (1999); Jianzhong
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cause A may think it has cooperated in round n while B thinks A has de-
fected. 1°3 B may then defect in round n + 1, producing a cascade of altemat-
ing defection.i" In this context, a timely third party signal of the relevant
facts of round n might cause A and B to update their beliefs in the same di-
rection, such that they now agree as to what happened in the prior round. 05
The result is compliance. If the adjudicator rules in favor of A by say-
ing "A cooperated in round n and therefore B should cooperate in round n
+ 1" (or some more contextually appropriate language), B may now update
his factual belief sufficiently to believe that A did cooperate in round n. If
so, then B's strategy tells B to cooperate in round n + 1. In general, the los-
ing player will then tend to comply with this expression, so long as the sig-
nal is strong enough to cause him to update his beliefs sufficiently. Thus,
for very general reasons, adjudicative signaling about such facts can gener-
ally influence disputant's behavior, generating compliance independent of
sanctions.
2. Two Problems for the Signaling Theory
There are two weaknesses in the signaling account of expressive adju-
dication. The first problem is merely a limitation, but an important one. In
many cases, disputants are so confident in their position that the third
party's signal will not change their beliefs sufficiently to change their behav-
ior. For example, the parties would presumably always have some doubt
about their estimates, but they might play strategies based on their level of
confidence. So, Party A might treat Party B's behavior as defection, and act
accordingly to punish B, if A believes it to be at least X% probable that B
defected. If A begins believing it is far greater than X% likely that B de-
fected, then even after a contrary signal from the third party, A may still be-
lieve it is X% (or more) likely that B defected. Stated more generally, both
disputants may start out with such confidence in their beliefs and such
doubts about the third party's perceptive abilities that, after adjudication,
they do not change their beliefs sufficiently to avert conflict. In genuinely
close cases, the parties may not be so confident in their beliefs, but the third
party may also lack confidence and therefore form only a very weak belief
about what the facts show. If the arbiter can only determine and signal that
Wu & Robert Axelrod, How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, 39 J. CONFLICr
RESOL. 183 (1995).
103. In these sorts of situations, strategies more complex than Tit-for-Tat may be better. For exam-
ple, the error may be such that a player can "accidentally" defect and then realize his mistake before the
next round. If so, then a form of "contrition" might help to sustain cooperation. For example, the acci-
dental defector in round n contritely cooperates in round n + 2 despite having been punished by the other
player's defection in round n + 1. See SUGDEN, supra note 33, at 110; Wu & Axelrod, supra note 104;
Robert Boyd, Mistakes Allow Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 136 J.
THEoRETIcAL BIOLOGY 47 (1989).
104. In the language of the prior note, B may expect A to show "contrition" by accepting this pun-
ishment and still cooperating in round n + 2. Because A regards B's defection as unprovoked, however, A
responds to B's defection in round n + 1 with his own defection in round n + 2.
105. Cf Sainty, supra note 102.
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there is, say, a fifty-one percent probability that the facts favor party A then
he will ordinarily fail to cause B to update his beliefs sufficiently to induce
him to play a different strategy. Close cases are among the situations most
likely to produce a dispute. Yet, again, a true signal here would do little to
cause the disputants' beliefs to converge to a common understanding. °6
Of course, if a single third party's signal fails to resolve the dispute, it
is always possible that additional third party signals may do the trick. But
this possibility reveals the second problem with the signaling model: it im-
plies that disputants would seek out too many third parties. If two parties
to a dispute recognize the possible advantage of receiving the signals of
others, so as to avoid conflict caused by ambiguous facts, then they would
presumably prefer to seek signals of a great many third parties, who collec-
tively have the potential for producing greater belief change and greater ac-
curacy than any one individual."° This is a problem because adjudication is
typically centralized in a single tribunal or institution, often with a single
member (perhaps with limited appeals) who provides the dispute resolution
services."6 Disputants may choose between many different fora, and may
appeal from one decision maker to a higher ranking one, but they do not
just gather a large number of opinions and aggregate them as signaling im-
plies.'°9
The story thus far is pessimistic. There appears to be no room for ex-
pressive adjudication based on economic models of correlated equilibria,
focal points, or signaling. But the story becomes more optimistic in the next
Part where I consider how these elements interact.
III. A RECONSTRUCTED THEORY OF ADJUDICATIVE EXPRESSION: THE
SYNERGY OF CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA, FOCAL POINTS, AND SIGNALS
Adjudication can work expressively by combining in a particular way
the different elements just discussed. An adjudicator will wield an expres-
sive influence on disputants if he offers a signal where appropriate and a fo-
cal point for correlating strategies where appropriate. The synergy between
106. Posner & Yoo, supra note 87, do not address this problem.
107. Similarly, the theater-goer selecting a movie or consumer selecting an appliance is ordinarily
interested in knowing of as many reviews as possible (which explains the popularity of web sites that
compile reviews, such as www.metacritic.com). More generally, the Condorcet Jury Theorem explains
why, under certain circumstances including the assumption that any one individual is more than fifty-
percent likely to be correct, the belief of a majority of individuals is more likely to be correct than any one
individual. See Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 7.
108. The problem-that the theory does not fit the practice of adjudication-is greater still because
signaling can work to align the disputants' beliefs even if they do not receive the same signal (or set of
signals). There may be some advantage to making the signals common knowledge but there is nothing to
say that purely private signals could not play an important role in resolving disputes. So we are left un-
able to explain why adjudication involves the declaration of a single signal to both parties.
109. Indeed, Posner & Yoo observe that some of the most effective international adjudication comes
from ad hoc arbitration before a single individual. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 87, at 27 (about one-
third of ad hoc arbitrations between 1794 and 1989). When more than a single individual is used, a com-
mon number is three.
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these types of expression arises because each type works to address weak-
nesses in the other. Recall the two problems with seeking to correlate
strategies around randomly constructed focal points: (1) disputants don't
need a third party and (2) randomization invites strategic exploitation. Sig-
naling, however, does necessitate a third party and, as explained below, sig-
naling works to minimize the problem of strategic disputing. Recall also
the two problems with signaling: (1) when the evidence of the relevant
facts is closely divided, signaling will be too weak to cause disputants to
agree on the facts; and (2) signaling does not explain centralization of dis-
pute resolution into a single tribunal. The construction of focal points,
however, does necessitate a centralized source of adjudicative expression
and focal points can, as explained below, facilitate the correlation of strate-
gies even when the signal is too weak to change the losing party's beliefs.
Section A describes the synergy between these various expressive
elements. I conclude that, in common circumstances, adjudicative expres-
sion can itself induce even selfishly motivated disputants to comply. The
rest of this Part extends and qualifies this expressive claim. At the end of
Section A, I acknowledge that the theory at that point only shows how
third-party determination of facts can influence behavior. Section B then
turns toward the legal side of adjudication. I claim that ambiguities in the
conceptual categories underlying conventions generate conflict between in-
dividuals. I then show how adjudicative expression can influence behavior
by clarifying these conventional categories. Section C extends the entire
analysis from two- to multi-party disputes. As explained, while two-party
disputes frequently correspond to matters of private law, multi-party dis-
putes often correspond to issues of public law. Finally, Section D identifies
the limits of the theory of adjudicative expression by recounting the condi-
tions in which it will not apply, where some other mechanism for generating
compliance is strictly necessary.
A. Declared Fact-Finding as a Focal Signal: The Basic Theory in Three
Steps
1. Step One: The Screening Function of Arbitral Signals
I objected to the correlated equilibrium and focal-point theories be-
cause they invite strategic exploitation and they don't explain the need for a
third party. Signaling overcomes both problems. First, by calibrating ex-
pression to the strength of the disputant's case, adjudicative signaling ame-
liorates the problem of strategic disputing otherwise caused by randomiza-
tion. To see this point it will help to assume, for simplicity, that an arbiter
will consider the evidence and reach one of only three beliefs: (i) that the
facts clearly favor party A, (ii) that the facts clearly favor party B, or (iii)
that the facts do not clearly favor either side because the evidence is closely
divided. Assume for now that the third-party arbiter adopts a policy of sig-
naling his particular belief to the parties, including his indecision in case
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(iii). If the disputants receive signal (i) or (ii), then they will both update
their beliefs in light of this new information. This updating might cause the
losing party to update his beliefs sufficiently to align them with the prevail-
ing party, but I defer discussing these outcomes until the next subsection.
By contrast, signal (iii) is unlikely ever to cause either party to update its
beliefs sufficiently to align them with the other party. Signal (iii) seems too
weak to cause the parties to change their behavior, and therefore too weak
to avert conflict.
But signal (iii) is nonetheless important for its screening function.
When the facts are closely divided, a signal of this fact raises the probability
that the dispute is genuine because both sides actually believe the facts fa-
vor their position. Thus, the signal that the case is a close one provides
some evidence to each party that the other side is not raising the dispute
strategically. As such, while still refusing to randomize as a general mecha-
nism for resolving disputes, the parties can benefit from following a strategy
of randomizing in this kind of case. A player will not necessarily fear stra-
tegic exploitation from correlating his strategy with a random event in just
those cases where a neutral arbiter has signaled that the facts do not clearly
favor either side. Signaling screens out those cases where the parties would
be exploited by using randomization and leaves those where they would
not.
Put differently, to address the problem of strategic disputes, we need a
mechanism that tends to resolve disputes against the party who raises a dis-
pute strategically. A signal does this. The more probable one party be-
lieves it is that the facts favor the other party, the more the former will an-
ticipate that the arbiter will signal in favor of the latter."' Thus, although a
party may not be able to tell whether the other party's claim of dispute is
genuine or strategic (because he may be confident in his position in either
case), he will still expect to win the adjudication far more often when the
other side's claim is strategic. And a party expects to lose disputes when he
decides to raise a dispute strategically. With these assurances in place, the
parties may then agree to randomize in the cases where the arbiter believes
the facts are unclear.
Of course, an arbiter will err on occasion, so this solution is not per-
fect. A party will still expect to win some small number of strategic dis-
putes. If adjudication were costless, then any positive error rate would pre-
vent expressive adjudication from working because the creation of a
strategic dispute would have a possible upside (the favorable result when
the adjudicator errs) and no possible downside. But adjudication is not
free. One cost is any fee the arbiter charges. Another is the time and re-
sources adjudication requires. A final cost is a loss of one's credibility be-
fore the set of possible arbiters. The danger here is that "crying wolf" too
110. Though I assume for simplicity that the arbiter can form only one of three possible beliefs-
favoring one or the other party or favoring neither-this way of phrasing the point show that the argu-
ment works if we assume a continuous range of possible beliefs.
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often will earn one a reputation for inventing disputes - a reputation that
will make one more likely to lose future adjudications."' These costs con-
stitute disincentives to inventing disputes because parties are certain to in-
cur costs and yet unlikely to gain the benefits of winning the adjudication.
The point is not that the system will necessarily, or even probably, deter all
strategic disputes but that it can deter enough of them to make the parties
want to randomize in disputes the arbiter says are "close.""' 2 Subsequently,
the outcome selected at random is now focal, which creates self-fulfilling
expectations this outcome will occur.
In addition, note that signaling requires a third party. A randomizing
device such as a coin flip cannot signal. Because the parties do not know in
advance whether or not they need a signal to screen out a strategic dispute,
they require a third party in every dispute.
In sum, signaling solves the objections I raised to the focal point and
correlated equilibrium theories. A signal necessitates a third party and
third-party signaling ameliorates the strategic problem by making it less
likely strategic disputants will prevail. The next step is to address the objec-
tions I previously raised to signaling.
2. Step Two: Disputants Correlate Strategies with the Arbitral Signal
With the threat of strategic disputing sufficiently limited, the parties
can simply correlate their strategies with the arbiter's signal regardless of
how much they update their beliefs. In other words, the disputants can
benefit by treating the signal as if it were perfectly accurate even though
they know it is not. The reason is simply the logic of the correlated equilib-
rium. I objected to that logic in Part II only because of the two problems
that, as just indicated, signaling resolves.
To see the point, return again to the simplified assumption that the
arbiter will consider the evidence and form one of three beliefs: the facts (i)
clearly favor party A, (ii) clearly favor party B, or (iii) do not clearly favor
either side. The last subsection addressed only signal (iii); now consider the
effect of signals (i) or (ii). If an accurate arbiter sends these signals, the los-
111. Of course, reputational concerns might themselves prevent a dispute because at least one of the
parties might always give in rather than risk a reputational loss. But reputation works imperfectly be-
cause information about others' past actions is imperfect. For the same reason, information costs might
allow an individual to avoid a bad reputation despite raising many strategic disputes. But various infor-
mational devices can make this reputational market work fairly well. For example, disputants might in-
vest in acquiring the evidence of their opponents' litigiousness. Note also the advantage of having a single
arbiter in a small community who might simply remember what individuals are most likely to raise dis-
putes strategically.
112. The concern over error rate, however, points again to the importance of the arbiter's accu-
racy for generating compliance (on this self-interested basis). The more accurate the arbiter is, the
rarer it will be that he rules in favor of an individual who created a dispute strategically, and therefore
the lower the risk of adjudicatory exploitation. Thus, signaling accuracy matters not only as it did in a
prior section-where more accurate signals produce more updating which produces more behavioral
change-signaling accuracy also matters because the arbiter is using signaling to identify the cases that
are genuine disputes for which the parties can agree to randomize without fear of exploitation.
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ing party will sometimes update his beliefs sufficiently to align them with
the other party, thereby resolving the dispute. I noted two objections
above: (1) that if a party's prior belief about the relevant facts is sufficiently
strong, he will not change his belief enough to change his behavior (even
though he does revise his estimate of the probabilities somewhat), and (2)
that disputants would always seek signals from multiple sources and not
from a centralized adjudicator.
The crucial point, however, is that, even if the parties are unpersuaded
by an adjudicative signal, it will still benefit them ex ante to correlate their
strategies with this signal and only this signal. And once they seek adjudi-
cation, the resulting declaration will make focal a particular outcome, creat-
ing self-fulfilling expectations that it will occur.
The parties will favor adjudication ex ante as long as the arbiter is un-
biased; if so, then each party will expect to prevail in adjudication of genu-
ine disputes about fifty percent of the time. As the Brown and Ayres ex-
ample demonstrated, there are many situations where the parties are better
off correlating their strategies with a random event because the parties then
each have an equal chance at getting their preferred payoff, while at the
same time reducing to zero the chance of noncoordinated outcome that
harms them both. Put differently, prior to adjudication each party expects
to be in the situation described above -unpersuaded by an adjudicative
signal contrary to one's position-no more often than to be in the opposite
position-the recipient of a favorable adjudicative signal that does not per-
suade the other party. Because failing to resolve the dispute is costly to
both sides, each is better off accepting this equal chance of prevailing,
which means correlating their strategies with the arbiter's public signal."3
Thus, the idea of coordinating on a focal signal explains how adjudication
works when the signal is too weak to influence behavior via its direct affect
on beliefs.
Moreover, correlating strategies with a public signal requires identify-
ing in advance the one and only signal that will serve as the focal basis for
coordinating, which explains why the parties seek a centralized and hierar-
chical set of adjudicative signals (with possible but limited appeals). As ex-
plained above, the focality of the agreed-to adjudication is necessary to
produce ex post compliance with the endorsed outcome rather than its op-
posite and rather than with some competing expression." 4 That the expres-
sion has to be focal explains why adjudication tends to be centralized in a
single actor or institution.
113. Stephenson's rational choice account of the institution of judicial review makes a similar point,
at least implicitly. Stephenson, supra note 17, does not avert to the problem of strategic disputing, nor the
concepts of a focal point or correlated equilibrium. Nonetheless, his formal model of judicial review im-
plicitly mixes signaling with the idea of a correlated equilibrium in a way similar to what I have described.
114. See supra Part II.B.2.
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3. Step Three: The Arbiter Sends an Undifferentiated Signal
Having completed the penultimate step in the argument, I reach a fi-
nal objection. The process just described still does not map onto adjudica-
tion because adjudicators do not send signals like the third one described
above that fail to favor either side. Courts do not say "too close to call"
(and disputants do not employ random devices after such signals). Here, I
offer to explain how and why randomization is concealed.
Suppose again that an arbiter assesses the competing claims of the dis-
putants, and concludes that the facts: (i) clearly favor party A, (ii) clearly
favor party B, or (iii) do not clearly favor either side. But now suppose that
the arbiter only sends one of two signals: that A prevails or that B prevails.
The arbiter maps the signals to his beliefs by following this strategy: "If I
reach conclusion (i) then I will signal 'A prevails.' If I reach conclusion (ii)
then I will signal 'B prevails.' If I reach conclusion (iii) then I will randomly
choose between delivering the signal 'A prevails' and the signal 'B pre-
vails."' In other words, the arbiter no longer differentiates in his signal be-
tween the cases where he perceives the evidence to be clear and those
where he perceives the evidence to be unclear. Instead of publicly identify-
ing the close cases where the disputants could gain by randomizing, the ar-
biter himself randomizes in those cases and then sends one of the signals he
would send when the evidence actually favored a particular party.
From the parties' perspective, there is no difference in following a
strategy that randomizes in certain cases the arbiter identifies and following
a strategy that permits the arbiter to randomize in those same cases. If A
and B are planning on correlating strategies with signals (i) and (ii) and
randomizing after signal (iii), then they would also be willing to correlate
strategies with signals (i) and (ii) and to allow the arbiter to randomize after
reaching the decision that previously resulted in signal (iii). From the par-
ties' perspective, nothing of importance changes in moving from the fully
candid to the more discreet arbiter. At this point we reach a process that
looks more like adjudication, where the arbiter purports to decide every
case and resists full disclosure of his own uncertainties about the dispute.
The question arises, however, why arbiters rarely reveal their own in-
decision. If I am right in thinking that an arbiter occasionally reaches belief
(iii), why do we observe a near universal refusal to signal this indecisive-
ness? One answer is that individuals are more likely to comply with deci-
sions they regard as legitimate and that individuals are less likely to per-
ceive as legitimate a decision where the arbiter admits uncertainty and
randomizes. But there is a self-interested reason I want to identify if only
because the idea of an undifferentiated signal cuts against my claim above
that individuals competing for the job of arbiter will signal their actual be-
liefs. If that is true, why not signal one's actual indecision?
The answer is that the arbiter is concerned about revealing his fallibil-
ity. Disputants seek accurate adjudicators. The need for the arbiter to pro-
ject accuracy (to obtain future opportunities) creates an incentive to con-
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ceal his failure to form a determinative belief, that is, to conceal the fact
that he had to randomize. In a sporting event, for example, a referee who
has to resort to randomization twenty times a game will seem less compe-
tent than a referee who has to resort to randomization only five times a
game, other things equal. Even though everyone knows there are some
calls that are too close for anyone to determine, those competing to be refe-
rees will understandably engage in a race to the bottom, where the bottom
means the referee claims never to require randomization because, in every
case, he has actually determined the relevant facts."5
To summarize: the success of adjudication does not depend entirely
on the sanctions law threatens nor the willingness of moral agents to defer
to the judiciary's perceived legitimacy. In circumstances of multiple equi-
libria, individuals motivated by selfishness (in general or in a particular con-
text) have an incentive to seek out and comply with adjudication, even
when the arbiter lacks the power to sanction. I rejected some explanations
for this result. Disputants do not generally want to correlate their strategies
on the focal points the arbiter constructs entirely at random because that
would invite strategic exploitation. And a losing party will often remain
unpersuaded by adjudicative signals favoring the prevailing party. But
there is nonetheless a synergy between focal points, correlated equilibria,
and signaling. Expressive adjudication can, therefore, generate some com-
pliance because disputants benefit by correlating their behavior on the arbi-
ter's focal signal.
B. From Finding Facts to Setting Precedent: The Expressive Power of
Rule Articulation
As I have developed the theory, it seems that third-party expression
can resolve only factual disputes and influence only the behavior of the dis-
putants. If so, then this is a theory of dispute resolution but not adjudica-
tion. Judicial bodies, particularly common-law courts, wield the additional
power of precedent, which involves resolving ambiguities in rules rather
than facts, and by which courts influence the future behavior of parties
other than the disputants. If the expressive theory cannot account for this
power-if precedent depends strictly on sanctions for legitimacy-then it
has a narrow, and arguably disappointing, scope. In this section, however, I
explain how third parties can also use expression to resolve disputes that
arise from ambiguities in the formal or informal rules that govern behavior.
Mere expression can influence behavior by sharpening the common under-
standing of what formal or informal rules require.
115. One might object that an individual cannot really randomize without referring to an external
object like a coin or die, which would then reveal what the arbiter wishes to conceal. But it is not neces-
sary to randomize literally. In an athletic competition, for example, a referee might alternate, so that the
first "tie" goes to Team A, the second to Team B, the third back to Team A, and so forth. This descrip-
tion also fits what many sports fans suspect of many actual referees.
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Existing theory already demonstrates the expressive power of rule ar-
ticulation in the context of private contracts. Most commonly, scholars em-
ploy the idea of a potentially self-enforcing agreement arising from an iter-
ated PD game.116 When two individuals are in this situation they will
benefit if they can sustain a cooperative equilibrium, as where each individ-
ual employs a strategy that conditions his cooperation on the other player's
cooperation. For example, two nations might agree to restrain tariffs. But
the players will not sustain the cooperative equilibrium if they do not have
concordant expectations about what behavior will constitute cooperation as
well as common beliefs in each round about whether the other has engaged
in that behavior. In the example, they have to agree on what constitutes a
tariff.
The problem with self-enforcing agreements is that expectations and
beliefs inevitably diverge. Garrett and Weingast emphasize that there is of-
ten more than one way to cooperate to achieve the Pareto-optimal out-
come.'17 To create concordant expectations, therefore, the parties must
agree on what each will regard as cooperative and defective behavior. Yet
the agreement they create will, like all contracts, be incomplete."' Success
may then depend on third-party adjudication to resolve ambiguities. Be-
cause the iterated PD game is generally thought to describe a common
situation, this story suggests a broad role for expressive adjudication.
This analysis of formal order, however, omits half the story-arguably
the more interesting half. Where other theorists have stressed the example
of self-enforcing agreements, in this section I emphasize spontaneous order
or conventions that arise without agreement or other design."9 I follow
Lon Fuller's distinction between "contract law" -meaning the rules created
by the two parties to a contract to govern their interaction (not the govern-
ment's rules for contracts) -and "customary law"-meaning the rules that
arise without design to govern the interaction of individuals in a larger
population." In these terms, existing analysis focuses on the role for ex-
116. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1113, 1170-72 (1999); Posner & Yoo, supra note 87, at 13; Stephenson, supra note 17, at 60-64.
117. See Garrett & Weingast, supra note 17.
118. See id.; Posner & Yoo, supra note 87, at 15.
119. A substantial literature in law and economics addresses the interaction of formal and informal
order. For a comprehensive review and bibliography, see Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen,
Norms in Law and Economics, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven M. Shavell eds., forthcoming 2005). This literature mostly uses the term "norm" to refer to infor-
mal order, but I distinguish between "norms" and "conventions." See also Richard H. McAdams, Con-
ventions and Norms: Philosophical Aspects, in 4 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 2735-41 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). Roughly speaking, a convention is "the
coordinated expectations that sustain a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, in circumstances where multiple
pure strategy equilibria are possible, and the behavioral regularity that the equilibrium represents." Id. at
2738. Thus, a convention is explained by game theory with no need for additional concepts. By contrast,
a norm is a behavioral regularity sustained in part by normative attitudes in which individuals at least ap-
prove others' conformity to the regularity and/or disapprove their nonconformity. See McAdams & Ras-
musen, supra; Philip N. Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725, 725
(1990).
120. Fuller, supra note 6, at 13-20.
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pressive adjudication in the context of contract law but not customary
law.12' To include the latter, I briefly describe some of the evolutionary
game-theory literature about the emergence of conventions, using the iter-
ated Hawk/Dove game to illustrate. I claim that expressive adjudication
can resolve disputes about what behavior a convention requires in a given
situation, and that such resolutions create effective precedent for future be-
havior in similar situations.122
Subsection 1 briefly describes the evolution of informal order, specifi-
cally, conventions. Subsection 2 explains how conceptual ambiguities in the
categories of a convention cause conflict. Subsection 3 explains how expres-
sive adjudication can resolve such conflict by setting a precedent for future
behavior.
1. The Emergence of Informal Order
Evolutionary game theory is a particularly mathematical-some
would say abstruse-area of game theory.1"3 Yet even an informal under-
standing provides a useful but neglected tool for understanding the rela-
tionship between law and custom.24 Indeed, this theory is arguably what
Fuller had in mind when he decried the absence of "any inquiry into the ac-
tual social processes through which this [customary] law came into being
and by which it is sustained."'
Evolutionary theory shows that, when a population of players repeat-
edly encounters a particular game, repetition can eventually produce a
strong pattern of expectations about what strategies others will use. Thus,
121. The primary exception is my prior work, Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 8, which provides a
preliminary statement of what follows in the text. Posner & Yoo, supra note 87, briefly develop a similar
point about customary international law, but do not discuss the mechanisms that produce conventions,
the causes of conventional ambiguity, or the importance of focal signals to compliance.
122. This is a very different claim than the argument I advanced in McAdams, Attitudinal Theory
supra note 7, at 374-78, that courts could influence future behavior by signaling the attitudes of a commu-
nity regarding the regulated behavior. That "attitudinal theory" of expressive law assumes that individu-
als seek the "esteem" or approval of others, as well as to avoid shame or "disesteem," and that a court
(like a legislative body) could signal the local pattern of approval and disapproval. The theory that follows
in the text explains the expressive power of precedent even if neither of those assumptions is true.
123. See, e.g., DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVIN, THE THEORY OF LEARNING IN GAMES
(1998); LARRY SAMUELSON, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION (1997); H. PEYTON
YOUNG, INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
INsTrrtrrIONS (1998); SKYRMS, supra note 21.
124. One of the few efforts at applying the evolutionary literature to customary law is Randal C.
Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1225 (1997).
125. Fuller, supra note 6, at 5. Decades ago, Fuller envisioned customary law's language of interac-
tion as follows:
To interact meaningfully men require a social setting in which the moves of the participating
players will fall generally within some predictable pattern. To engage in effective social behavior
men need the support of intermeshing anticipations that will let them know what their opposite
numbers will do, or that will at least enable them to gauge the general scope of the repertory from
which responses to their actions will be drawn.
Id. at 2. He also refers to "interactional expectancies" and a sociological term- "complementary expecta-
tions"-all of which are in tune with the game theory I am about to describe. Jd. at 3,5,9.
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in the common situations where there is more than one possible equilib-
rium,'26 a pattern of expectations can emerge that sustains a pattern of be-
havior because each person is best off conforming to the behavioral pattern
given that he expects everyone else to do so. The resulting pattern of expec-
tations and behavior is a "convention."' 27 An obvious example is the prob-
lem of coordinating driving on the left or right side of the road; the practice
that emerges is a convention. Once a conventional pattern of behavior
spontaneously arises (e.g., driving on the right), it tends to be self-
sustaining. That is, even though conventions arise without design, confor-
mity to conventions is "self-enforcing" because a person is worse off by be-
ing the only one (or one of a few) to deviate from the convention (as by
driving on the left when everyone else drives on the right).
To illustrate, my primary example for the remainder of the article is
property. The convention of property is perhaps the most discussed exam-
ple in the evolutionary literature."2 Here, I briefly describe one account.'29
Robert Sugden and Jack Hirshliefer (separately) used evolutionary game
theory to explain David Hume's claim that property is conventional. 30
They posit that, in a "state of nature," with no state to enforce property
rights, disputes over particular resources (e.g., a set of firewood) may be
modeled by an Iterated Hawk/Dove ("HD") Game. In their models, Hawk
refers to an aggressive claim to the resource, Dove is deference to the oth-
ers' claim, the Hawk/Hawk outcome is violence, and the Dove/Dove out-
come is an even split of the resource. The use of the Iterated HD Game is a
plausible model for those cases where (a) the fighting capabilities of the
players are roughly equal (otherwise there may be a dominant strategy for
126. Or, as Fuller termed, there is more than one possible "system of stabilized interactional expec-
tancies." Id. at 10.
127. See DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 42 (1969); McAdams, supra
note 119, at 2738; Postema, supra note 64, at 176.
128. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN ADVERSITY 223-34 (1987); SUGDEN, supra
note 33, at 55-103; see also JOHN MAYNARD SMrrH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982). In
the law and economics literature, see discussions in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 156,
174-76, 179 (1991); POSNER, supra note 92, at 177-79; Kenton K. Yee, Ownership and Trade from Evolu-
tionary Games, 23 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 183, 187-94 (2003). I have discussed the example several
times beginning with McAdams, Focal Point, supra note 7. Indeed, this section draws on Ginsburg &
McAdams, supra note 8, at 1253-56. See also Richard H. McAdams, Conformity to Inegalitarian Conven-
tions and Norms: The Contribution of Coordination and Esteem, 88 THE MONIST 238-50 (2005).
129. It is not important to my expressive point that one believe that what follows is the best account
of the origin of property. For example, though the theory following in the text explains property as
emerging from a state of nature, one can instead use evolutionary game theory to explain property as aris-
ing spontaneously from a collectivist regime where resources are shared. See Samuel Bowles & Jung-
Kyoo Choi, The First Property Rights Revolution (Oct. 28, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). This has the advantage of corresponding to known history, specifically, the human transition
from hunter/gathering societies involving sharing to agricultural ones involving private ownership of land.
Nonetheless, I use the analysis in the text as an illustration, because the analysis is more established and
considerably simpler.
130. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1740,
Book 3, Part 2, Section 2) (property "arises gradually and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our
repeated experience of the inconvenience of transgressing it"); see also Peter Vanderschraaf, The Infor-
mal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 215,230-45 (1998).
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the better fighter to play Hawk and the weaker player to play Dove) and
(b) the costs of fighting over the resource are large compared to the value
of the resource (and hence, the worst outcome for both sides is a
Hawk/Hawk fight).
If these assumptions are correct, one can view property as a complex
set of expectations that emerges over time in the iterated game. According
to Hirshliefer and Sugden, the key is that the individuals observe some fea-
ture of the repeated situation that distinguishes or labels their roles in the
game.' One such asymmetry is the fact that one of them is currently in
physical possession of the property in dispute and the other is not. By itself,
this observation creates new possible strategies such as: (1) when possessor
play Hawk and when nonpossessor play Dove, or (2) when possessor play
Dove and when non-possessor play Hawk. Finally, the existence of these
new strategies creates two new possible equilibria where everyone plays
strategy (1) or everyone plays strategy (2). For example, if everyone else is
playing strategy (1), then when you are the possessor, you expect the other
player to play Dove, and when you are the nonpossessor, you expect the
other player to play Hawk. Your best reply is then to play Hawk when pos-
sessor and Dove when nonpossessor, which is to say to play strategy (1) like
everyone else. The result is a first approximation of the convention of
property.
Though nothing guarantees that this convention will arise (everyone
playing strategy (2) is also possible),32 the theory demonstrates that the so-
cial practice of property can emerge from the repeated interactions of indi-
viduals in a state of nature, without a third-party enforcer creating or pro-
tecting property rights. Significantly, the analysis does not require that
individuals act morally or perceive property as legitimate. Moreover, as
long as every player can perfectly determine whether he is a possessor or
nonpossessor in a given case, the property convention (or its opposite) will
eliminate Hawk/Hawk fights.'33
131. See HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 128, at 223-34 (1987); SKYRMS, supra note 121; SUGDEN, supra
note 33, at 55-103; McAdams, supra note 128.
132. Sugden argues that the property convention is more likely to arise than is the opposite conven-
tion because of payoff differences between possessors and nonpossessors. See SUGDEN, supra note 33. at
89-91. Yee, supra note 127, concurs on this point. Hirshleifer makes the claim regarding land, that terri-
toriality is likely to be adaptive given that possessors tend to know better and be better matched with land
than nonpossessors. See Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 649,
657-58 (1980). See generally Michael J. Casimir, The Dimensions of Territoriality: An Introduction, in
MOBILITY AND TERRITORIALrrY: SOCIAL AND SPATIAL BOUNDARIES AMONG FORAGERS, FISHERS,
PASTORALiSTS AND PERIPATETICS 1 (Michael J. Casimir & Aparna Rao eds., 1992). Nonetheless, as a
general matter, the selection of particular equilibria in evolutionary game theory is highly contingent. As
Fuller, supra note 6, at 33, anticipated: "[I]f we seek to discover constancies among the different systems
of customary law we shall find them in the interactional processes by which those systems come into be-
ing, rather than in the specific product that emerges, which must of necessity reflect history and context."
133. Of course, as I discuss below, each player cannot perfectly determine whether he is a possessor
or nonpossessor, because the concept of possession is subject to residual ambiguity and possible excep-
tions.
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Note also that the evolutionary process will not stop at such a simple
convention (nor need it ever stop). Suppose the players notice not only the
asymmetry of physical possession but also a temporal asymmetry-when
physical possession occurs. The combination of these asymmetries-
possession and time-produces a more complex set of roles the players can
occupy: not just (1) the current possessor and (2) the current nonpossessor,
but (3) the original possessor and (4) the original nonpossessor. The larger
set of possible roles creates a larger set of possible conventions. One obvi-
ous (but not inevitable) possibility is the familiar idea of first possession)3 4
The common expectation may be that everyone will play Dove against the
original possessor, who will always play Hawk (and perhaps also that eve-
ryone but the original possessor will play Dove against the current posses-
sor, who will play Hawk against everyone but the original possessor).'35 In
this fashion, individuals may come to expect that others will play Hawk or
Dove depending on the asymmetry of first possession.
So stated, however, one can immediately discern a possible objection
to an expressive theory of precedent. Given that this form of unintentional,
spontaneous order can prevent Hawk/Hawk fights, why is adjudication
necessary? Indeed, given settled expectations, how can pure expression in-
fluence behavior? On the one hand, if the policymaker favors the existing
convention, then there is no need for any intervention, including adjudica-
tion. On the other hand, if a policymaker wants to change the prevailing
convention, by redirecting settled expectations toward some other behavior
(e.g., a switch to driving on the left), then mere expression is insufficient.
Sanctions and/or legitimacy are strictly necessary to upset a self-sustaining
convention. Thus, if I am going to explain a role for expression given these
constraints-to prove the precedential power of adjudicative expression-I
must explain why spontaneous forces do not fully coordinate behavior
without the need for adjudication.
The next subsection advances just this sort of claim, arguing that ex-
pressive adjudication can effectively set precedents for conventional behav-
ior before expectations are firmly settled. This is not a surprise because
genuine disputes arise because expectations are not firmly settled. The
problem is one of residual ambiguity about the conceptual categories the
individuals use in forming their expectations. With enough time for endless
trial and error, evolutionary game theory shows that individuals could re-
134. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221, 1241-42
(1979); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73,74-75 (1985); cf Rich-
ard A Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 515,528-30
(2002).
135. 1 will not discuss the probabilities that this convention will emerge. I do note that a first posses-
sion convention is more efficient than a current possession convention (because the latter diminishes the
incentive to invest in property, given the difficulty of continuously "holding" it). This efficiency gives the
convention a greater resilience that makes it more likely to persist over time. But others have show why
efficiency does not ensure that the convention will emerge or survive over time. See Mahoney & San-
chirico, supra note 101, at 2028. For my purposes, all that matters is that the convention is possible, so it
can illustrate the problem of ambiguity that plagues conventions.
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solve residual ambiguities without design. But ambiguity will cause conflict
during the period of uncertainty, possibly a very long time, creating an ad-
vantage to intentional clarification of the convention.
13 6
2. Conceptual Ambiguity in Informal Order
In the prior subsection, the existence of a convention-e.g., first pos-
sessors play Hawk-seems to cover all possible situations in a straightfor-
ward manner. Real-world conventions do not work so flawlessly. 37 De-
spite the presence of a convention, there always remains the possibility that
a situation will occur in which the players lack common expectations about
what each other will do. As Gerald Postema describes it, while "the stan-
dard situations needing coordination are provided for," "[t]here may... be
substantial differences of opinion in the community regarding what the
convention requires in some specific instances.""13 Without common expec-
tations, the players will frequently fail to coordinate their behavior. 39
Garrett and Weingast make this point with respect to the contracts
that define cooperation in an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma-a form of in-
tentional order. Because contracts are always incomplete, some event for
which the contract is not fully specified may cause the parties' expectations
to diverge. Here, I extend the problem of ambiguity to explain the imper-
fection of spontaneous conventions (unintentional order). There are two
problems: the convention may be ambiguous because (1) it is based on a
fuzzy asymmetry or (2) there is uncertainty about its completeness.
I will illustrate these points with the property convention discussed
above. Repetition of the HD Game may produce the convention of defer-
ring to first possessors. This theory is useful for explaining why those claim-
ing to own things often seek to communicate their claim to the world by
various markings, such as boundary markings or other physical markers on
land."4 This sort of communication avoids misunderstandings about who is
in possession, which in the HD Game described above is necessary and suf-
ficient to avoid the Hawk/Hawk outcome. The problem, however, is that
despite these efforts, possession often remains ambiguous, a point well
136. I leave aside the possibility that intentional resolution of the ambiguity will, on average, lead to
better or worse conventions. This is obviously an important and interesting issue, related to the question
of whether formal rules can improve upon the level of welfare created by informal order-conventions or
norms. See, e.g., Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 101, at 2058-62; Posner, supra note 64. Nonetheless,
the purpose of this article is to establish that selfish individuals have an incentive (other than sanctions
and legitimacy) to comply with adjudicative judgments.
137. See POSNER, supra note 92, at 177-79; Garrett & Weingast, supra note 17.
138. Postema, supra note 64, at 178.
139. They may still coordinate by accident. For example, there may be no common expectation
about whether to drive on the left or the right side of the road, but if the drivers may get lucky and choose
the same side.
140. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1328-30 (1993); Epstein, Allo-
cation of Commons, supra note 134, at 521-33; Rose, supra note 134, at 81-82.
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made by the property scholar Carol Rose."' Where possession is ambigu-
ous, the roles the players occupy will be ambiguous, and they may each ex-
pect the other to play Dove, with the result being a Hawk/Hawk conflict.
Consider two types of ambiguity.'42
a. Fuzzy Boundaries
The convention may be ambiguous because the boundaries of the
asymmetry underlying it are fuzzy, at least in part.'43 Recall that the con-
vention arises because the players mutually observe an asymmetry that dis-
tinguishes their roles in each play of the game, and then play strategies
based on what role they occupy. What asymmetries the players notice in
their situation depends on the conceptual categories they use for under-
standing their situation.'"
As an example, consider an ambiguity in the property convention of
first possession. When exactly does possession occur? One of the more
famous property cases poses this question regarding a wild fox. In Pierson
v. Post,145 Post hunted a fox for a time and was about to shoot it when Pier-
son appeared, killed the fox, and took it. If possession required killing or
physical grabbing, then the Pierson was the first possessor; if some broader
concept of control (or investment in acquiring control) is sufficient, Post
was the first possessor.146  The same issue arises in other cases where indi-
viduals attempt to transform other wild animals or gas reserves into prop-
erty.'47 Similarly, nations disputing over a territory often have different ver-
141. See Rose, supra note 134, at 82-88. She identifies two ambiguities I do not explicitly pursue in
the text, though these work in favor of the argument I am developing. One is the problem that possession
(or the "text" of possession) may occur at the "wrong" time-after multiple parties have expended effort
seeking to acquire the resource. Id. at 82--84. A second problem is the problem of differing audiences-
that symbols of possession that seem clear to one community or culture will be unclear to another. Id. at
84-88.
142. The following six paragraphs draw on Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 80, at 1256-61.
143. The idea here follows from the general concept of "fuzzy sets." See, e.g., GEORGE J. KLIR &
TINA A. FOLGER, FUZZY SETS, UNCERTAINTY, AND INFORMATION (1988); Lotti Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, 8
INFO. & CONTROL 338-53 (1965).
144. There is much that might be said at this point about the connection between evolutionary game
theory and theories of social construction, but I want merely to observe that the conceptual categories will
invariably distinguish the players' roles only imperfectly. See, e.g., James Johnson, Is Talk Really Cheap?
Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory and Rational Choice, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 74 (1993);
John W. Schiemann, Meeting Halfway Between Rochester and Frankfurt: Generative Salience, Focal
Points, and Strategic Interaction, 44 AM. J. POL. SC. 1 (2000). Cf Richard H. McAdams, Comment on the
Annual Presidential Address to the Law & Society Association, Cultural Contingency and Economic
Function: Bridge-Building from the Law & Economics Side, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 221,222-23 (2004).
145. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
146. The Court ruled for Pierson, holding that one must bring the animal within "certain control"
before one possesses and therefore owns it. See discussion in Rose, supra note 134, at 76.
147. The whaling industry, for example, struggled in the 19th century with the question who first
possesses a whale, the one who first harpoons it or the one who first harpoons it with a secure line from
the harpoon to the ship or boat. See ELLICKSON, supra note 128, at 191-206. Rose, supra note 134, at 77
n.21, cites cases discussing similar possession issues concerning oil and gas.
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sions of the precise point at which possession of the territory first oc-
curred."4
In disputes of this sort, the boundary defining the convention is fuzzy,
and therefore, the convention is (at the moment) ambiguous. The ambigu-
ity prevents there being any clear expectation about what a given person
will do. While the ambiguity lasts, the individuals may fail to coordinate
and end up in a Hawk/Hawk fight.
49
b. Potential Incompleteness
The convention may be ambiguous for another reason. Even if the
boundaries of the underlying asymmetries are perfectly clear, the conven-
tion is always potentially incomplete. That is, there may be uncertainty
about whether the set of expectations constituting a convention is subject to
exception. There are usually more asymmetries present in a situation than
are likely to be relevant to the players' behavior. The question always
arises: which asymmetries do not matter? We have already seen a possible
evolutionary path the property convention may take: first the players play
strategies based on the asymmetry of possession, then the players add the
further asymmetry of time and play strategies based on first possession.
But would the process stop at two asymmetries? Some asymmetries seem
irrelevant-e.g., the names of the parties-but it is difficult to specify in ad-
vance the criteria by which some asymmetries are relevant and some are
not. Without criteria for relevance there can always be a divergence of ex-
pectations concerning new asymmetries. Every convention -every set of
expectations -might be subject to an exception based on facts that have not
previously occurred, at least not in the precise combination now present.
To illustrate, suppose that A is unquestionably the first occupier of a
plot of land, but that he vacates the area, after which B occupies the land
openly for twenty years. Suppose A is silent about B's use of the land for
this time, but then reasserts his claim, demanding that B vacate the plot.
Given the first possession convention, will the non-original possessor (B)
play Dove? B will play Dove if he assumes that the only asymmetries rele-
vant to A's behavior are those embodied in the concept of first possession.
But it is possible that the players will take account of another time asymme-
try (in addition to who possessed the territory first), which is how long the
current possessor has been in possession. Even in a state of nature, it is
148. See discussion of international examples in Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 8, at 1258-59.
149. If the ambiguity in the roles of "original possessor" and "original nonpossessor" were suffi-
ciently severe, it would be unlikely that any convention would arise based on that asymmetry. But the
convention might arise because the asymmetry works in what Postema, supra note 64, at 178, calls the
"standard case," while ambiguity arises only in the residual case. This would occur if, for example, ninety
percent of the time, the same individual first tracks, corners, kills, and grabs a wild animal. Thus, even
without a sharp understanding of which of these acts defines possession, if they usually favor the same
individual, it may pay for individuals to adopt strategies based on first possession. But perhaps ten per-
cent of the time, the concept's application is uncertain because different individuals take each of the steps
associated with first possession.
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possible that the players will adopt more complex strategies that render the
original description of the convention-that it always favors first posses-
sors -incomplete. The convention that eventually emerges might instead
be deference to the first possessor except when the current possessor has
occupied and claimed the territory for more than, say, twenty years, in
which case everyone defers to the current possessor. In other words, we
might get the convention similar to what the common law terms adverse
possession."'
There is, however, no guarantee that the extended occupancy excep-
tion will arise. As a result, when these hypothetical facts-first possessor A
tolerates B's twenty-year occupancy-first occur (or occur for the first time
within memory), there will be uncertainty about whether the new asymme-
try between the players-one being a current possessor of long duration
and the other not-will matter. The ambiguity of potential incompleteness
is common because new circumstances are pervasive and they inevitably
raise the question of how the old convention now applies.' Although
repetition may eventually resolve the ambiguity, conflicting beliefs about
the relevance of the new asymmetry may produce conflict, as each plays
Hawk expecting the other to play Dove.
3. Using Expressive Adjudication to Resolve Ambiguity and Create
Precedent for Future Behavior
When conventional ambiguity causes conflict, a third party may influ-
ence the behavior of the two disputants by offering a clarification of the
convention. Unlike the resolution of a factual dispute, however, a third
party's clarification of a convention can, if sufficiently publicized, influence
the future behavior of the disputants and others in the community in which
the convention exists. An adjudicator's focal signal concerning the conven-
tion creates a precedent for future behavior by making salient to commu-
nity members a particular solution to a recurring coordination game.
Aligning expectations in this way is usually socially valuable because it
works to avoid conflict without the need for future services of conflict reso-
lution.
To begin, I should define the difference between a genuine and strate-
gic dispute in this context. A genuine dispute exists because the players ac-
tually have divergent expectations, which occur either because there is ei-
ther residual fuzziness in the asymmetry that defines the behavior for this
150. See Rose, supra note 134, at 79. See discussion of international examples in Ginsburg &
McAdams, supra note 8, at 1260-61.
151. Lawyers are familiar with the idea that the facts of two cases are never exactly alike. As a logi-
cal matter, there are an infinite (or at least large) number of "circumstances" in a situation that may dis-
tinguish the roles of the two players. There are also an infinite (or large) number of potential role-
defining circumstances that arise for the first time in every conflict. See Robert Sugden, The Role of In-
ductive Reasoning in the Evolution of Conventions, 17 LAw & PHIL. 377 (1998). As a result, there is al-
ways (or usually) the potential that new circumstances, not accompanying past HD interactions, might
influence how the current FiD interaction will occur.
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circumstance, or uncertainty about the possible exceptions in the broader
convention for this circumstance. A strategic dispute exists when the par-
ties actually have consistent expectations, but one party pretends otherwise
in an effort to gain some advantage from disputing.
At this point, all of the above analysis of factual disputes carries
through to conceptual disputes. First, from the parties' perspectives, they
would benefit from a randomized solution to their genuine disputes caused
by fuzzy boundaries or potential incompleteness.15 z But they do not want to
commit to a strategy of randomizing all disputes because they would make
themselves vulnerable to strategic exploitation.'53 Signaling, however, can
ameliorate this problem."4 What is different in this context-with disputes
over the content of the convention-is what the third party signals: his be-
liefs, if any, about the existing state of expectations in the relevant community.
For example, if an individual seeks to raise a strategic dispute by contesting
the relevance of first possession to the expected behavior when in fact
nearly everyone in the community expects the first possessor to play Hawk,
then the third party can signal his belief that the existing convention clearly
sides with the person who is the first possessor. Similarly, if one disputant
claims to believe that there is an exception to the ordinary expectation (e.g.,
first possession does not apply when the first possessor is a minor), but the
third party believes that the existing expectations clearly reject such an ex-
ception (e.g., because there are clear precedents applying first possession to
cases involving minors), then he can signal his beliefs that existing expecta-
tions clearly sides with the first possessor.
Signaling lowers the returns to strategic disputing, which (as previ-
ously argued) makes it possible that the parties will benefit in the remaining
cases by following the adjudicator's randomly selected recommendation-a
constructed focal point. These genuine disputes are the cases of first im-
pression where there really is some fuzziness in a conventional boundary or
some uncertainty about a possible exception. As long as each party expects
to win with a probability close enough to fifty percent, then both may bene-
fit from correlating their strategy with the third party's recommendation,
thereby reducing to zero the probability of the noncoordinated outcome
each prefers to avoid.
As stated above, however, the additional significance of the adjudica-
tor's resolution of conventional ambiguity is that it may serve as a prece-
dent for the future behavior of the disputants and of other parties. The rea-
soning here is based on focal point analysis. The disputants tend to follow
the third party's recommendation because their common knowledge that
each is focusing unique attention on this message makes the third party's
recommended outcome salient; salience tends to create self-fulfilling expec-
tations that the salient outcome will occur. The same effect can occur for
152. See supra text accompanying notes 143-51.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 157-60.
154. See supra Part M.A.
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those not a party to the present dispute if the adjudicatory declaration is
publicized sufficiently. When future disputants face the same situation of
multiple equilibria, their best choice of behavior depends on what they ex-
pect the other to do. If nothing else creates determinate expectations,
common knowledge of the outcome of a prior adjudication of this issue
may suffice.'55 Certain ritualistic qualities of adjudication can create com-
mon knowledge of the decision among parties other than the disputants."6
Thus, a decision like the one in Pierson v. Post, if publicized, tends to
support the expectations that a hunter in the position of Pierson (who is the
first to kill the animal) will play Hawk and that a hunter in the position of
Post (who came close but had not yet killed or captured the animal) will
play Dove. If there had been no settled expectations at the time the court
decided Pierson v. Post, because the case genuinely was one of first impres-
sion, the case could have created such expectations in parties involved in
similar disputes in the future. When the issue is relitigated, the court may
find that the current expectations support a particular outcome, and may
then signal that fact. Focal signals thus provide a way of sharpening the
convention for everyone.
Finally, when the case is one of first impression, I have proceeded up
to now on the assumption that the adjudicator will randomly choose be-
tween the possibilities.'57 But while randomization may be appropriate for
resolving factual disputes when the evidence is evenly divided, there will
usually be reasons to prefer one way of resolving the conventional ambigu-
ity over another. More likely, considerations of efficiency or fairness justify
resolving the ambiguity in a particular way. In general I have nothing to
say about such matters here. Given the way I have described the problem,
however, one general consideration for selecting a resolution is the degree
of clarification that different resolutions permit. Some methods of clarify-
ing a convention to resolve the existing dispute may work to align expecta-
tions for a broad range of future situations; others may provide minimal
clarity beyond the precise situation." 8 The point is familiar to lawyers as
155. There are several layers to the possible precedential effect. First, if the future potential dispu-
tants have common knowledge of how the prior disputants behaved postadjudication, even without
knowing of the existence of the adjudication, that knowledge may generate self-fulfilling expectations of
the same outcome. Second, if the future potential disputants also have common knowledge of the prior
adjudication and its resolution, that resolution may strengthen the self-fulfilling expectations that it will
occur. Finally, if there is any weight given by one adjudicator to the conventional clarification of another
adjudicator, past adjudications not only make a particular outcome focal, but also predict the outcome
another adjudicator would reach. Even without adjudicating the dispute, this expected resolution may
further strengthen the expectations of what will occur. This latter point explains how stare decisis may
contribute to compliance. See infra text accompanying notes 222-32.
156. See CHwE, supra note 73.
157. Cf Postema, supra note 64, at 201 ("[Ilf judicial duty is ultimately conventional..., there will be
controversial cases in which, because there is no coordinated solution, there is no judicial duty to decide to
controverted issue in a particular way.").
158. Rose, supra note 134, at 77-78, emphasizes how courts defined property rights as deriving from
possession in such a way that emphasized the need for clear principles that would communicate to the
world the fact and boundaries of an individual's claim.
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the choice between bright-line rules and standards. Thus, in Pierson v.
Post, the rule favoring the party who first kills and holds the animal pro-
vides a clearer demarcation of possession than would a rule favoring the
one who hunted the animal for a "sufficient time" or who came "close" to
capturing it. 59
In contrast to my original focus on the process of adjudicating facts,
the process just described is the "law" part of adjudication. Sharpening the
definition and clarifying the completeness of a convention are what a court
does when it precisely states the legal rule in a case of first impression.
What I am adding here is an understanding of how the court, merely by ex-
pression, can influence behavior. Like the bystander-in-the-intersection,
the third party who points to and makes salient one particular outcome (in
a game of multiple equilibria) is likely to create self-fulfilling expectations
that each player will select the strategy associated with that outcome. One
of the parties in the present dispute, and one party in each future dispute,
will want to resist the adjudicator's suggestion that he play Dove, but the
third-party's cheap talk expression will cause him to do so anyway because
he now expects the other party to play Hawk."
That an adjudicative announcement today can avoid or resolve dis-
putes tomorrow is significant. Society may gain considerably from having
the convention clarified in this manner by aligning expectations and avoid-
ing conflict. In Part IV, I explore some implications of the expressive the-
ory, and contrast dispute resolution with the prospective effect of dispute
avoidance.
C. From Two-Party to Multi-Party Interactions: Adjudicating Public
Disputes
The discussion thus far has addressed only two-party disputes. I se-
lected this dyadic focus merely for ease of exposition. At each point, I
could have developed the theory of expressive adjudication using a game
with more than two parties, but it was easier to develop the ideas in the
context of simpler disputes. Now, however, I wish to extend the analysis to
159. There is a substantial literature on the general choice between rules and standards. See, e.g.,
Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279-
301 (1986); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150,
161 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621-23
(1992). The analysis here identifies one new consideration: rules are more likely than standards to clarify
expectations and thereby avoid conflict expressively. I make no claim that this advantage is decisive, even
where it applies (on which, see infra text accompanying notes 214-15). Because one can frequently rely
on sanctions or legitimacy to enforce either rules or standards, the real normative significance is a trade-
off: if sanctions are scarce, then one may prefer to use them more to enforce standards instead of rules
because the latter are more likely than the former to work expressively.
160. The same may be said of situations of intentional order, such as those arising from potentially
self-enforcing agreements arising in an Iterated PD game. As discussed above, there may be ambiguities
in the agreements or conventions that define "cooperation" and "defection," caused by fuzzy boundaries
or potential incompleteness. Adjudication may make one particular definition focal, thereby clarifying
the convention and aligning the players' expectations about future rounds.
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multi-party disputes. Multi-party disputes are more likely to constitute
public disputes, tracking what we consider to be matters of public law."'
An example is criminal law, which may be seen as a dispute between an in-
dividual and his community.
To begin, consider a distinction some norms theorists draw between
second-party and third-party systems of informal enforcement. 162  Recall
that, in game theory, once an equilibrium is reached, each party plays its
best response to what it expects the other to do. Violating a convention can
therefore be said to carry its own punishment. When the convention arises
from the interaction of just two parties, this punishment is second-party en-
forcement, where the second party is the individual in the game who is, in a
sense, the victim of the first party's violation. For example, if the driving
convention at intersections is for the driver on the left to yield to the driver
on the right, then one might say that the convention is "enforced" against
each driver-on-the-left by each second-party driver-on-the-right, because
the latter will collide with the former if he disregards the convention.163
By contrast, a considerable literature in and out of legal scholarship
discusses the existence of third-party enforcement of conventions and
norms.164 In contrast to the terminology I have used where the third party
is the arbiter or adjudicator in the disputing triad (which I will henceforth
refer to with the term "adjudicator"), third party in this context refers to
private individuals who participate in sanctioning the norm violator other
than an immediate victim of the violation. For example, Robert Ellickson
reports on third-party enforcement of property-related norms among
ranchers in Shasta County, California. 165  Lisa Bernstein describes third-
party enforcement of trading norms in various trade associations."
161. Technically, of course, a dyadic dispute need not be private because one or both parties might
be a public official acting in an official capacity. And a multi-party dispute might arise within a private
organization, such as a trade association. Nonetheless, public disputes are more likely to be public, and,
in any event, extending the expressive theory to cover multi-party cases will demonstrate the wider scope
of the theory.
162. See ELLICKSON, supra note 128, at 130-32; Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and
Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 489,495-96 (2002); McAdams, Focal Point Theory, supra note 6, at 1685.
163. Of course, the collision imposes symmetrical harms on both parties, so the victim of the violator
suffers as much as the violator. Nor is the collision caused by the victim for the purpose of punishing the
violator; it is instead the natural result of the failure to coordinate. Nonetheless, the term "second-party"
sanction is still useful to describe the source of the expected harm-from the other involved party-that
ordinarily causes an individual to comply with the convention. More importantly, it distinguishes systems
where the source of the expected harm is a third party, as the text explains.
164. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 128, at 126-31, was perhaps the first to emphasize third party
enforcement in his discussion of norms. Mahoney & Sanchirico explain third party enforcement solely as
an equilibrium. See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role
of Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1281 (2003). Using the distinction developed in McAdams & Rasmusen, supra
note 119, and McAdams, supra note 119, I would say that Ellickson discusses third-party enforcement of
"norms," while Mahoney & Sanchirico discuss third-party enforcement of "conventions." The point I
make in this subsection applies to either form of third-party enforcement.
165. ELLICKSON, supra note 128, at 29-64.
166. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Mer-
chant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996);
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Various theories seek to explain this phenomena. Third parties might
incur costs to enforce a norm because: (1) they have internalized the norm
and expect to enjoy feelings of pride or virtue when they enforce it and/or
to suffer guilt if they do not enforce it;167 (2) they value the esteem of others
and expect to gain esteem from observable enforcement efforts and to suf-
fer shame from the observable failure to enforce;"6 (3) they wish to signal
certain attractive traits or abilities by their willingness to incur enforcement
costs; 169 or (4) they are in an equilibrium in which they expect others to pun-
ish them for failing to enforce the norm. 70
Whatever the explanation for norm enforcement, the expressive adju-
dication theory applies to these third-party enforcement systems just as it
does when the dispute arises within second-party enforcement systems.
With multiple parties there is, of course, the dispute that exists between the
individual suspected of a norm violation and the third parties who suspect
him of it. But to explain the effect of expressive adjudication, I will instead
focus on the disputes that arise among the potential third-party sanctioners.
Any system of third-party enforcement requires that third parties
form beliefs about what the norm requires and whether a particular indi-
vidual has met those requirements. Disputes arise in such systems when the
third parties disagree about either issue. If the norm requirements are am-
biguous because the conceptual boundaries are fuzzy or potentially incom-
plete, then some third parties may believe that the facts constitute a norm
violation while others believe they do not. Even if the norm requirements
are clear, if the facts are ambiguous then some third parties may believe
that the accused individual violated the norm while others believe he did
not.
In either case, the failure of the third parties to agree whether sanc-
tioning is required is costly and potentially destructive to the system of en-
forcement. The problem is that the third parties who disagree with one an-
other are likely to regard each other's subsequent behavior as constituting a
norm violation. The reason is that in a third-party system the failure to
punish a norm violator ordinarily constitutes a norm violation and the un-
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
167. See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 62-81 (2002);
Cooter, supra note 66; Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of So-
cial Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994); see also Kahan, supra note 67.
In Kahan's reciprocity theory, what is internalized is not a particular behavior (e.g., promise keeping) but
the more abstract obligation to reciprocate the behavior of others (e.g., keeping promises when others
keep theirs).
168. See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & PHILIP PETriT, THE ECONOMY OF ESTEEM (2004); Tyler
Cowen, The Esteem Theory of Norms, 113 PuB. CHOIcE 211, 221-22 (2002); Robert C. Ellickson, The
Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 1, 18-20 (2001); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development and Regulations of Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 338, 353-55 (1997); Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108
HARV. L. REv. 1003,1019-21 (1995); Pettit, supra note 119, at 753-54.
169. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 92, at 18-27 (2000).
170. Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 164.
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justified punishment of an individual who is not a norm violator ordinarily
constitutes a norm violation. Thus, suppose that an individual, C, commits
an act that may or may not be theft, which is a norm violation in his com-
munity. In response, the other individuals in the community form a belief
about whether C violated the norm against stealing. As it turns out, the is-
sue is contentious, and half the group-the As-believe he did; the other
half-the Bs-believe he did not. Given these beliefs, the As proceed to
punish C but the Bs do not. Now the problem arises. The As now believe
that the Bs have, by doing nothing, violated the (secondary enforcement)
norm requiring the punishment of thieves. The Bs instead believe that the
As have violated a norm against unjustifiably punishing C. Given the logic
of the third-party enforcement, in the next time period, the As should pun-
ish the Bs and the Bs should punish the As.17' The problem may not stop
there because the Bs are likely to regard the As' punishment of them as a
norm violation, just as the As are likely to regard the Bs' punishment of
them. So it possibly continues round after round, essentially destroying the
third-party enforcement system. Even if things do not proceed this far, any
disagreement is costly because sanctioning is costly for both the one admin-
istering and receiving it. Third parties therefore prefer to reach a common
understanding about whether an individual violated a norm.
Now consider the services an adjudicator can provide toward this end.
First, the adjudicator might provide a random focal point around which the
third parties could correlate their strategies, where all sanction C when the
adjudicator announces "C stole and should be punished" and all refrain
from sanctioning when the adjudicator announces "C didn't steal and
should not be punished." But, as explained in Section II.A, expressive ad-
judication will not work if it provides only randomly selected focal points.
One reason is that, if adjudication could succeed by randomly selecting out-
comes, then the disputants could more cheaply randomize themselves
without an adjudicator.
The other, more fundamental problem is analogous to the strategic is-
sue noted in Section II.B: if one selects the focal point for correlating
strategies randomly, then the enforcement system will offer little, or no, de-
terrent to norm violations. Deterrence of theft (or any act) requires that
there be a greater probability of punishment if one has committed theft (the
act) than if one has not. Other things equal, one maximizes deterrence by
moving the probability of punishment for violators towards one hundred
percent and the probability of punishment for nonviolators towards zero.
Deciding disagreements randomly does neither, but makes it equally possi-
171. The norm might allow an excuse for "good faith" but erroneous beliefs, so that members need
not punish (1) one who wrongly refuses to punish a norm violator in the good faith belief that he is not a
norm violator nor (2) one who wrongly punishes a nonviolator in the good faith belief that he is a violator.
But the excuse merely pushes the problem to a higher level. Given the underlying problem-ambiguity
in the convention or facts -there is no way to avoid disagreement in deciding whether others have acted
in good faith (or acted in good faith in deciding whether others acted in good faith, and so on). That dis-
agreement then leads to the problem identified in the text.
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ble that violators and nonviolators will be punished. Put differently, if the
only thing we care about is coordinating the punishment decisions of third
parties, then we could coordinate by correlating our decisions with a ran-
dom event, or indeed merely by agreeing never to punish anyone (or to
punish everyone once a year on a given date). But because we also care
about something besides coordination- deterring theft (and other norm
violations)-we also care about the accuracy of the adjudicatory declara-
tion, which means we want the adjudicator to provide a signal about what
happened.
Nonetheless, for reasons explored in Section II.C, signaling alone will
not work. First, if the adjudicator merely signaled his beliefs, then he would
not resolve disagreement in many cases because the As and Bs would not
change their beliefs sufficiently to change their sanctioning behavior. Also,
if the adjudicative declaration was merely a signal, the third parties would
then seek a multitude of signals rather than the signal of a single adjudica-
tor (or a single set of hierarchically arranged adjudicators). Indeed, for a
system of third-party norm enforcement, the best signal would probably be
a public vote of all third parties on the need for sanctions, which would do
the most to induce those in the minority to update their beliefs in the direc-
tion of the majority. Public voting, however, looks quite different than ad-
judication.
The solution, as explained in Section II.A for the two-party context,
is that expressive adjudication works via the synergy among correlated
equilibria, focal points, and signaling. First, an adjudicative declaration
does provide a focal point around which third parties can correlate (and
thereby coordinate) their sanctioning decisions. As a result, third parties
act in unison and do not need to sanction each other in subsequent rounds
for making the wrong sanctioning decision. Second, the adjudicative decla-
ration also supports deterrence by operating as a signal of what an accurate
adjudicator actually believes. By signaling his usually accurate belief, the
adjudicator will be more likely to declare the norm violated when it is than
when it is not. Put differently, the accurate adjudicator facilitates deter-
rence (as well as coordination) by ruling that a violation occurred when he
strongly believes it did and ruling that no violation occurred when he
strongly believes it did not. If the accurate adjudicator cannot form a firm
belief, because the case is a close one, it is likely that the third parties are
badly divided as well. In this case, when close to fifty percent of third par-
ties are prepared to sanction and fifty percent are not, his deciding ran-
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domly does not change the expected sanction,'72 but the benefits of coordi-
nation are now at their greatest.17
3
The synergy then explains why adjudication is needed rather than
something else. Because the expressive influence depends partly on signal-
ing, it requires a human adjudicator rather than a randomizing device. Be-
cause the expressive influence depends partly on focal point creation, it re-
quires that the third parties designate one particular individual (or one set
of hierarchically arranged individuals) as their adjudicator rather than a
much larger set. Finally, as explained in Section III.B, these conclusions
hold whether the dispute is factual or legal. That is, the focal signal pro-
vided by adjudication coordinates third-party sanctioning whether the
cause of third-party disagreement (over an alleged norm violation) is differ-
ing beliefs about the relevant facts or about what the norm requires.174
Thus, expressive adjudication works for multi-party as well as two-
party disputes. Given the danger presented by uncoordinated sanctioning,
an adjudicator can influence sanctioning behavior without wielding the
power of sanctions or legitimacy. When the group is a private organization,
like a trade association, the adjudication may still concern private disputes.
Where the group is a community or society, the adjudication now concerns
public disputes, such as criminal law.
D. Limits of Adjudicative Expression: The Need for Legal Sanctions
and Legitimacy
Adjudicative expression can influence behavior by resolving disputes
of fact and convention, and the latter resolution can also influence the be-
havior of those not a party to the present dispute. Readers may too quickly
infer from my defense of this expressive power that I do not believe that
sanctions or legitimacy are necessary for compliance. I want to be clear,
however, that the domain for expressive adjudication is far narrower than
that of all disputes, which means there are conditions in which compliance
depends strictly on the presence of either sanctions, deference to legitimate
authority, or some other mechanism. The expressive theory does not apply
to disputes outside its domain and does not predict perfect compliance even
in its domain.
172. In those cases where the evidence is so evenly divided that half of observers conclude that the
suspected individual did violate the convention and half conclude he did not, we should expect that a true
violator is as likely to be sanctioned as a true nonviolator. As a result, the sanctioning system at this point
produces no deterrence, so coordinating by a random device will not make matters worse for deterrence.
173. When the third parties are equally divided, their coordination is at its lowest possible point,
which means their tendency to punish each other in subsequent rounds -for failing to punish a violator or
for punishing a nonviolator-is at its greatest.
174. In the latter case, where the norm requirements are ambiguous (because of fuzziness or poten-
tial incompleteness), the adjudicator clarifies it and his articulation of the requirement serves as a focal
point for coordinating enforcement. If the norm is already clear (in which case the dispute may have
arisen because some third parties were acting strategically by disputing the existence of a norm violation
they did not want to punish), the adjudicator merely signals the content of existing expectations.
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Initially, the domain of the expressive theory is limited to what Schel-
ling called "mixed motive" games. Thus, the first condition for expressive
power is a situation of multiple equilibria where the parties have both con-
flicting and common interests. This is the case in the ubiquitous iterated
Prisoners' Dilemma game because, even though the cooperative equilib-
rium may be possible, it is riskier to cooperate and be vulnerable to exploi-
tation than it is to defect. Another possible barrier to coordination is that
the parties conflict over which equilibrium should prevail (as in BOS and
HD). In practice, this tends to represent situations where parties of roughly
equal power both regard the continuation or escalation of the dispute-as
by mutual resort to self-help -as the worst possible outcome. In the discus-
sion, I provided a number of illustrative disputes that I believe take place
much of the time in this setting -negotiations between business partners,
traffic conflict, public smoking, and property disputes between neighbors.
By contrast, some games have just one equilibrium, in which case the
payoffs alone determine how the players will behave, and none of the ex-
pressive effects will apply.75 There are two common situations that are
likely to represent a single equilibrium game that is impervious to expres-
sive influences. Severe inequalities of power may create situations where
the only equilibrium is that the stronger party wins the dispute. Here, the
stronger party's best strategy is to assert its interest aggressively, even at the
expense of continuing or escalating the dispute, no matter what the weaker
party does. If so, then mere expression will not change the outcome. Con-
tinuing with the example of property, an individual who is particularly good
at physical combat may simply take what he pleases unless the court can
generate compliance via sanctions or legitimacy.
Another single equilibrium situation exists, even between two indi-
viduals of roughly equal power, if the object in dispute involves high stakes
relative to the cost of conflict, or conversely, the disputing costs are low
relative to the value of the object in dispute. The right model here is the
one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma.176 The situation may arise because one party
claiming a disputed resource perceives that losing it would be catastrophic,
so that party wants to act aggressively no matter what the other party does.
If losing is the worst outcome, then the party will be better off bearing the
costs of conflict, and having some chance of winning the resource, than to
defer to the other, and have no chance of winning. An example would be a
dispute over property that constitutes a large fraction of the wealth of one
or both parties. Another example is an arms race between nations where
falling behind the other ensures a loss of sovereignty.
175. Another possibility is that there are multiple equilibria but there is no conflict over which out-
come is best. Given the usual possibility of communication (as is usually present where adjudication
would be possible), there is no "dispute" to be resolved.
176. Note that one can easily transform a HD game into a Prisoners' Dilemma by raising the pay-
offs for mutual aggression (the lower right-hand cell in Figure 2) to the point where it is regarded by
each player as the third best, rather than worst, outcome (in Figure 2, raising the -1 payoffs to 1 would
suffice).
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Conversely, sometimes the costs of conflict are very low relative to the
object in dispute. The high conflict costs in the Hawk/Dove game arise be-
cause, among other reasons, the decisions are simultaneous. At roughly the
same time, two drivers decide whether to proceed at current speeds
through an intersection and two neighbors contesting a property line decide
whether to back down or stand fast. The conflict here-a collision or vio-
lence -occurs when each chooses the aggressive strategy not knowing what
the other will choose. By contrast, some situations involve sequential deci-
sions. Here the party moving second always has the opportunity to avoid
the costly Hawk/Hawk outcome by responding to Hawk with Dove. For
example, as long as the person who litters or pollutes is able to complete his
act before anyone stops him, then he may not expect a violent reaction
from one who later discovers his act. As a result, the game is really one-half
of a Prisoners' Dilemma where an individual may be better off deciding to
litter or pollute, regardless of whether others do.' In general, when the
payoffs dictate one equilibrium, there is no room for the expressive influ-
ences described here.
There is a second condition to the theory of expressive adjudication.
Even when there are multiple equilibria, the adjudicator's ability to influ-
ence the parties' behavior depends on the presence of ambiguities in the
facts or the expectations defining the convention. If the facts and conven-
tion are clear, the parties will resolve their dispute accordingly. The party
who receives his less preferred outcome will not even perceive himself as
having a dispute with the party who receives his most preferred outcome
because each party's expectations about how to proceed in the situation are
so settled.'78 If so, then there will be no dispute brought to the adjudicator.
But, even if there is an individual who raises a dispute and challenges the
prevailing convention, the expressive power is limited. I mentioned that an
adjudicator has some ability to set a precedent and thereby influence par-
ties other than the disputants. But if these other party's expectations are
entirely settled-the convention is unambiguous -then it is highly unlikely
177. Recent experimental work challenging the standard economic prediction is quite relevant here.
These experiments show that people are more cooperative in one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma and more
"spiteful" in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games than is predicted by perfectly rational self-interest. See,
e.g., Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209
(1995); Ernst Fehr et al., Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation, and the Enforcement of Social Norms,
13 HuM. NATURE 1 (2002); Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experi-
ments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73. (2001). If so, then one might expect that a se-
quential Hawk/Dove game might still have multiple equilibria. If the person playing second might out of
spite play Hawk in response to Hawk, then the person playing first might want to play Dove. Or, if the
person playing second might, acting out of some concern for fairness, reciprocate Dove with Dove, then
the person playing first might want to play Dove. (A similar result might also occur among purely selfish
individuals in iterated settings where one can establish a reputation for playing Hawk.) As a result, the
Hawk/Dove game might be more common than is indicated in the text by the strict requirement of simul-
taneity.
178. This is why social movements often begin by "consciousness raising," i.e., the effort to make
individuals who are disadvantaged by the current convention aware of their disadvantage, as well as
the corresponding advantage for certain others.
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that adjudicative expression, by itself, will change any behavior. In short,
the expressive power is conservative; it works merely to clarify existing
conventions. To change unjust or inefficient conventions requires another
compliance mechanism.
As a third condition, even if there is a situation of multiple equilibria
and ambiguity, there is no guarantee that adjudicative expression will re-
solve conflict. There needs to be some third party whose signals each dis-
putant regards as sufficiently accurate to screen out strategic disputes. If
the perceived error rate is too high, there is too great an opportunity for
strategic disputing. Moreover, for both the signaling function and the
cheap talk construction of focal points there needs to be some third party
whom each disputant regards as sufficiently unbiased or impartial. Neither
party wants to submit its dispute to an individual it expects to side with the
other party. Thus, for any given dispute, there needs to be an individual
mutually perceived as relatively disinterested and possessing the necessary
expertise. Obviously, this will not always be the case. In short, expressive
power is real, but it supplements, rather than replaces, the other mecha-
nisms of compliance -sanctions and legitimacy.179
IV. THE POWER OF ADJUDICATIVE EXPRESSION: IMPLICATIONS
As stated at the outset of this article, legal compliance is a fundamen-
tal matter for social science and legal theory. To understand the causal
mechanisms of compliance is to understand how law works. The expressive
theory I have articulated offers a third way of explaining adjudicative com-
pliance, one that is distinct from the two dominant theories -sanctions and
legitimacy. I hope this new approach will prove useful to those who study
adjudicative procedure. Because such work tends to assume a particular
theory of how adjudication works, there is much to be done to explore what
the expressive theory implies for procedural scholarship. In this final Part, I
offer only to begin this line of research by explaining a few of the positive
and normative implications of the expressive theory of adjudication.
A. Positive Implications
The power of adjudicative expression implies that. there will be some
compliance with adjudication even without the threat of sanctions or le-
gitimacy. In the first section below, I examine some examples of otherwise
puzzling compliance. The expressive theory also reveals a positive theory
of how government adjudicators wield the power of sanctions. As ex-
plained in the second section, we can use expression to make law and gov-
179. Recall also that in some settings the third party can render the best expressive "service" not by a
single declaration made to both parties (the subject of this article), but by communicating separately and
privately (and sometimes differently) to each disputant, as in facilitative mediation and shuttle diplomacy.
Supra note 36.
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ernment endogenous to models of adjudication, rather than merely assum-
ing their existence.
1. Explaining Compliance Without Sanctions
An expressive theory of adjudication helps to explain the effectiveness
of both judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in situations where they lack the
ability to impose sanctions. Here I discuss one historic and three contem-
porary examples.
At various times in history, judicial bodies emerged before the gov-
ernmental apparatus existed to enforce their decisions. The clearest exam-
ple of this phenomenon may be medieval Iceland, where, for several centu-
ries, citizens tended to comply with the decisions of the courts despite the
courts' lacking the power to sanction noncompliance."s As William Miller
observes, saga Iceland's legal culture showed a surprising "proclivity for
law, legalism, and litigiousness." '181 The legal codes were elaborate and
comprehensive. 82  Though there was not a separate legal profession,
"[1]egal expertise flourished."'83  Yet "Iceland developed [its] legal sys-
tem.., in the absence of any coercive state institutions."' 8 Despite the
elaborate pyramid of jurisdictions and complex scheme of venues
and judicial competence, there was no provision for any executive
power. It was up to the litigants to serve process on their oppo-
nents, maintain order in court, and enforce court judgments in their
favor. Ultimately, the sanction behind legal judgment and arbi-
trated settlement was self-help, most often appearing in the guise of
the bloodfeud. 18
Contrary to our conventional understanding of law, there was "no state ap-
paratus to pretend to monopolize the legitimate use of force.... [T]here
was no sheriff to issue a summons to a hostile party, to keep the peace in
180. See WILLIAM I. MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN
SAGA ICELAND 228 (1990). There has also been some discussion in the law and economics literature. See
DAVID FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER 263-67 (2000); Richard A. Posner, Medieval Iceland and Modem Le-
gal Scholarship, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1495 (1992) (reviewing WILLIAM I. MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND
PEACEMAKING (1990)).
181. MILLER, supra note 180, at 226. Miller also refers to the era as having a "cultural obsession with
law." Id. at 227.
182. See generally id. at 222-57. For example, the code "attempted to regulate virtually every facet
of farm management from employment contracts to the separation of and accounting for hay blown into a
neighbor's field." Id. at 223. The section of the code on procedure spanned more than 100 pages. Id. at
248.
183. Id. at 226.
184. Id. at 224.
185. Id. at 20-21; see also id. at 181 (The blood feud "provides the sanction behind arbitrated settle-
ments and legal judgments, in effect serving as the executive power of a polity that has no other formally
instituted state executive apparatus."); id at 188 ("[Tlhe successful prosecution or defense of a legal claim
could never be accomplished alone. The litigant needed bodies to make sure his adversary did not disrupt
the court, railroad the judgment, or simply use his advantage in numbers to forgo law in favor of battle or
to do these things himself if his adversary were undermanned."); id. at 228 ("[Tlhis mass of rules was mer-
cifully unaccompanied by any state enforcement mechanism .... Law enforcement, like self-help, was the
responsibility of the wronged party or his successor.").
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the court, or to execute the judgment. It was up to free adult males to do
the work of law.' 186
Of course, courts did declare a sanction, which ranged from a simple
fine up to "full outlawry (skggangr)-which meant a loss of all juridical
status and property, privileging anyone to kill the outlaw and indeed oblig-
ing the prosecutor to do so."' 87 But this declaration itself is not a sanction;
its implementation depended on the efforts of private parties. Also, the
immunity granted to the killer of an outlaw was merely the right to be free
from adverse judgments issued by a court that had no power to enforce its
judgments. Yet "there must have been more to getting an outlawry judg-
ment than simply being put back into the same problem one had before go-
ing to law: killing the enemy."'" Here, then, is the puzzle: "[W]hy people
made as much use of the law as they did, [and] why the law occupied such a
prominent position in the constitution of Icelandic society, '189 given that
courts lacked the power of sanctions?
One can read Miller to support a legitimacy theory, that the court's
declaration made the adjudicated winner's violence more legitimate than
the loser's. But the theory of expressive adjudication is also quite consis-
tent with the evidence, given the emphasis Miller makes on the background
threat of private violence. Individual litigants could enforce or resist a
judgment only by gathering the support of their kin. "[Power] meant hav-
ing others think one had the ability to muster bodies to assist in the various
procedures that made up a legal action."'" Even after the defendant was
initially declared an outlaw, there was still time for him to gather forces to
resist enforcement because a defendant was not "fully outlawed" until a
subsequent procedure occurred two weeks after the initial judgment.191 As
Miller states: "outcomes reached by talk, although not rare, took place
within the shadow of violence."'"
Translated into game theory, the situation is one with multiple equi-
libria similar to a Hawk/Dove game where the Hawk/Hawk outcome is vio-
lence. The expected costs of the violence was probably higher than the ex-
pected costs of giving in to the other's demand, yet each most preferred to
have the other give in to him. In this setting, it is easy to believe that a
court could influence the behavior of the parties by providing a focal signal.
186. ld. at 232.
187. Id. at 234.
188. Id. at 236.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 245.
191. Id. at 244.
192. Id. at 236 (emphasis added). The background of possible violence was inherent in everyday life
of the time. See id. at 187 ("In every incident there lurked the possibility of escalation, the possibility that
the most trivial offense could transform good relations into feud."). As with litigation, settlements were
governed by the same background threat. See id. at 271 ("The stakes were high and at any moment the
peacemaking cause might fail. In fact, it was the very real possibility of failure that made the ritual work,
that gave it the ability to convince others that what motivated the claimant was not fear or avarice. For if
the claimant suspected that the observing community doubted his mettle, the predictable rhythms of the
settlement dance could abruptly cease to be replaced by a dance of a different beat.").
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The court's willingness to signal ameliorated the threat of strategic disput-
ing, so that individuals benefited from correlating their strategies with the
court's declaration. In the remaining cases of genuine disputes, the court's
declaration made focal a particular outcome and thereby created self-
fulfilling expectations that it would occur. Like the bystander in the inter-
section directing traffic, the court's expression influenced each side's expec-
tations of how the other would proceed. Once the court announced a win-
ner, it appeared the winner would fight and this expectation made it more
difficult for the loser to gather or retain kin to fight on his behalf.193
Courts in modem legal systems do wield sanctions, but there are some
contemporary examples of effective sanctionless adjudication. The most
obvious is the nongovernmental adjudication that occurs in various types of
alternative dispute resolution. Given the pervasiveness of ADR, it is im-
portant to understand fully its effect. The theory of expressive adjudication
here supplements the work of Brown and Ayres, who identify economic ra-
tionales for mediation.'94 Their work emphasizes the role of facilitative
mediators as (usefully noisy) informational conduits between the parties,
frequently accomplished in an ex parte meeting with a single party. The
expressive theory instead emphasizes the importance of the final declara-
tions of arbitrators, made in the presence of both parties, and around which
the parties may then correlate their strategies. I return to ADR in the
normative discussion below.
Moving closer to conventional courts, international tribunals often
succeed in adjudicating disputes despite their inability to credibly threaten
nations with sanctions for failing to comply. Tom Ginsburg and I recently
reviewed all the decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
we conservatively estimated a compliance rate of sixty-eight percent.'95
Other scholars find high compliance with other international tribunals. 96
193. As another historic example, Andrea McDowell, finds the Hawk/Dove game useful for model-
ing disputes among mines during the Californian gold rush, where early courts had only a weak or non-
existent threat of legal sanctions. Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in
the Gold Mines, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771 (2004); see also Andrea McDowell, From Commons to
Claims: Property Rights in the California Gold Rush, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2002). She observes
compliance with adjudicative declarations, but attributes them primarily to the threat of private third-
party enforcement, those miners other than the one immediately victimized by "claim-jumping." As ex-
plained above in Section Ill.C, expressive adjudication can facilitate third-party enforcement by creating
a common understanding of when the third parties must punish a rule breaker. Regarding the dispute
resolution that occurred during the long overland trip to the California mining camps, see generally JOHN
PHILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT (1980).
194. See Brown & Ayres, supra note 22.
195. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 8, at 1310-11.
196. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 286 (1993); COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS 35 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) (most decisions complied with); THE SETrLEMENT
OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 178 (John G. Collier &
Vaughan Lowe eds., 1998) ("all decisions were, sooner or later, complied with"); Warren F. Schwartz and
Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Or-
ganization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179, S200 (2002) ("the level of compliance with trade commitments is
quite high").
No. 51 1103
HeinOnline  -- 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1103 2005
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Ginsburg and I explain this compliance as arising from a tribunal's ability to
provide focal points and signals in situations of multiple equilibria. The
compliance rate with the ICJ is high, we claim, because nations tend to
bring to the ICJ those disputes for which these factors are sufficient to gen-
erate compliance. Indeed, we find low compliance in cases lacking mutual
consent to the adjudication, i.e., where the ICJ overrules one party's juris-
dictional objection and later rules against the same party on the merits. By
contrast, we find a large part of the ICJ's success occurs in territorial dis-
putes where both parties desire the adjudication to resolve ambiguities in
facts or conventional categories defining possession. As with ADR, I re-
turn to the subject of international adjudication in the normative discussion
below.
Moving to domestic courts, a final example of sanctionless adjudica-
tion is judicial review of the decisions by other governmental branches.
Most obvious is the problem of constitutional review. Legal theorists com-
monly debate the normative question involved-whether unelected courts
should overrule elected legislatures and executives-under the rubric of the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty."1" But they tend to ignore the intriguing
positive question-how do courts succeed in getting other branches to
comply with their decisions? The question arises not only in constitutional
cases-as where a court purports to invalidate a statute or executive or-
der-but whenever a court rules against a government party, as in cases in-
volving contract claims or administrative challenges. The mechanisms for
compliance are puzzling because the judiciary lacks material power over
the other branches of government, while the legislature and executive hold
important power over the judiciary. As Matthew Stephenson puts the
question, why do the parts of government with "the money and guns" listen
to the part with neither?198
Stephenson's answer is fully compatible with the theory of focal sig-
nals. He imagines that the constitutional constraints the courts enforce in a
democracy are essentially a contract between two political parties that ex-
pect to alternate control of government. Because the leaders of the politi-
cal parties are risk averse, each is willing to forgo implementing its most ex-
treme policy preferences when it is in power in exchange for the other
party's leader forgoing its most extreme policy preferences when it is in
power. Although he does not describe the situation as an iterated Prison-
ers' Dilemma, that is the structure he imagines, where each side can benefit
from an agreement of constraint. The agreement would-be self-enforcing
except for "noise" that produces divergent factual beliefs about whether
each side has honored the agreement. The parties can then gain by each
conditioning its strategy on the judiciary's decision. In my terms, the judici-
ary here is providing a focal signal. Because it is a signal, it ameliorates the
197. For a critical review, see, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The His-
tory of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
198. See Stephenson, supra note 17, at 60.
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problem of strategic disputing. Because it is focal, it creates self-fulfilling
expectations of how the parties will behave. Where noise creates ambigui-
ties that threaten to destroy cooperation in an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma,
a focal signal can resolve the ambiguity and preserve cooperation.
In each of the four cases just discussed-medieval Iceland, ADR, in-
ternational adjudication, and judicial review-there is an important rival
hypothesis: that the adjudicator achieves compliance solely because dispu-
tants deferred to what they perceived to be its legitimate authority. As I
said in the introduction, I will not here compare the two hypotheses, but
leave that empirical analysis to future research. For now, I want to explain
two ways that the expressive theory complements legitimacy theory. One
way is timing. It takes time for an institution to acquire legitimacy. If a new
adjudicative institution lacks sanctions (as in the above examples) and at
the very beginning lacks legitimacy, then it would appear to have no way to
generate compliance. Yet if everyone ignores the adjudicative institution,
its failure may prevent it from ever being perceived as legitimate. The ex-
pressive theory, however, explains how a new institution could generate
compliance in the first instance, thereby surviving long enough to acquire
legitimacy.
The second point is one of reinforcement Even if most of the compli-
ance that occurs in the absence of sanctions were attributable to the com-
mon belief that the adjudicator is legitimate, we should expect that this mo-
tivation will fail for some extraordinary individuals who do not perceive a
court's legitimacy, or are indifferent to it, and will also fail for some ordi-
nary individuals in very high-stakes disputes. Indeed, given the failures of
compliance in a world with sanctions, we should imagine that in a world
without sanctions no motive for compliance is redundant but that each con-
tributes causally to whatever compliance occurs.
Note one final implication. There is a substantial economics literature
on the settlement of litigation.'99 That literature seeks to explain the factors
that determine when litigants will settle, and for what amount. Given the
economic assumption that the only mechanism for compliance is the threat
of legal sanctions, the settlement literature assumes that the threat of court-
imposed sanctions is an essential part of the settlement story. On the stan-
dard view, if a court had no ability to impose sanctions, then a defendant
would have no reason to defend himself or to offer the plaintiff any positive
sum to settle the case.' ° But where adjudicative expression will induce
199. For overviews, see SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 387-470; Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, in THE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (M. Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., forthcoming 2005).
200. Shavell, supra note 2, at 445-50, points out that nonbinding arbitration may influence the set-
tlement behavior of parties because they will regard the arbitrator's award as a signal of the result of a
full-fledged trial. I do not regard this as an expressive theory because it requires the threat of legal sanc-
tions, which the arbitration then predicts.
A subset of the settlement literature discusses whether defendants would pay to settle "NEV" law-
suits-those where the plaintiff has a "negative expected value" because the costs of maintaining the
suit exceed the expected gains from trial. See SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 419-23; Spier, supra note 199.
This analysis suggests that there may be circumstances where defendants would pay to avoid such
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compliance, this is no longer the case. Even without the threat of judicial
sanctions, a party who expects to comply with an adjudicator's adverse
judgment will have an incentive to incur costs seeking to win the proceed-
ing. For that reason, it is possible a party will prefer to settle with the other
party to avoid those costs.2"' Thus, it is no surprise that (as previously dis-
cussed) Garrett and Weingast find that Denmark backed down in a case
before the European Court of Justice when it expected to lose the case and
to comply.2' And it is perfectly understandable that medieval Iceland,
whose courts had no sanctioning power, nonetheless saw a large amount of
private arbitration in the shadow of the law.2 3 In general, the suit-and-
settlement literature applies to all the sanctionless adjudication just dis-
cussed-medieval Icelandic courts, nonbinding arbitration, international
adjudication, and litigation involving government parties. The settlement
literature has a broader domain than previously understood.
2. Understanding the Endogeneity of Legal Sanctions
The expressive theory of adjudication also offers a way of seeing law
and government as arising endogenously within a third-party sanctioning
system. Too often, theorists take the existence of government and legal
sanctions as a given. Much of the recent work on norms, for example, in-
cluding my own, treats norm origin as puzzling without reflecting on the
puzzle of law's origin.2' 4 Social norm scholars commonly write about how
law can supplement norms when norm sanctions are inadequate or how law
can change undesirable norms.'" Both approaches treat law as exogenous,
without its operation as requiring explanation.
In an otherwise excellent article, Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico
fall prey to this sort of thinking." Consider what they term the "counter-
factual problem.""' They raise this problem for the supposed stability of
equilibria in iterated games, their chief example being a particular coopera-
suits, given the costs of defending against them. Even if true, the analysis assumes that the defendant
will incur costs defending against such suits in order to prevent the plaintiff from winning a default
judgment. But if the court can impose no sanctions, then the conventional view would be that the de-
fendant's expected loss is always zero, and remains so even if the defendant spends nothing defending
himself.
201. Of course, if the parties have beliefs about the nonnegotiated outcome that will permit them to
settle, they might ordinarily be expected to do so before the filing of suit. Events during litigation, how-
ever, may cause the parties to change their beliefs about the likely adjudicatory outcome or the likely
costs of adjudication, either of which may provide a new basis for settlement.
202. Garrett & Weingast, supra note 17, at 195.
203. See MILLER, supra note 180, at 259-99; see id. at 271 ("Then as now people were aware that
lawsuits had a settlement value. After initial informal attempts to arbitrate had been rejected, plaintiffs
often prosecuted lawsuits with the sole intention of coercing recalcitrant defendants to agree to submit to
arbitration.").
204. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 7; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 903.
205. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 7, at 397-408, 424-32; Sunstein, supra note 9.
206. See Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 164.
207. Id. at 1300-08; see also Cristina Bicchieri, Self-Refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction: A
Paradox of Common Knowledge, 30 ERKENNTIS 69, 71-72 (1989).
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tive equilibrium in an n-person iterated Prisoners' Dilemma. As an im-
provement on Axelrod's Tit-for-Tat,2° Mahoney and Sanchirico propose an
equilibrium in which each individual plays "Defection for Deviation" (Def-
for-Dev), defined as follows: "1) Start in round one by cooperating with all
opponents; 2) Defect against a player if and only if she deviated from the
def-for-dev strategy in the immediately preceding round.""2 9 In the equilib-
rium in which everyone plays this strategy, third-party retaliatory defection
is an informal sanction that deters unjustified defections.
After demonstrating the advantages of the Def-for-Dev equilibrium,
Mahoney and Sanchirico go on to raise the following concern. The key to
the equilibrium is the set of expectations that underlie it. Everyone pun-
ishes a defector because everyone otherwise expects to be punished them-
selves. But what happens if there is a defection? The counter-factual prob-
lem is that, in equilibrium, defection would be perfectly deterred; the fact of
defection is inconsistent with the set of expectations underlying the coop-
erative equilibrium. A defection will therefore cause individuals to rethink
their expectations; doubting one's prior expectations will undermine the
stability of the equilibrium. Thus, they conclude, the stability of the coop-
erative equilibrium is less than it first appears.
Mahoney and Sanchirico offer this solution: legal sanctions. They
view the imposition of legal sanctions for defection as the critical mecha-
nism that ensures the stability of cooperative expectations and a coopera-
tive equilibrium. Mahoney and Sanchirico recognize, however, that the
counter-factual problem might also infect the imposition of legal sanctions:
"Of course, this moves the counterfactual problem up a level. When we es-
tablish a second-order norm that the court's decision will be honored, how
can we know what to do if another player disregards the court's decree?" '
To answer this concern Mahoney and Sanchirico assert:
Yet, in an important respect, the situation here is not the same. The
difference lies in the government's ability and willingness to force
compliance irrespective of community beliefs. The possibility that
the defendant in a lawsuit ignores the court's decree does not lead to
the counterfactual problem because the incentive compatibility for
the defendant of following the decree does not rely solely on a
common understanding in the community that such court decrees
are followed. Rather, the incentive compatibility of following the
208. AXELROD, supra note 101.
209. Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 164, at 1296. One of the main purposes of the article is to
demonstrate this strategy's superiority to the much discussed strategy of Tit-for-Tat, and its ability to ex-
plain the existence of norms based solely on expectations of punishment (i.e., without tinkering with the
utility function). See id. at 1291-98.
210. Id. at 1309. They continue:
Accepting the premise that the norm of honoring the court's decree is incentive-compatible for
each individual given that such a norm is commonly accepted in the community, then an individ-
ual's failure to honor that decree would call into question whether the norm is really commonly
accepted-and then we are back to the same counterfactual perplexity that we encountered in a
world without the court.
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decree is grounded in the court's ability and willingness to punish
the defendant irrespective of (or at least with less dependence upon)
how the defendant's behavior might affect any common understand-
ing among community members. The court's capacity and resolve
to back its commands with force provide a solid platform on which
society can build more complex informal enforcement systems
Thus, although law-meaning centralized commands backed
by force-may constitute only a small portion of the total
rule-making and enforcement system, it is a necessary one. With-
out it, the remaining parts of the system may unravel in the face of
uncertainty about whether all players continue to expect one an-
other (and expect that others expect, and so on) to continue to
comply with the extant norms."'
In this regard, Mahoney and Sanchirico err."' They mistakenly imag-
ine that the counter-factual problem in the legal context arises because a
defendant ignores the court's order. To the contrary, in the context of legal
sanctions, the counter-factual problem arises when a government official
responsible for enforcing the court's order chooses instead to ignore it, or
indeed when the human being responsible for creating the court's order-
the judge-refuses to issue it. As such, the counter-factual problem that
undermines formal legal sanctions is exactly parallel to the counter-factual
problem that undermines informal third-party sanctions.
To see the point, we need only consider the obvious fact that a gov-
ernment or legal system depends entirely on third parties -sheriffs, police,
bailiffs, judges, marshals, wardens, parole officers, etc.-to impose legal
sanctions. The judge must issue the decree; the sheriff must seize the de-
fendant's property; the warden must keep him locked up. The crucial ques-
tion is why these individuals engage in the cooperative behavior of sanc-
tioning law violators. Why do they incur the costs of doing their job? The
answer is that they expect to be sanctioned if they don't. But what happens
if one of these legal actors nonetheless defects? According to the counter-
factual logic, their defection will cause other legal actors to question their
prior expectations. Here the problem stands exactly as it did for private
sanctioning without the court-any of these government officials expects to
be sanctioned if he fails to enforce the decree only because the enforcement
norm is a "common understanding," yet if anyone does refuse to enforce it,
his noncompliance causes everyone to question whether law enforcement is
211. Id. at 1309-10 (emphasis added).
212. As an empirical matter, it is doubtful that legal sanctions are necessary to the existence of third-
party sanctions, given historic evidence of such sanctioning in societies without a state. For example, an-
thropologists have found third-party sanctioning systems that punish violations of religious obligations
and sexual taboos among state-less societies. See, e.g., BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM
IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 50,53,65-68,80 (1926); EDWARD EVANS-PRtTcHARD, THE NuER, A DESCRIPTON
OF THE MODES OF LIVELIHOOD AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF A NILOTIc PEOPLE 162-69 (1947).
And, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 180-92, there is historical evidence of compliance with
courts that wielded no credible threat of legal sanctions. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 180, at 224 (com-
pliance with sanctionless adjudication in medieval Iceland).
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really a "common understanding." In short, if the counterfactual problem
can undermine expectations regarding informal sanctions, it can equally
undermine the expectations of formal sanctions. Law is not a deus ex ma-
china that saves third-party sanctioning from collapse. Law is simply one
form of third-party sanctioning.
Indeed, one might be tempted to make the opposite mistake by posit-
ing that it is the threat of informal sanctions that step in to cause legal ac-
tors-the sheriffs, police, judges, etc.-to cooperate and to rescue the legal
system from the counterfactual problem. But this too treats formal and in-
formal systems of sanctioning as if they each operated with logic distinct
from the other. Instead, it makes more sense to embrace a unified theory
of third-party sanctioning, by starting with one of several existing norms
theories. Under most of these theories, as explained above, some mecha-
nism-internalization, esteem, signaling, etc.-creates a motive for enforc-
ing the norm and this motive sustains the enforcement system.213 The ex-
planation works for both informal and formal enforcement; it is not strictly
necessary for legal sanctions to support informal sanctioning nor for infor-
mal sanctioning to support legal sanctions (though such interactions are, of
course, possible and likely).
At this point, however, the analysis of Section III.C comes to bear.
Whether the sanctioning system is private or public, a key requirement is
that third parties coordinate their sanctioning decisions; the failure to coor-
dinate will undermine any system of third-party sanctions. Expressive ad-
judication facilitates this coordination. Indeed, third-party sanctioning may
be impossible without a system of adjudication, but that system does not
require the adjudicator to wield sanctions or influence via mechanisms of
legitimacy.
The fact that mere expression suffices to coordinate sanctioning allows
one to explain legal sanctions rather than assuming their existence. Legal
sanctions-and indeed government-can arise endogenously. As a first
stage, imagine a private and informal system of third-party enforcement.
To coordinate sanctioning, a community employs a private actor to arbi-
213. Alternatively, there might be no solution to the counter-factual problem, which then renders
both formal and informal systems of third-party sanctioning unstable. My main reasons for rejecting this
possibility have nothing to do with the expressive theory pursued in this article, but with my views about
the right theory of informal order. The other major point Mahoney & Sanchirico advance in their article,
supra note 164, at 1286, is that third party sanctioning can succeed based on nothing more than the com-
mon expectations that one will be punished for failing to sanction violators. Thus, they reject what other
norms theorists (including myself) have termed as "the second order collective action problem" of en-
forcement and reject as unnecessary the different solutions these theorists offer. Id. at 1298-91. Yet, as I
have shown in the text, the only solution Mahoney & Sanchirico propose to the counter-factual prob-
lem-legal sanctions-is also subject to that problem. I believe this shows that there really is a secondary
collective action problem in norm enforcement-that expectations alone aren't sufficient-so that one of
these other theories (internalization, esteem, signaling, etc.) is necessary. I also believe the other theories
then succeed in solving this enforcement problem and explaining the possibility of third-party sanctioning.
If so, then as I argued in Section III.C, the expressive theory of adjudication can assist any such system of
third-party sanctioning, regardless of the particular supporting mechanism and regardless of whether the
system is formal or informal.
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trate norm violations, essentially disputes between an individual and the
community. As explained in Section III.C, this arbiter now influences
whether private third parties will sanction a suspected norm violator. If the
arbiter proclaims that the accused did violate the norm, then the other
group members will punish him. If the arbiter proclaims otherwise, they
will not punish him. Thus, the arbiter now effectively wields the power of
sanctions.
Although the conceptual continuum between private and governmen-
tal actors is long and contentious, the scenario I am describing could easily
evolve to the point where the community understands the adjudicator to be
a public actor-a court-with the parallel understanding that the rule being
enforced is "law." Now a government official wields the power of sanc-
tions. Eventually, the community may require other public actors to assist
in administering punishment-sheriffs, wardens, etc.-and the punishment
inflicted will be understood as inflicted as a legal sanction. If so, then we
can treat legal sanctions-at least judicial sanctions-as arising endoge-
nously within a model of expressive adjudication.
B. Normative Implications: The Trade-Off in Dispute Resolution and
Dispute Avoidance
In this section I explore some of the normative implications of the ex-
pressive theory, specifically, those peculiar to adjudicative law making. The
positive theory explored above has some normative implications for law
generally, whether created through adjudication or through legislative or
executive declaration. For example, the fact that a law of any source can
construct a focal point for coordination favors the use of rules over stan-
dards because achieving a focal effect depends on aligning expectations
precisely.214 Also, because any expressive effect depends on publicity, op-
timal law enforcement will depend on how resources are allocated toward
generating publicity for rules as well as toward the more traditional con-
cerns for the certainty and severity of punishment.215 Though these are in-
teresting issues, I defer such points for later research that is not focused on
adjudication. I explore here only the normative consequences for adjudica-
tive processes.
The primary normative conclusion I draw is that there is a trade-off
between the backward-looking function of adjudication-to resolve dis-
214. Where the situation allows an expressive effect, that potential should be folded into the broader
analysis of that trade-off. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 159. There is a parallel point for positive the-
ory: that we will observe rules used more commonly in those situations where legal expression can influ-
ence behavior and standards used more commonly where the expressive theory does not apply.
215. The point here is not that the government needs to publicize its threat or imposition of sanc-
tions in order to maximize deterrence. The point here is that, where legal expression serves to construct a
focal point, the more the focal point is publicized, the greater the alignment of expectations, and the more
situations that will be resolved without conflict and without the threat of sanctions. Again, a positive im-
plication is that, where the expressive theory applies, we will observe the state advertising its law more
aggressively then when the theory does not apply.
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putes-and the forward looking function-to avoid disputes. The trade-off
directly implicates the normative choice between public and private systems
of adjudication. At least if we focus solely on the expression dimension of
compliance, private adjudication has a comparative advantage in dispute
resolution while public adjudication has a comparative advantage in dispute
avoidance.
1. Impartiality and the Advantage of Consensual Dispute Resolution
One implication of the expressive theory presented here is that the
perception of adjudicative impartiality matters to dispute resolution for rea-
sons other than legitimacy. Impartiality matters to both the analysis of a
correlated equilibrium and of signaling. First, where adjudication can work
by creating a correlated equilibrium, I previously noted that the key condi-
tion is that each side has a sufficient probability of winning the message it
prefers.216 Brown and Ayres illustrate by assuming that a mediator flips a
coin. 217 If so, then each side has exactly a fifty-percent chance of getting its
preferred outcome which, combined with the avoidance of the uncoordi-
nated outcome, makes the expected return higher with adjudication than
without. As an example, in the Hawk/Dove payoffs of Figure 2, each party
expected a payoff of .67 without adjudication and a payoff of 2 with ran-
domized adjudication. 218 The point I made at the time was that randomiza-
tion was not essential, but that the parties will each prefer adjudication as
long as each expects to prevail with a probability sufficiently close to fifty
percent. Now let us examine that point in more detail.
Suppose that a party perceives that the adjudicator is biased in favor
of the other party. For example, with the same payoffs as in Figure 2, sup-
pose that one party believes that in the event of a "genuine dispute" (i.e.,
the adjudicator believes the factual or conceptual issue is "too close to
call"), the adjudicator is ten-percent likely to rule in his favor and ninety-
percent likely to rule in favor of the other party. Focusing on this outcome,
the expected returns for this party after adjudication are now only .4
(ninety-percent chance of receiving zero and ten-percent chance of receiv-
ing four), which is lower than he expected without adjudication. As a re-
sult, this individual will refuse to consent to adjudication with this particular
adjudicator.2t 9 Instead, given these payoffs, each party needs to believe it is
at least 16.75% probable that it will win in this scenario in order to consent
to the adjudicator.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
217. Brown & Ayres, supra note 22, at 375.
218. See Figure 2, supra Part II.A.2.
219. Surprisingly, this need for neutrality does not arise in the Battle of the Sexes Game of Figure 1.
There, without a mediator, each party expects to receive .83 in the mixed strategy equilibrium. Yet even if
a party expects an adjudicator to decide in favor of the other party with 100% probability, his expected
return--is higher than without adjudication. Of course, a party will still prefer an adjudicator that is
less biased in the other party's favor and for that reason will not consent to such a biased adjudicator is a
better one is available (better meaning less biased against him, unbiased, or biased in his favor).
No. 5]
HeinOnline  -- 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1111 2005
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Second, signaling also requires a degree of impartiality. A party who
believes the adjudicator is biased against him will be less persuadable; given
an adjudicative signal contradicting his current beliefs, he will update his
beliefs more when he thinks the adjudicator is neutral than when he thinks
the adjudicator is biased against him. Moreover, only a sufficiently accurate
signal will screen out strategic disputes; the party perceiving adjudicative
bias against him will still fear strategic exploitation if he is known to comply
with a biased adjudicator. If so, then it will not pay an individual to corre-
late his strategy with the adjudicative signal.
The result is clear: a party will not consent to even purely expressive
adjudication if the perceived bias is too great.220 When a party refuses con-
sent because of perceived bias, what will happen if the adjudication pro-
ceeds anyway and the adjudicator (as he expected) rules against him?
Though the threat of sanctions may still generate compliance, the expres-
sive effect is severely weakened or eliminated. First, recall from Section
II.B that the consensual designation of a coordinator is necessary to solve
the dual problems of common knowledge (that we are each aware of what
the adjudicator declared, each believes that the other is aware, each be-
lieves that each believes the other is aware, and so on) and of competing
messages (that the adjudicator's message stand out among all others). Ab-
sent mutual consent, these problems remain to prevent the correlation of
strategies from being focal. Second, the party who believes the adjudicator
is biased against him will update his beliefs less in response to the adjudica-
tive signal. Finally, because the party perceiving adjudicative bias against
him will fear strategic exploitation, he will take costly action to commit
himself to ignoring the adjudication, seeking to tie his hands against com-
pliance (as by resorting more quickly to violent self-help).
There are two specific normative implications. First, perceived impar-
tiality is even more important to compliance than previously appreciated.
The traditional justification for impartiality is legitimacy-that individuals
comply with an adjudicative outcome because they perceive it to be legiti-
mate, and they will only perceive it to be legitimate if it is unbiased. For
those convinced of legitimacy theories of compliance, impartiality now has
a double significance because a second compliance mechanism depends on
it. For those who are skeptical of legitimacy theories, or for contexts in
220. Interestingly, the expressive theory does not require strict impartiality, but only a limit to the
degree of bias. In the above BOS example, a party would tolerate a very high degree of bias. If, for some
reason, there was only one possible adjudicator who a party perceived to be heavily biased in favor of the
other side, he would still consent as long as the bias did not exceed a 83.25% chance of the other side pre-
vailing. Schelling may have had this feature in mind when he wrote: "The white line down the center of
the road is a mediator, and very likely it can err substantially toward one side or the other before the disad-
vantaged side finds advantage in denying its authority." SCHELLING, supra note 31, at 144 (emphasis
added). Nonetheless, the tolerance for bias is a function of the specific payoffs. If one wants to maximize
the chances that adjudication will attract the interest of and compliance from both sides, then one should
design a system so that each side will perceive itself as being fifty-percent likely (or more) to prevail when
randomization is required.
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which one is skeptical of such theories, there is still a reason to care about
perceived bias.
Second, focusing solely on expressive grounds of compliance, there
will be more compliance when adjudication is consensual than when it isn't.
This is not to say that consent is necessary to expressive compliance. What
is necessary is merely the perception of impartiality. But while the parties
may or may not perceive that nonconsensual adjudication is impartial, con-
sent ensures that the parties believe the adjudicator is impartial because
they will mutually consent to adjudication only when they mutually per-
ceive the arbiter to be impartial. Moreover, the requirement of consent
may give potential adjudicators a strong incentive to develop a reputation
for impartiality. Indeed, as I discuss below, Posner and Yoo use this last in-
sight to argue against the "independence" of international tribunals, by
which they mean the adjudicative characteristic of nonconsensual jurisdic-
tion and permanent judges.22' To ensure impartiality, they instead recom-
mend "dependent" tribunals composed of arbitrators selected by dispu-
tants. Stated more generally, we might say private dispute resolution is
likely to be better than public dispute resolution at using expression to in-
duce the losing party to comply.
2. The Market Failure in Precedent and the Advantage of Public
Adjudication
Courts and commentators have long noted the prospective value of
adjudication-that society benefits from a judicial system that articulates
and clarifies rules. 222 Though there are some situations where ambiguity
might lead to more desirable conduct,223 clearly articulated rules more
commonly benefit society by allowing individuals to plan effectively for the
future and to avoid costly disputes.
The expressive theory deepens our understanding of the benefits of
precedent in two ways. Most basically, the theory shows how the benefits
accrue even if the adjudicator lacks the power of sanctions or legitimacy. If
it is sufficiently publicized, legal expression can by itself clarify conven-
tions-removing the fuzziness and incompleteness of contracts and custom.
221. Posner & Yoo, supra note 87.
222. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); Wiiarn M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 249
(1976). The Supreme Court recognizes the clarifying value of precedent when it insists that courts decide
the relevant constitutional rule before deciding whether the rule was sufficiently clear that its violation
overcomes a qualified immunity. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) ("Deciding the consti-
tutional question before addressing the qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal
standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public."); cf. United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925 (1984) (recognizing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for
fourth amendment violations, but noting that "[i]f the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment ques-
tion is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates, nothing will prevent
reviewing courts from deciding that question before turning to the good-faith issue").
223. See, e.g., Brown & Ayres, supra note 18.
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Sanctions and legitimacy may increase the salience of legal expression, and
enhance its clarifying function, but they are not essential to it.22
4
The second implication is more complex. It is that the private market
for adjudication will not supply an optimal quantity or quality of precedent.
The problem is that the disputants and the private adjudicator will tend to
undervalue the effect the adjudicative resolution can have on future behav-
ior. Although the disputants and adjudicator have every incentive to ex-
ploit the potential of expression for resolving the current dispute, they have
an insufficient incentive to care about the precedential effect on future dis-
putes in which they are not participants. Put differently, a private market
will supply an optimal amount of dispute resolution, but not an optimal
amount of dispute avoidance. As I will develop, this analysis then has im-
plications for current debates over alternative dispute resolution and inter-
national adjudication.
There are three related problems: (1) that effective precedent is a
public good, (2) that selfish adjudicators paid by the case prefer to maxi-
mize future disputes, and, (3) that creating clarity through a system of
precedent requires coordination. First, the precedent that clarifies a con-
vention and the publicity given to the precedent are public goods.225 Once
the clarifying precedent is produced and publicized, it costs nothing for
other individuals to use it in deciding how to behave. Nor can those who
bear the costs of precedent recapture all its benefits. Thus, the disputants
who pay for adjudication will not want to pay for the optimal degree of pre-
cedential clarity or publicity. Indeed, disputants will not want to bear any
precedential costs if they do not expect to find themselves in a similar situa-
tion in the future.226 If the disputants expect to encounter the identical
situation with other parties in the future, they might ex ante (before they
know the adjudicative winner and loser) agree to bear some costs to create
and publicize an adjudicative clarification. But they will not be willing to do
so to the socially optimal degree as long as there are other parties besides
themselves who will encounter the situation as well and would benefit from
the clarification. The social optimum is to invest in precedent up to the
point where the marginal social costs equal the marginal social benefits, but
the disputants will invest only to the point where the marginal private costs
equal their marginal private benefits. Such is the problem of public goods.
224. Of course, if the convention itself actually harms social welfare, then the clarification might be
undesirable because it might further entrench the convention.
225. See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 51, at 313 ("A good is a public good when the marginal cost
of supplying it to an additional consumer is close to zero. A radio broadcast is a prototypical public good.
Although the program is costly to produce, once a signal is broadcast, it costs nothing for each additional
viewer to tune in to a program.").
226. For example, a landowner whose dispute with his neighbor arises from unusual facts-say, a
conflict in official surveys-might never expect to have such a dispute again. Nor would they wish to in-
cur any precedential costs if they do expect to encounter the situation again, but only with the same party
to the current dispute who will already know of the precedent without any publicity of it, or if the adjudi-
cative winner could influence future disputants merely by revealing the outcome of the prior adjudication.
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As serious as the public goods problem is, a second problem concerns
the motivation of the adjudicator. A selfish private adjudicator is not
merely indifferent to his decision's precedential effect; if his income de-
pends on the number of disputes he resolves, then he has an interest in
maximizing future disputes, which he can accomplish by preserving am-
biguous conventions and "ambiguating 227 clear conventions.2as
Finally, even if there were no motivational problems for disputants or
adjudicators, precedent can clarify conventions only if there is coordination.
There will be no focal effect if adjudicators involved in different but similar
disputes issue conflicting statements about the convention and equal public-
ity is given to each. To coordinate, different adjudicators must give weight
to the articulations of other adjudicators and each must attempt to recon-
cile different, possibly conflicting articulations. Yet we know that doctrinal
synthesis is horribly complex. There is usually more than one plausible
means of interpreting and reconciling precedent, and frequently a differ-
ence of opinion about which means is best. Though a system of precedent
seeks to solve a first-order coordination problem among disputants, prece-
dent itself requires a second order of coordination among adjudicators.
Among a large number of adjudicators, centralization and hierarchy
are powerful tools for speeding up the process of coordinating precedent.2 9
When different adjudicators articulate inconsistent clarifications, we may
say that the adjudicators themselves have a dispute. For various reasons,
each prefers his own precedent. With enough time, the set of all adjudica-
tors may eventually reach a common understanding. But to resolve these
adjudicators' disputes more quickly, and allow faster coordination on
precedent, the disputing adjudicators can benefit by turning to a third adju-
dicator and deferring to his focal signal. The adjudicators thus solve their
higher order coordination problem by a higher order of adjudication. We
conventionally achieve this clarification only by an appeal (by the original
disputants) to a higher court. Thus, even if disputants and private adjudica-
tors were ideally motivated, the market would be very slow to work out the
inconsistencies in precedent compared to the possibilities of a centralized
system.
227. Cf Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943,972,988 (1995).
228. Market competition might ameliorate this incentive problem if private adjudicators develop a
reputation for their precedents' effect and if disputants care about that effect. As just discussed, however,
disputants will generally not care (or not care enough) about the precedential effect, and they will patron-
ize adjudicators without respect to their reputation for precedential clarity. Even when disputants do care
about precedent, there is reason to doubt that the reputation market would work this way, given the in-
formational complexity of the issue. Assessing an adjudicator's precedent requires attributing particular
disputes to particular ambiguities -matters that academic doctrinalists spend their careers debating.
229. A large number of decentralized adjudicators might eventually settle on a particular means of
clarifying an ambiguous convention, just as individuals acting without adjudicators might eventually settle
on a particular refinement of the convention without adjudication (and just as a group of improvising mu-
sicians might eventually improvise a complete symphony without a composer or conductor). But in either
case the time required may be staggering, during which time there are many costly disputes.
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The upshot is a new justification for a governmental system of authori-
tative adjudicators, hierarchically arranged-a judiciary. Traditional justifi-
cations for the judiciary turn on the existence of sanctions and legitimacy. If
one believes sanctions are essential to the judiciary having any effect on be-
havior, then one justifies the judiciary by the need for a single governmen-
tal institution to wield such sanctions."0 If one believes adjudicative legiti-
macy is essential to achieving adjudicative compliance, then one justifies a
judiciary by an argument it has a unique potential for legitimacy.231
I do not seek to reject these claims, but only to add an expressive justi-
fication for publicly provided adjudication. To isolate the expressive ele-
ment, my analysis assumed that adjudicators lacked the power of sanctions
and legitimacy. But rather than revealing that government had no role to
play once stripped of these powers, the analysis shows that the private mar-
ket in adjudication will fail to supply enough precedent. To increase the
quantity and quality of precedent, we require some level of subsidy and
centralization. First, like other public goods, government enhances social
welfare by using taxes to support a judiciary, paying some of the costs of
precedent creation and publicity that the disputants will not willingly bear.
Second, government might better motivate adjudicators by paying them a
salary that is not based on the number of disputes they resolve. At a mini-
mum, a fixed salary avoids motivating selfish adjudicators to maximize fu-
ture disputes. Moreover, given that clear precedents work to avoid disputes
or to facilitate settlements prior to formal adjudication, a fixed salary gives
adjudicators an incentive to provide clear precedents as a way of decreasing
their work load. Third, government may achieve the coordination of
precedent by claiming primacy for its adjudicators and then by arranging
them hierarchically, with higher courts empowered to choose among incon-
sistent precedents 32
230. This view is a subset of the Hobbesian justification for the existence of government, which has
been subject to serious criticism. See, e.g., GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1986).
231. A potential problem with this justification is that government is probably not necessary to enjoy
legitimacy. See, e.g., Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20
ACADEMIC MGMT. REv. 571,573-74 (1995).
232. This analysis is consistent with economic theories of stare decisis. See Erin O'Hara, Social Con-
straint or Implicit Collusion? Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
736 (1993); Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63 (1994).
These theories imagine judicial norms arising internally from an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game,
rather than being imposed from without. The "all defect" equilibria is that judges indulge their political
preferences and ignore each others' opinions; the "cooperative" equilibrium is that judges constrain their
opinions and follow precedent. According to the theory, the cooperative equilibrium produces two bene-
fits for judges: they achieve greater influence over future cases they don't decide and they can reduce
their workload by encouraging settlement via clear precedent.
If the prospect of future influence is a sufficient motivation, the theory implies that private adjudica-
tors might-to some degree-follow each others' precedent, which might suggest that centralization is
unnecessary. But the analysis itself reveals advantages to a public system of adjudication. One is that
a longer time horizon increases the prospects for cooperation in an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma. A
public system can uniquely provide judges life tenure, which O'Hara reports increases the actual prac-
tice of following precedent. O'Hara, supra, at 774-75. Second, the other benefit judges receive for
cooperating on precedent-decreasing their workload with clear precedent-assumes that adjudica-
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In sum, even if the government did not give its adjudicators the power
of sanctions and even if the government did not enjoy legitimacy, there is a
strong justification for the government to create a judiciary in order to sub-
sidize and coordinate precedent creation. The private provision of adjudi-
cation is inferior to government in avoiding rather than merely resolving
disputes.
3. The Adjudicative Trade-Off as Applied to ADR and International
Adjudication
The prior two subsections reveal an unfortunate trade-off between
dispute resolution and dispute avoidance. Absent sanctions and legitimacy,
a private system of adjudication, based on consent, will generate a higher
degree of compliance than a public, nonconsensual system. Higher compli-
ance means that more of the costs of disputing are avoided. In short, con-
sidering only expressive effects, private adjudication is superior at dispute
resolution. But, for the reasons just explained, and again considering only
expressive effects, a public system of adjudication is superior at providing
precedent and therefore superior at dispute avoidance. The avoidance and
resolution of disputes are at odds with one another.
The trade-off between dispute avoidance and dispute resolution has
particular significance in the context of adjudication without sanctions.
Consider two examples. One is the desirability of ADR when used in place
of public adjudication, as with binding arbitration. In recent years, there
has been a stark decline in the number of trials in the United States,
matched by an increase in the use of ADR and settlement, both encour-
aged by courts.233 Some of the ADR literature praises this shift by measur-
ing how the disputants favor ADR's procedures, and possibly how ADR
saves them money."z By itself, however, this is no justification for ADR. If
private dispute resolution appeals to disputants merely because it avoids
imposing on them the costly process of articulating and publicizing clear
precedent, then the benefit to the individual disputants comes at a cost to
tors are paid by salary, which also favors a public system. Finally, this effort at sustaining cooperation
in a multi-party Prisoners' Dilemma will be plagued by factual and conceptual ambiguity, producing
disagreement among third-party judges about whether a particular judge has violated the norms of
following precedent. Rather than have each private adjudicator decide on his own whether to "sanc-
tion" this judge by refusing to follow his precedent, it is helpful to have a "meta-judge"-a higher
court-who can coordinate this decision so that either all judges follow or no judges follow the prece-
dent.
233. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adju-
dications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004); Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Norma-
tive Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 783 (2004); Judith Resnik,
Civil Processes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 748 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds.,
2003).
234. See, e.g., BARBARA MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DfsTRIcr
COURTS 46, 63-69, 77-83, 111-18 (1990); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 953,980 (1990).
No. 5] 1117
HeinOnline  -- 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1117 2005
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
society. Better dispute resolution may mean worse dispute avoidance. Al-
though the optimal degree of precedent refinement involves weighing the
relevant costs and benefits, the existence of such benefits means that there
can be such a thing as too little adjudication.235
A second example is international adjudication. Ironically, as domes-
tic adjudication in many nations moves more towards private systems, the
recent international trend is to the creation of tribunals modeled on domes-
tic courts. Most academic commentary favors the trend.236 Eric Posner and
John Yoo, however, have dissented, arguing that a tribunal is more likely to
succeed in generating compliance if it is more like private arbitration. 2 7
They put the point in terms of the "dependence" or "independence" of the
tribunal, where dependence means the disputing nations must agree to hire
the particular individuals who adjudicate their dispute. By contrast, certain
international tribunals are more independent because they have permanent
members-judges-and a form of compulsory jurisdiction. The jurisdiction
is not compulsory in the same sense as exists in domestic courts because na-
tions must have agreed to accept jurisdiction and they remain free to with-
draw their consent. But because withdrawal requires advanced notice, ju-
risdiction is compulsory for a period of time. 38
Given the above analysis, I agree with Posner and Yoo's claim that the
dependence of international adjudicators, who lack the power of sanctions,
will enhance the rate of compliance. Their point is that dependence pro-
vides a particular incentive for impartiality. A dependent tribunal knows it
cannot get future disputes to resolve unless both disputants then consent,
and it cannot get both disputants to consent unless it enjoys a reputation for
impartiality. I would add to this that a dependent tribunal also has an in-
centive only to resolve those cases for which purely expressive adjudication
will generate compliance. As I explained in Section III.D, there are some
disputes in which an individual has a dominant strategy. A dependent tri-
bunal will not decide these cases because the nation with a dominant strat-
egy will not consent to a meaningless adjudication. But an independent tri-
bunal might decide these cases, incurring costs for everyone without
altering behavior.
Nonetheless, the analysis of this article reveals two weaknesses in the
Posner and Yoo position. One is that it is possible to generate compliance
even if the tribunal is independent (and even when it lacks the power of
sanctions), as long as the disputants believe the tribunal is impartial. Al-
235. Even in public adjudication, there is a danger that excessive settlement will undermine rule ar-
ticulation. See Fiss, supra note 222, at 1085 ("A settlement will thereby deprive a court of the occasion,
and perhaps even the ability, to render an interpretation.").
236. See, e.g., Laurence Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Suprana-
tional Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 387 (1997); Robert 0. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution:
Interstate and Transnational, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD PoLmcs 73 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds.,
2001).
237. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 87, at 17-19.
238. Id. at 21.
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though the desire to attract future opportunities to resolve disputes creates
one incentive to remain impartial, the absence of that incentive does not
guarantee that tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction are biased. As Posner
and Yoo acknowledge, there is an effort in structuring the tribunals to en-
sure their impartiality.239 Moreover, even independent international tribu-
nals must worry that nations will, over time, withdraw from the tribunal's
jurisdiction, as France and the United States have withdrawn from the ICJ's
"optional clause" jurisdiction.24 The threat of withdrawal provides an in-
centive for impartiality that is arguably equivalent to the incentives arbitra-
tors have to attract future cases. International tribunals are still a long way
off from having the independence of domestic courts with truly compulsory
jurisdiction from which individuals cannot withdraw. 241
There is a more serious problem. Even if Posner and Yoo are correct
that dependent courts are better at dispute resolution, independent courts
are more likely to excel at dispute avoidance. The factors that facilitate the
creation of useful precedent -explained above-include the factors that
make a tribunal independent in Posner and Yoo's terms: that participating
nations subsidize its operation, that its constituent judges are paid a salary
rather than by the number of cases resolved, and that a single institution
can coordinate the selection of a particular precedent. Posner and Yoo
themselves mention at one point that a centralized judiciary can better cre-
ate a "coherent jurisprudence, 242 though this observation plays no role in
their subsequent analysis and policy recommendations. They even observe
that the IC "is considered by many to have the final word on questions of
international law, '243 but do not acknowledge that this perception gives the
ICJ a unique ability to create focal precedents. Given the value of clear
precedents for avoiding disputes, it remains possible that any reduction in
the ICJ's ability to resolve disputes is more than offset by it enhanced abil-
239. Id. at 31-32. For the ICJ, for example, no state can have more than one citizen serve as a judge
on the 15-judge tribunal, but any state involved in a case that does not have one of its nationals on the
Court can appoint an ad hoc judge for that case.
240. Id. at 33-35.
241. Indeed, the right analogy here is between independent international tribunals and independent
domestic courts engaged in constitutional review. When the parties-in-interest include the executive or
legislative branches of government, even a domestic court depends on essentially voluntary enforcement.
As discussed above in Section IV.A, the court cannot itself "sanction" the executive or legislative branch
because it depends on the executive branch to enforce its orders and on the legislative branch to fund its
existence. Yet domestic courts still manage to generate compliance. The reason, according to recent
scholarship on the U.S. Supreme Court, is that the judiciary acts with sensitivity to how its decisions will
be received, mostly avoiding genuinely counter-majoritarian decisions that other branches might ignore.
See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L.
REv. 145 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX.
L. REv. 1881 (1991). One might expect the same sensitivity by the IC, which requires impartiality for
survival, both because nations will withdraw from its jurisdictions and ignore its decisions if it is perceived
to be biased.
242. Posner & Yoo, supra note 87, at 24.
243. Id. at 35.
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ity to avoid disputes."' Indeed, it is possible that the nations creating the
ICJ (and other such independent tribunals) are solving a collective-action
problem inherent in the creation of clear precedent. Cooperation here may
consist of sacrificing one's ideal dispute resolution mechanism as a means of
contributing to the public good of dispute avoidance.
In sum, besides the general importance of any mechanism by which
law induces compliance, there are several specific implications to the theory
of expressive adjudication. The power of adjudicative expression explains
the function of tribunals that lack the power of sanctions and legitimacy, of-
fers a way of viewing law and government as arising endogenously within a
system of third-party sanctions, and reveals an important trade-off in dis-
pute resolution and avoidance.
V. CONCLUSION
This article offers a "third way" of thinking about adjudication.
Where the two conventional theories of adjudicative compliance emphasize
threatened sanctions and perceived legitimacy, I emphasize the selfish in-
terest of disputants in correlating their strategy with the adjudicator's focal
signal. To reach this conclusion, I first identified how one's choice of be-
havior often depends on how one perceives certain facts and conventions.
Conventions arise from both intentionally created expectations-as where
two parties agree how to order their affairs-and unintentionally created
expectations-as where a population slowly settles on a particular equilib-
rium behavior for a given situation. Second, I identified how in either case
ambiguity causes conflict. The problem is not only uncertainty about the
facts, but also the inevitable fuzziness and potential incompleteness of the
expectations defining a contract or convention.
Expression resolves this ambiguity. There is a synergy among three
roles that adjudicative expression serves: as a device for correlating strate-
gies, as a means of constructing focal points, and as a signal of information.
When the relevant facts or conventions are ambiguous, an adjudicator can
resolve disputes by signaling his beliefs -which works by screening out stra-
tegic disputes with sufficient probability and then by providing a focal point
that creates self-fulfilling expectations for how the individuals will proceed.
When the ambiguity is conventional, the adjudicator's clarification of the
convention can set a precedent and thereby affect the behavior of parties
other than the immediate disputants. Thus, expressive adjudication can
both resolve existing disputes and, by articulating clear precedent, avoid fu-
244. Posner & Yoo also purport to measure the success of tribunals like the ICJ by the rate at which
they are "used" to resolve disputes. But this measure completely ignores the effect of a tribunal's good
precedent, which may prevent disputes by prospectively clarifying the relevant conventions. Indeed,
measuring use may make a tribunal appear successful when it is intentionally retaining unclear conven-
tions and ambiguating clear conventions. Because successful dispute avoidance decreases a tribunal's use,
while successful dispute resolution increases its use, the rate of use is not a good measure of a tribunal's
success. Id. at 32.
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ture ones. This analysis applies both in dyadic and multi-party disputes,
which includes (and frequently corresponds to) private and public disputes.
My claim for the expressive power of adjudication has a limited do-
main-situations of multiple equilibria where the parties, despite conflict-
ing over which equilibrium should prevail, mutually prefer to coordinate to
avoid certain outcomes. In practice, this tends to represent situations of po-
tentially self-enforcing contracts (modeled by the iterated Prisoners' Di-
lemma game) and situations where the parties both regard the continuation
or escalation of the dispute-as by mutual resort to violent self-help-as
the worst possible outcome (modeled by the Hawk/Dove game). Though
limited, this domain is significant and therefore the theory described here
reveals an important new way in which adjudication achieves compliance,
or more generally, of how law works.
In addition to offering a better understanding of legal compliance, the
power of adjudicative expression helps to explain various instances of sanc-
tionless but effective adjudication, from medieval Icelandic courts to mod-
em ADR, from international adjudication to judicial review of the actions
of other governmental branches. The expressive theory also offers a way to
understand adjudicative sanctions endogenously, as arising out of a process
of informal third-party sanctions. Finally, the expressive theory reveals a
fundamental trade-off between dispute resolution and dispute avoidance.
Looking solely at the expressive effect, the institution best designed to in-
duce the disputants to resolve their dispute is private, while the institution
best designed to create clear precedent is public. Where other mechanisms
secure compliance-such as sanctions -public institutions may avert the
trade-off. But where sanctions are unavailable, as in nonbinding arbitration
and international adjudication, the best institution for resolving disputes is
not the best for avoiding them.
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